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ABSTRACT
FLOOD OF MEMORIES: NARRATIVES OF FLOOD AND LOSS
IN TAMIL SOUTH INDIA
Aaron Mulvany
Lisa Mitchell
Legendary deluges such as those said to have over-swept the Tamil lands or the flood waters that appear in
popular religious and folk tales have long been a part of Tamil folk experience, and they serve as the
backdrop against which contemporary flood is experienced. In this light, this dissertation explores the
development and of disaster management policies in the Union Territory of Pondicherry from their origins
in colonial-era policies to the significant re-orientation that followed the 2004 Asian tsunami. Conclusions
are based on 14 months of ethnographic research in coastal fisher communities and government relief
agencies in the Union Territory. Historical data collected from archives and interviews with territorial
officials and NGO workers complement insights gleaned from extensive participant-observation and field
collection among deep-sea fisher populations in the former French territories of the Coromandel Coast.
Part one defines a Tamil “flood imaginary” by exploring myth-historic instances of flood in the Tamilspeaking region of India.

The study then examines flood in the French colonies of India during the 18th

and 19th centuries. Together these provide the background for better understanding the policies and beliefs
about flood in place prior to the 2004 Asian tsunami and the effects these had on preparedness and
resilience at both community and administrative levels.

Part two focuses on the ways in which these

affected how the territorial government and at-risk communities responded to the 2004 tsunami. Tensions
that arose between government and community post-tsunami are examined through the interrogation of
documents of agencies that undertook rehabilitation. ”Official” narratives of relief and reconstruction are
balanced against the perspectives of recipients of government and voluntary aid and the local panchayat
leaders who are agents of first resort for lodging requests and grievances. Through a comparison of relief
efforts taken within a single state, this research higlights the efficacy of an approach to disaster relief and
mitigation planning that appropriately integrates outside expertise with community metis and demonstrates
the value of policy informed by ethnography.

v

Table of Contents

List of Tables

vii

List of Illustrations

viii

Note on Orthography and Translation

ix

Common Abbreviations

x

Introduction

1

1.

A Flood Imaginary of the Tamil Lands

32

2.

The Colonial Foundations of Flood Response

62

3.

Intermezzo: Entrenched Regimes of Response

124

4.

Before: Problems of Memory, Problems of Response

181

5.

Rehabilitation: Discussions and Debates

242

Conclusion

293

Bibliography

303

vi

List of Tables

3.1

Karaikal monthly rainfall totals, 1950-1954

133

5.1

Comparison of key damage metrics, 1977 and 2004

257

vii

List of Illustrations
0.1
0.2
1.1
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
5.14
5.15

Urban fisher village abutting Pondicherry’s seawall
Natural Hazards, human disasters
India and detail of Coromandel Coast
Pondicherry at the time of the Dutch Invasion, 1693
Pondicherry and its enclosure, 1739
1694 Dutch Town Plan
Detail by Jean Deloche
Pondicherry and its environs, 1704
View of the Ruins of the Citadel, September 1762
Pondicherry Pier, 1954
Tsunami Memorial in Veerampattinam
Tsunami Memorial in Karaikal
Senkeni Amman Temple Foundation Narrative
Karaikal monument in context, looking north
Tsunami Memorial at Kanya Kumari
Tarangambadi Memorial
San Thome Memorial
FRP boats at Kuricchikuppam
Traditional catamaran
Vue des magasins de la Compagnie des Indes à Pondichéry
Syndicat Agricole, c. 1935
“Peculiar town-building plans” in Vambakirapalaiyam
Girod’s ville blanche
Northern edge of the old colonial center today
Sivaraman Imuldar’s building site
Same, looking east towards the seawall
The “approved road,” northern view
MP Nagar U-drain, looking north
Kitchen interior
Common room interior
MP Nagar, southern approach
MP Nagar, looking south
Ammankoilpet, Main Road
Water filtration facility
Shopping center
Health clinic

viii

04
11
33
67
72
73
74
75
104
129
138
139
139
143
146
148
148
189
204
233
234
269
272
273
280
280
280
287
288
288
289
289
290
290
291
291

Note on Orthography and Translation

In the following pages draw from sources in both Tamil
and French. Within the text, Tamil words will appear
following accepted orthographic practice in their first
incidence and thereafter appear in simplified roman
characters, e.g. Tamiḻ Æ Tamil, Caṅkam Æ Cankam. In a
few cases, where there is an accepted English spelling it
will be used throughout, e.g. catamaran.
French words will appear as in French throughout.
In all cases, inset quotes will appear following accepted
orthographic practice.
All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

ix

Common Abbreviations

AP
BAA
B.O.
CEE
CMFRI
CRZ
DFFM
DRDM
FY
GoI
GoPY
GoTN
J.O.
JPD
M.O.
NAIPRC
P&R
PIA
PMSSS
UTP

Annual Plan
Bulletin Actes Administratif
Bulletin Officiel
Centre for Environmental Education
Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute
Coastal Regulation Zone
Department of Fisheries and Fisherman Welfare
Department of Revenue and Disaster Management
Fiscal year
Government of India
Government of Pondicherry
Government of Tamil Nadu
Journal Officiel
Joint Project Director
Moniteur Officiel
National Archive of India, Puducherry Record Center
Department of Planning and Research
Project Implementation Agency
Pondicherry Multipurpose Social Service Society
Union Territory of Pondicherry

x

Introduction
In July 2009, a staff writer at the Tamil daily Dinakaran breathlessly asked, “Will
tsunami attack?” 1 The story was accompanied by four graphics detailing a solar eclipse
due to occur on July 22. The dire headline had been prompted by the recent publication
of Will History Repeat Itself: the Triple Eclipse of 2009 by D.K. Hari and his wife, D.K.
Hema Hari. The premise of the book was a simple one: the July 22, 2009 solar event
would be bookended by two lunar eclipses – one on July 7 and the other on August 6 –
resulting in a so-called “triple eclipse,” an event that the authors argued was historically a
presage of dire events. As Hari explained in a press release:
The first recorded triple eclipse in 3097 BCE coincided with
the Kurukshetra war. The destruction of the city of Dwaraka
coincided with another set of triple eclipses in 3031 BCE.
More recently, the first half of the 20th century saw the
occurrence of a series of triple eclipses between 1910 and
1945, which coincided with World Wars I & II, the
Holocaust and the nuclear bombings in Japan! 2
The article in Dinakaran cited neither the authors nor the book, relying instead upon
sensational graphics suggesting that the combined gravity of the moon and sun pulling on
the on the earth simultaneously could cause the tectonic plates near Japan to shift,
causing an earthquake that could in turn create a tsunami. 3
While media outlets across Asia noted the solar eclipse, few outside of India
commented on its lunar siblings or their astrological implications.4 Tamil and English

1

“Cuṉāmi tākkumā,” Tiṉakaraṉ (Pondicherry, India), July 14, 2009.
D.K. Hari, “Triple Eclipse Series to Begin July ’09: What does it mean for the world?” (press release, June
22, 2009).
3
Japan sits on the edge of the Eurasian plate, abutting both the Pacific and Philippine plates. Earthquakes
in this region are caused by subduction; the edge of one plate is pushed beneath mantle of the adjacent
plate. The resulting pressure eventually causes the subducted plate to “snap back,” forcing everything
above the plate – earth, water, etc. – to tremor with great force.
4
Newspapers in Australia, for some reason, seemed to enjoy noting superstitious reactions among
2

1

dailies in the Union Territory of Pondicherry all covered aspects of the triple eclipse. 5
The above mentioned article from Dinakaran, for example, included an inset titled
Vatantikaḷai, or “Rumors,” that described various beliefs about eclipse events: that
radios, televisions, and telephones should not be used; that no food or drink should be
taken; that work and travel outside of the home should be delayed. K. Sundaravadivelu,
senior scientific officer in the Union Territory’s Department of Science and Technology,
initiated a campaign over local radio and television to combat such superstitions. Similar
efforts were made across India. For example, Jana Vignana Vedika, an organization that
promotes science education and scientific thought, worked to dispel such beliefs in
Andhra Pradesh 6 while C.S. Shukre took advantage of his role as director of Bangalore’s
Jawaharlal Nehru Planetarium to reach a more national stage. 7 The reassurances issued
by Sundaravadivelu, Shukre and JVV only served to underscored just how widespread
such beliefs were, at least across southern India.
On the ground in Pondicherry, I read each newspaper report as it came out. As
the eclipse drew nearer I grew eager at the prospect of collecting field data about beliefs
linking astrology with more mundane concerns among the Paṭṭaṇavar fisher communities
with whom I was working. Against expectations, fisher folk in the hamlets bordering
Pondicherry town gave little credence to the rumors of impending disaster. “Nobody
here believes that,” I was told. Changing tactics, I asked if they remembered any floods
Hindus. See, for example, “Total eclipse of the heart of Asia,” Hobart Mercury, July 23, 2009; “Darkness
falls as a dragon‐demon swallows the sun,” The Australian, July 23, 2009; “Blind superstition and
devotion eclipse science,” The Age, July 23, 2009.
5
See, for example, “Jūlai‐āgasṭil 3 kirakaṇaṅkaḷ,” Tiṉatanti (Pondicherry, India), June 23, 2009;
“Āpūrvacūriya kirakaṇam,” Mālai malar (Pondicherry, India), July 21, 2009.
6
“JVV derides eclipse fears,” The Hindu, July 21, 2009, http://www.thehindu.com/todays‐paper/tp‐
national/tp‐andhrapradesh/article235090.ece.
7
“There is no need to fear a cosmic spectacle,” The Hindu, July 22, 2009, http://www.thehindu.com/
todays‐paper/tp‐national/tp‐karnataka/article235798.ece.
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coming into their villages. “Flood (veḷḷam) doesn’t come here,” they told me, looking
frankly baffled. Undeterred, I asked if they knew the story of how Kannagi had saved a
sand image of her beloved Kovalan from flood by embracing it, or how Poompuhar had
been swept away by the sea. “We know those stories, but we don’t remember them.”
Pressing on I started talking about how a local goddess had saved a nearby village from
the tsunami five year earlier, a story the fishermen in Veerampattinam had told barely six
months after the 2004 tsunami. That story they knew, but it was not until I asked in
another Union Territory fisher hamlet – Kilinjil medu, far to the south of Pondicherry
town in Karaikal District – that eyes began to light up with the recollection. “That didn’t
happen there [in Veerampattinam]; that happened here!” said an older fisherman. “The
sea came all the way up to here,” he explained, motioning me to follow him towards the
massive wooden doors blocking the entrance to the small temple dedicated to
Ellaiyamman. “The sea-water (kaṭalnīr) went up to there, and then it just stopped and
went back out again.”
Not everybody in Kilinjil medu agrees that the wave left the village after touching
the threshold of Ellaiyamman’s temple, but the ascription is an interesting one. Ellai is
the Tamil word for boundary, and Ellaiyamman is associated with protecting boundaries
and limens. In the Union Territory it is not uncommon to find a small temple dedicated
to the goddess in fisher hamlets, though they are rarely located at what might be
recognized as the boundary of the settlement. This is not altogether surprising for, as Val
Daniel has shown, the territorial limits of the Tamil village, the ūr, are less boundaries
than they are “frontiers.”

Unlike boundaries, which demarcate an external (and

sometimes dangerous) no-man’s land, frontiers are a part of the things they set apart: they

3

belong to the ur just as much as they belong to whatever is outside of it. 8
These were all curious turns. I knew that historically floods had occurred in the
Union Territory and logically that Pattanavar fisher hamlets, located at the literal edges of
the earth, would be most susceptible to coastal inundations. I knew from interviews
conducted in 2005 that the
Pattanavar community in
Veerampattinam

claimed

that their village had been
saved from tsunami by
divine intervention, a story
that

relief

workers

and

government officials knew
Illus. 1 Urban fisher village abutting Pondicherry’s seawall

of to be circulating, though

in their professional capacities none of them would admit the story to be anything but a
curiosity. Why was this story later appropriated by a handful of fishermen, not even a
full community, in a village 120 kilometers away from its source? What had happened to
traditions that narrated mythic floods in the Tamil lands, traditions that were known to
have survived and even thrived in the public discourse well into the twentieth century?
And what could possibly have been meant by the statement “floods don’t come here”
given that, even barring the tsunami, such a claim was demonstrably false?
The stories above begin to illustrate some of the ways in which narratives about
flood and disaster (Tamil, pēriṭar) are deployed in modern south India. Modern India is
8

See E. Valentine Daniel, Fluid Signs: Being a Person the Tamil Way (Berkeley, CA:University of California
Press, 1984), 72‐79.

4

still often portrayed as benighted by myth and superstition – as demonstrated by
Australian reportage on the triple eclipse and unfortunately reinforced by India’s own
scientific community – but such stories are also used by people to frame their own
communities in ways that often confound expectations. My central argument in the pages
that follow is that it is memories of disastrous events – personal, collective, and
institutional – that shape our understanding of, and expectations for, future calamitous
events. Such memories may or may not coincide with “the facts” of any given event, but
it is never unambiguous, recoverable facts that matter to individuals and communities
when shaping narratives of disaster.
The narratives discussed in the pages that follow store collective memories of
calamitous events, and these memories in turn organize the recognition of risk and
construct life worlds that define the natural environment in ways that minimize hazard for
communities like those of the Pattanavar fisher caste. The reality of hazard is minimized
by building villages in elevated soil locations that drain quickly, by using a style of
fishing craft that is easier to control in rough waters, and by supplicating god for
protection. Simultaneously, they shape their self-images with attributes of strength,
independence, resilience, and devotion. As Veerarappan boasted, “I have two arms.
They have always brought me back. I am a man, and there is god. This is all I need.” 9
Susanna Hoffman and Anthony Oliver-Smith remind us that, “[d]isaster exposes
the way in which people construct or ‘frame’ their peril (including the denial of it), the
way they perceive their environment and their subsistence, and they ways they invent
explanation, constitute their morality, and project their continuity and promise into the

9

Veerappan (fisher, Kuricchikuppam) in discussion with the author, June 2010.

5

future.” 10 Recognizing this is key to understanding how narratives of disaster and
recovery are constructed and mobilized by vulnerable communities.
The kinds of events that will be discussed in the following pages are often simply
called disasters, but what makes a “disaster”? Even if stakeholders can agree about what
constitutes a disaster, it is all too common to discuss disasters by bookending them as
events-qua-events. But even this assumes that we can agree on what constitutes an
“event” as a conceptual category. Establishing “disaster” and “event” as functional
categories is a matter of no small import. Naming an event “a disaster” has clear
political, economic, and even social ramifications; describing it as “an event” suggests
that it is discreet, terminal, something that has a beginning and an ending. To do this
changes how we interpret both causes and consequences.
Framing Events
To begin with the term “event,” what precisely do we mean when we say (or
write) that “an event” has occurred?

We might mean one of several possibilities.

Perhaps the fullest account of what constitutes an event can be found in the literature
discussing “performance events.” In the context of folklore, musicology, and related
cultural studies disciplines, for example, it has long been understood that such processes
are best examined within their contextual surround. 11 Stuart Blackburn has examined not
just the texts of such mimetic events but also the manner in which they are performed,
10

Susanna Hoffman and Anthony Oliver‐Smith, Catastrophe and Culture: The Anthropology of Disaster
(Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2002), 6.
11
See, for example Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books,
1973); Susan Wadley, “The Kātha of Śakat: Two Tellings,” in Another Harmony: New Essays on the Folklore
of India, ed. Stuart H. Blackburn and A.K. Ramanujan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 195‐
232; Dell Hymes, “Breakthrough into Performance,” in Folklore: Performance and Communication, ed. Dan
Ben‐Amos and Kenneth S. Goldstein (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), 11‐74; Richard Bauman, Verbal Art as
Performance (Rowley, MA: Newbury House, 1977).
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how performer and audience interact, and the performers' activities before and after each
event. 12 Recognizing a broader context of performance and drawing from ancient Tamil
poetics Sabarimuthi Carlos has suggested that the concept of munnam be integrated into
the study of Indian folklore, texts and performances. 13

Rooted in oral performance,

Carlos defines munnam as the liminal space between utterer and listener, constructing
performance as the relationships enacted between them. This space can be more or less
permeable depending on the kind of performance taking place, and it has interesting
parallels with the frontier quality of the Tamil ur – both part and apart – discussed above.
We often think of performances – concerts, plays, puppet shows, story-tellings –
as events with defined beginnings and ending, but when we expand our frame of
observation to include the munnam they become more than fixed objet d’art consisting of
a discreet text, an identifiable audience or constituency for whom it is performed, and a
particular set of mutable conditions prescribed by tradition. These kinds of events are
marked as being separate from daily experience, but despite specific mechanisms of
separation – the dimming of the house lights, the striking up of the orchestra – the
division between performer and viewer is not some stark boundary but rather like the
limen of the Tamil village: a slightly porous frontier that belongs in part to each side;
while it does not explicitly invite border crossing, it intimates it.
Other events, such as religious festivals, are woven into the fabric of daily life.

12

Stuart H. Blackburn, Singing of Birth and Death: Texts in Performance. (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1988). Blackburn brings the same concerns to his study of Ramayana shadow‐puppet
theatre in the Western Ghats of South India. See Inside the Drama‐House: Rama Stories and Shadow
Puppets in South India. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
13
S. Carlos, “Indigenous Concepts: The Study of Modern Ballads in Tamil,” in Folklore in Modern India, ed.
Jawaharlal Handoo (Mysore: Central Institute of Indian Languages, 1998). Carlos adds this concept to
those of akam and puram texts, described by A.K. Ramanujan in The Interior Landscape: Love Poems from
a Classical Tamil Anthology (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).

7

The annual mother goddess festival in Veerampattinam, for example, is celebrated every
July and is awaited with great anticipation. It begins on nālām veḷḷi, or “fourth Friday,” of
the Tamil month of Āṭi (July-August) and takes place over eleven days. It commences
with the raising of a ceremonial flag pole in front of the temple, called kāppu kaṭṭutal, in
the predawn of the Thursday before fourth Friday. This ceremony is performed to ward
off all evil that occurred in the community over the previous year, but it is the detonation
of two fire-crackers (Ta. veṭi) in quick succession immediately following the kappu
kattutal ceremony that announces the start of the festival. 14
For those in the town who await the annual festival, the event has begun only once
the firecrackers explode at dawn on fourth Friday. Examined from outside the rituals,
however, the veti do not strictly demarcate a beginning; several things must happen
before the firecrackers can even be lit. I have already mentioned the kappu kattutal ritual,
but even before this the priests conducting the ritual must first walk to the neighboring
village of Kakayanthope to receive a ritual blessing. This, too, is a performance, but it is
one that occurs without an audience, or rather the only audience members are the
participants themselves. But for those who must take part, this ritual properly marks the
beginning of festival. This is not to suggest that people actively contest the definition of
the festival’s beginning. They do not. Rather it highlights the ways in which the
definition of an event may well depend upon the perspective of the person defining it. If
disasters are definable as events, and I maintain that they are, when do such disasterevents begin, and how do we mark their ending?

14

S.B. Bharathi, Coromandel Fisherman: An Ethnography of Paṭṭaṇavar Subcaste (Pondicherry:
Pondicherry Institute of Linguistics and Culture, 1999), 211.

8

Framing Disasters
What, then, are disasters? The March 2011 Sendai earthquake and tsunami were
disasters – or were these two events only a single, complex disaster? Hurricane Katrina
in 2005 was also a disaster. So, too, was the 2004 tsunami that devastated the Indian
Ocean basin from Phuket, Thailand to parts of Indonesia to Sri Lanka and India and
beyond and serves as the foundation for the current work.

Such natural disasters are

often easy to frame, and as one examines the last century the list of calamities can seem
almost unending. But what of smaller-scale events: a tornado that affects a narrow
swathe of a single state, a chemical spill that evacuates a single neighborhood, a fire that
sweeps through a single factory? Unlike risk – which will be discussed below – the
definition of disaster remains stubbornly colloquial.

Everybody just knows what a

disaster is. But there must be some scale of diminishing return. At what point does a
disaster become small enough that it no longer accrues notice beyond the local?
The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), a non-profit
research center located within the Université catholique de Louvain and a collaborating
center with the World Health Organization since 1980, gives what is perhaps most
functional definition for disaster:
A situation or event which overwhelms local capacity,
necessitating a request to a national or international level for
external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event
that causes great damage, destruction, and human
suffering. 15
15

Regina Below, Angelika Wirtz and Debarati Guga‐Sapir, “Disaster Category Classification and Peril
Terminology for Operational Purposes,” CRED, last modified October 2009, http://cred.be/sites/default/
files/DisCatClass_264.pdf. CRED quantifies their definition using four criteria: ten or more people must be
reported killed, one hundred or more people must be reported affected, there must be a declaration of
emergency, or there must be a call for international assistance. Only one of these criterion need be met
in order to be entered into the International Disaster Database (EM‐DAT) maintained by CRED and WHO,
but it is worth noting what seems to be an extremely low mortality threshold.

9

Several things make this an apt definition. The first is that in order to be a disaster local
capacity must be overwhelmed. If a local administration is able to render all necessary
relief and rehabilitation following an emergency then a disaster-event has not necessarily
occurred. It has failed to garner need beyond local capacity. The second part of the
CRED definition is closer to colloquial usage – something that, when it occurs, causes
great damage, destruction, and human suffering – and this portion of the definition I can
accept unreservedly. I am not so confident about the final clause, for though disasters are
often sudden, they are not so often unforeseen. A secondary point worth consideration is
this: by this definition a disaster “necessitate[s] a request…for external assistance.”
Disaster becomes defined less by its immediate and material consequences than it is
defined by the sources of relief assistance.
To return to the former point, that disasters are “unforeseen,” disasters must be
recognized to be processes as much as they are events. 16 Natural disasters are as much
the consequence of decisions made as they are the result of uncontrollable meteorological
or geomorphic forces. Seen this way, disasters become the anthropogenic consequence
of natural hazards and their attending risks, where the hazard represents a threat – an
earthquake, a storm, a tsunami, a wildfire – and “risk” represents possible consequences,
like collapse, wind damage, flooding, and the like (Illus. 2).

16

Anthony Oliver‐Smith, “Theorizing Disaster,” Catastrophe and Culture: The Anthropology of Disaster
(Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2002).
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Illus. 2 Natural hazards, human disasters

A natural hazard operates against the physical and social structure put into place
over time by communities using inputs from available resources. The resulting disaster
occurs because of the interplay of natural forces with man-made decision processes: to
settle, to build, to expand, and so on. Communities respond to crisis in the first place by
dispatching available resources to relieve distress and rebuild damage. The community
responds in the second place by reconsidering their position in relation to the natural risks
inherent in the settled environment. Do they rebuild or resettle? If they rebuild, do they
rebuild to their prior state or do they “build back better” by taking into account a better
understanding of the risks and vulnerabilities gained through the experience and building
to mitigate them? Thus begins the process of long-term investment to re-establish the
physical and social infrastructures of the community. This is a simplified picture, but it is
meant to highlight the human inputs that go into natural disasters. The same process can
be used to clarify so-called man-made disasters as well, but it must be understood that
11

this kind of disaster is initiated not in the first box in figure 1 (the input of natural risk
into the built environment), but in the second: the development of technological risks at
the primary level of infrastructure development.
If we can accept, then, that disasters are caused by the actualization of risks
within/against a community, how are we to understand “risk”? William Rowe’s classic
definition of risk as “the potential for realization of unwanted, negative consequences of
an event” 17 offers a broad canvas upon which to paint risk. Sven Hansson, on the other
hand, notes no fewer than five separate definitions of risk in varying technical registers
ranging from the probability of unwanted events, to their cause, to the condition of
making decisions under such threats. 18 I will hew to a colloquial definition of risk closer
to Rowe’s: risk embodies those hazards that have the potential to cause harmful
consequences that may or may not occur. What is important to remember here is that
risks represent the possible adverse consequences of actions taken, much more in line
with agentive “to risk” than the subjective “a risk.”

“[Risks] do not simply exist,”

Hansson reminds us: “they are taken, run, or imposed.” 19
This perspective on risk is the foundation of the work of Ulrich Beck. In Risk
Society Beck differentiates between Old World dangers – what he considers “personal
risks” – and modern day risks that he perceived to be global dangers. Beck’s inversion of
the two words ‘danger’ and ‘risk’ can be confounding at first, but he labors to make the
distinction clear:
Anyone who set out to discover new countries and
continents – like Columbus – certainly accepted ‘risks’. But
these were personal risks, not global dangers like those that
17

William Rowe, An Anatomy of Risk (New York; Wiley‐Interscience, 1977).
Sven Hansson, “Seven Myths of Risk,” Risk Management 7(2):7‐17.
19
ibid. 9.
18
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arise for all of humanity from nuclear fission or the storage
of radioactive waste. In the earlier period, the word ‘risk’
had a note of bravery and adventure, not the threat of selfdestruction of all life on Earth….The risks and hazards of
today thus differ in an essential way from the superficially
similar ones in the Middle Ages through the global nature of
their threat…and through their modern causes. They are
risks of modernization. 20
Beck underscores this distinction in his later work writing that “humanity’s
dramas – plagues, famines, and natural disasters, the looming power of gods and demons
– may or may not quantitatively equal the destructive potential of modern megatechnologies. They differ essentially from ‘risks’ in my sense since they are not the
result of decisions.” 21 I would differ here from Beck: while the hazards (in my sense)
associated with natural disasters are less under our control than those associated with
technological disasters, their consequent risks are no less the result of human decisions.
To relate this distinction back to Beck, the threat (hazard) of seismic tsunami in the
Pacific Ocean is beyond our control. Nevertheless, the consequences of the Sendai
earthquake were made exponentially worse because of human decisions to build a nuclear
power plant in a location at risk from natural hazards. Secondary decisions to design the
Fukushima plant to withstand earthquakes measuring only 7.0 on the Richter scale22 were
based on risk calculations that determined larger quakes were too unlikely to justify the
increased expense. The risks from natural disaster were thus increased as a result of
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human decisions.
In reality, risk is a cultural concept shaped by the communities who must face it. I
would stress here that the construction of danger does indeed occur at the level of the
community rather than at the level of the wider culture, though there may well be
correspondences between the two. Risk does not reflect an objective reality but rather a
set of values that must be interpreted within their cultural functions. Organizations, too,
shape risk estimates around functional needs, what Raynor and Cantor described as a
“cultural model of institutional risk behavior.” 23 The perception of risk, in turn, becomes
the result of social institutions presenting risk to its constituents in particular ways.
Disasters as Social Motivators: The Bihar Earthquake
In her book, Creating Histories: Oral Narratives and the Politics of HistoryMaking, Wendy Singer marked July 3, 1939 – a day on which agricultural laborers
destroyed the immature sawai crop in protest of land laws – as a key moment in decision
process of the Maharaja of Darbhanga to cede some land back to local control.24 The
Tinkonma protest was a dramatic event that forced the maharaja to take measures he had
been avoiding. It is an event with a clear beginning, middle, and ending. But it is also
the punctuation mark on a much longer narrative.
On January 15, 1934, an earthquake struck India on the shared border between
Nepal and Bihar. 25 According to Singer, “the maharaja was inundated with petitions for
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rent remissions and support to rebuild devastated village houses, wells, and ponds.” 26
The maharaja responded to these petitions with positive relief aid, though often in
amounts that were criticized for being insufficient to need, and aid amounts continued to
be contested for the next two years. The press attributed the maharaja’s bungling to his
failure to contribute adequately to an aid program established by the British colonial
administration, as noted in the journal Indian Nation, 19 January 1935. 27 Government
aid programs had been in existence in British India since 1878, when the colonial
government began setting aside Rs. 1.5 crore annually for famine relief. Unused portions
were spent on the development projects meant to mitigate future famines, such as
improved railways to move food more quickly between regions or irrigation projects
intended to increase yield and protect against famine-inducing drought. 28
Earlier reforms, in particular the 1919 Mont-Ford Reforms, had devolved sole
responsibility for the collection of relief funds to provincial governments, such as the
maharaja’s in Darbhanga, and coupled this responsibility with fixed contributions to the
central Famine Insurance Fund administered in Delhi. In 1928-29 the Famine Insurance
Fund was changed to the Famine Relief Fund with the intention that all monies collected
would be spent only on famine relief. By 1937, with the introduction of provincial
autonomy, relief was again left entirely in the hands of provincial governments, since the
India Act of 1935 no longer had any provisions for a centrally administered relief fund.
The 1934 Darbhanga earthquake presents us with an interesting perspective on the
mobilization of relief aid because it straddles these two periods: central versus local
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responsibility for relief. At the time of the earthquake there was an expectation of aid
from the centrally administered government relief fund. Over the following five years,
however, responsibility was placed in the hands of individual provinces and monies
previously collected by the colonial administration were to have been returned to local
control. If the maharaja had not made adequate provision for the relief of his people, as
was reported by the Indian Nation, who then was to aid them in their distress? This
failure on the part of the local administration to dispense sufficient post-disaster aid was
later identified as one of the issues that contributed to the unrest that led to Tinkonma. 29
It is insupportable to argue in this example that earlier failures by the maharaja
could in any way be used to extend the duration of the disaster-event “1934 Bihar
Earthquake” to encompass the 1938 Tinkonma Movement. It does, however, point to the
ways in which human decisions are deeply implicated in the outcomes of natural disasters
often occurring years later. The maharaja could not have prevented the earthquake, but
proper management of disaster relief funds could have resulted in an improved response,
perhaps lessening the dissatisfaction of local agriculturalists, perhaps even delaying
preventing the unrest that led to the Tinkonma Movement.
It is also possible to read the inadequate response to the 1934 earthquake as
evidence of the maharaja’s perceived weakness, a weakness that was only confirmed by
his failure to suppress peasant agitation and his later capitulation by signing the Pandaul
Agreement in 1940. 30 What it clearly suggests is that the way a given event is framed is
as open to contestation at its conclusion as at its inception. But by explicitly raising the
question of who is responsible for post-disaster relief it also hints at the tensions implicit
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in the externality required by CRED’s definition of disaster discussed above. The British
colonial administration, having ceded responsibility to provincial governments in 1935,
effectively rejected assumptions later made by CRED that disaster necessarily requires
definition in relation to externalities.
But is it possible, or even necessary, to define a breakpoint between “the event”
and what might have been its eventual results? Taking our leave of Tinkonma and
looking instead to the literature on trauma, we are reminded that the effects of
generational calamities such as the Holocaust or a civil war can be very long-lived. It
would be difficult to argue that Holocaust still is, that is to say that it has yet to end, but
the psychological and cultural trauma it begat continues to have a powerful affect. 31 To
take another example, the civil war in Mozambique ended two decades ago and free
elections held in 1994, but its effects re-echo into the 21st century. 32 It is difficult enough
to capture either of these generational events within a single frame, but that is no reason
to assume that singular disaster events cannot also have equally long-lasting traumatic
effects. 33 Even the most ordinary event can be observed and understood from multiple
perspectives, thus narratives created from each subject position will be framed according
to the needs of a particular constituency.
Shahid Amin followed this course in his exploration of the February 4, 1922, riots
at Chauri Chaura, a moment in the nationalist history of India that he says later narrators
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have tried to elide or efface in various ways. 34 Recognizing a lacuna in the ways in
which historians have discussed nation and the nationalist struggle, Amin sought to
“interrogate the narrative strategies by which a people get constructed into a nation.” 35
His work not only highlighted the different ways in which a single event was framed by
various actors and audiences, but also the ways in which narrative framing changed over
time. And though his book is about a single event that occurred on a specific day in the
history of Indian Nationalism, his own narration of the event begins in chapter 2 with
Gandhi’s all-India campaign against the Rowlatt Acts of 1919 before quickly moving
through Gandhi’s 1920 train tours and the explosive expansion of nationalist fervor in
1921. This is not mere historical contextualization, however: the chapter is titled “A
Narrative of the Event.” Amin’s use of the indefinite article highlights that his is just one
of many possible narratives. Alternate narratives could simultaneously be used to make
sense of the event in ways meaningful to members of different groups, and none of these
must necessarily be intelligible to the others.
Framing the Extraordinary: The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster
Kai Erikson once defined a disaster as “an 'event' with a distinct beginning and a
distinct end, and it is by definition extraordinary – a freak of nature, a perversion of the
natural processes of life.” 36 It is “a sharp and furious eruption” that leaves terrible
destruction in its wake. Unlike my own view, Erikson’s definition effectively separates
disaster from its effects, leaving both to be conceptualized as separate problem sets. This
can be a useful distinction to make, but it can also obscure the processual nature of
34
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disaster. The catastrophic failure of a gas line at the Union Carbide manufactory in
Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, in 1984 tests our understanding of disaster-as-process because
the resulting disaster can be traced back to several causal factors which, had they been
addressed, could have prevented the disaster.
The company’s narrative of the Bhopal disaster is a classic portrayal of risk as
merely a function of physical or technical systems. In this construction – the same used
to explain the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in 1989 and the blow-out on British
Petroleum’s Deep Water Horizon in 2010 – accidents are seen to occur only because
components fail to perform as they are supposed to.

“Proximate conditions are

emphasized,” writes Kathleen Tierney, “and…[e]xplanations are sought in the design
details of system components, the immediate circumstances surrounding an accident, and
individual decision making at the time an incident occurs,” resulting in one of two
attributable causes: failures in the technical system or “human error.” She continues,
“what are typically not discussed are the broader organizational, institutional, and societal
factors that contribute to the incidents.

There is, in other words, a failure to

contextualize.” 37
Contextualization is precisely what the International Campaign for Justice in
Bhopal (ICJB) sought by providing the following narrative of the disaster, posted on its
website in August 2009:
Shortly after midnight poison gas leaked from a factory in
Bhopal, India, owned by Union Carbide Corporation.
There was no warning; none of the plant's safety systems
were working. In the city people were sleeping. They woke
in darkness to the sound of screams with the gases burning
their eyes, noses and mouths. They began retching and
coughing up froth streaked with blood. Whole
37
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neighbourhoods fled in panic, some were trampled, others
convulsed and fell dead. People lost control of their bowels
and bladders as they ran. Within hours thousands of dead
bodies lay in the streets. 38
It is not surprising that an activist group seeking accountability from Dow Chemical, the
company that has controlled Union Carbide as a wholly owned subsidiary since 2001,
would frame the incident in this way. Possibilities offering a more nuanced narrative
suggest themselves, but a story that begins “After years of budgetary parsimony and a
series of layoffs, Union Carbide found itself in late 1984 faced with serious quality
control issues,” lacks the compelling framework that lends itself either to outrage or to
memory.
The ICJB has continued to commemorate the Bhopal disaster annually during the
Global Day of Action Against Corporate Crime, at least through 2010, and claims the
support of activist groups in solidarity campaigns around the world. Though their work
has long focused on pressuring Dow Chemical and the Government of India to meet
Bhopali demands for justice, ICJB also harries Dow at every opportunity throughout the
subcontinent. In January 2007, Indian Express reported that ICJB protesters blocked
construction of a new Dow research and development center in Pune. 39 Later that same
year, student protesters at the Delhi campus of the Indian Institute of Technology forced
IIT-D to reject Dow's sponsorship of the upcoming GLS-8 conference. 40
ICJB frames its protests as commemorative acts, aggressive memorials that force

38 “Main Page,” International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal, accessed August 25, 2009,
http://www.bhopal.net/index1.html.
39 Vinod Matthew and Nisha Nambiar, “Bhopal tragedy comes to haunt Dow R&D unit,” Indian Express,
January 28, 2007, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/266053.html.
40 Pallavi Singh, “IIT‐D returns sponsorship of Dow for GLS‐8 Conference,” ExpressIndia.com, accessed
February 8, 2008, http://www.expressindia.com/latest‐news/IITD‐returns‐sponsorship‐of‐Dow‐for‐GLS8‐
conference/251500/.
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auditors back to events that took place over two decades ago. The Union Carbide
disaster lives on for the victims of Bhopal, though the event is long over.

Their

commemorations entail two propositional statements identified by Alfred Gell. First,
memorial implies that a particular turn of events was “capable of being otherwise.” 41 It
could have been different. Had Union Carbide behaved differently before the disaster,
the fatal release of MIC gas never would have happened. Barring that, had Union
Carbide behaved differently in the wake of the disaster, victims might have received
better care and many of the consequences of the disaster could have been mitigated. The
second of Gell’s propostions illustrated by ICJB’s commemoration is that the shape of
memorial entails an “opportunity cost,” insofar as the imagination of a particular past
necessarily implies the intentional exclusion (or forgetting) of all other possible pasts. In
other words, by disciplining our memories to recall a given event in a particular way we
necessarily exclude all other possible conceptual models of the “real” world.
As one might imagine, the narrative of the disaster maintained to this day by Dow
Chemical illustrates this second proposition well.
culpability.

The company still disavows any

In the first place, the incident happened to Union Carbide, not Dow

Chemical. 42 At the time Union Carbide tried to insulate themselves from responsibility
by conducting an internal investigation, which “discovered” that “the gas was formed
when a disgruntled employee, apparently bent on spoiling a batch of MIC, added water to
the storage tank.” This line was adopted by Dow after the two companies originally
41
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merged in 1999 and was published in a special commemorative issue of the in-house
newsletter “Around Dow” in the same year. 43 Dow continues to defend itself in two
exceedingly inept ways by saying that Union Carbide was not part of Dow in 1984, and
even if it was the leak had been the result of sabotage anyway. 44
Evidence, however, does not support Dow's framing of the event. Their assertion
that the gas leak was caused by sabotage was refuted by testimony given by the chairman
of Union Carbide, Warren Anderson, before a Congressional subcommittee on March 26,
1985. 45

In his own testimony before the Congressional subcommittee, Jackson

Browning, Carbide's Vice President for Health, Safety and Environmental Affairs,
reassured the public against claims of sabotage by saying that "the MIC tank line fittings
are colored-coded and that the water line couplings are incompatible with the gas line
couplings that go into the tank," making the kind of sabotage posited by Carbide almost
impossible. 46
Not surprisingly, these different narratives are dependent upon perceptions of the
dynamic of power between Union Carbide (now Dow Chemical) and the largely poor
residents of Bhopal. The residents of Bhopal blame the entire disaster on the company:
from the placement of the factory – which Bhopalis protested from the very beginning
because of its proximity to the resident population – to the claim that training manuals
43 June Hoo, ed., “Around Dow: Special Commemorative Issue” (Midland, MI: Dow Chemical Company,
1999).
44
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were in English even though few workers were English-literate, to repeated accusations
of poor maintenance and out-dated technology.
Michel-Rolph Trouillot has remarked that “history does not belong only to its
narrators, professional or amateur. While some of us debate what history is or was,
others take it in their own hands,” 47 This is an especially apropos comment in light of the
conflicting narratives about Bhopal. A kind of history has already been written about the
Bhopal disaster, and its merits have been debated by journalists, historians, even the
officers of Dow Chemical. 48 But history also belongs to those who merely carry it within
themselves, silent witnesses to events both remembered and forgotten. Shahid Amin
reminds us of this when he writes of Chauri Chaura that it is an event that “all
Indians…are obliged to remember – only in order to forget – as an ‘error’.” 49 In the
construction of nation certain moments belong to all. But so it is with disaster, perhaps
even more so. For of what daily consequence is a disaster to an historian when compared
to the effects they have on those who survive in anticipation of the next?
Framing Pasts and Futures
The subduction earthquake that began the disaster called the 2004 Asian tsunami
occurred just before 8 a.m. local time in Sumatra (1 a.m. GMT), but is this where we
should begin the story of the calamity that followed? None of the local catastrophes that
resulted – Phuket, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India – began at this same moment, except in the
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most existential of senses. The tsunami struck the nearest coast of Simueleu, Indonesia,
within ten minutes, but it took more than two hours to reach the coast of India, and much
longer still to affect the Maldives and the coast of Africa. If the wave did not strike the
eastern coast of India, for example, until two hours after the Sumatran earthquake shook
the ocean floor, when in time do we locate the event horizon of the tsunami? 50
Keeping our gaze firmly on the Coromandel Coast, we know that the wave did not
strike Chennai until two and a half hours after the initiation of the tidal wave, again at
about 8 a.m. local time. Does this mark the beginning of the event for this place? This
seems a reasonable conclusion at first, but as we dig more deeply into the particulars of
individual cases along the coast we find that it cannot be so simple. Residents in
Veerampattinam, the fishing village discussed above and located approximately one
hundred kilometers south of Chennai, reported a mysterious spring appearing in the
temple tank (kuḷam) shortly after 7 a.m. The sudden appearance of the spring filling the
empty tank drew most of the village inland to the temple to watch the strange occurrence.
By all accounts this occurred around 7:15 a.m. local time, 51 approximately one and threequarters hours after the precipitating geological event in Sumatra but still an hour before
the wave struck the Coromandel Coast. In the aftermath of the tsunami villagers were
quick to attribute the spring to divine intercession, crediting their remarkable salvation to
the grace and protection of god. 52

For this community in this place it is perfectly

reasonable to begin their tsunami narrative well before any waves ever struck their
50 In physics, the “event horizon” in the boundary in space‐time beyond which the events within a black
hole can no longer affect observers outside. Here I use the term similarly, but am interested more in the
other side of the event horizon, or rather the side of the boundary that defines the moment observable
effects begin.
51 Fisher group, in discussion with the author, June 2005, See also “A phone call saved an entire village,”
The Hindu, January 1, 2005,http://www.hindu.com/2005/01/01/stories/2005010107320100.htm.
52 Fisher group, in discussion with the author, June 2005.
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village. Doing so underscores the need to be able to define ‘event,’ understand how
narrations of an event can change in respect to munnam – or the interaction between its
narrators and its auditors – and finally be able to connect (discreet) events from the an
over-arching ‘disaster’.
Recalling figure 1, a natural event actuated emplaced infrastructures in the village,
both physical (the temple tank) and social (religious belief). This in turn caused the
human event, as it occurred in Veerampattinam. In other villages the first structures to
be affected were the physical structures of the villages themselves, but in
Veerampattinam our understanding of the event must be structured differently. This still
excludes any consideration of aftermath, just as Erikson’s definition of disaster would
have us do. But if our working definition of disaster includes destruction and human
suffering on a scale great enough to overwhelm local capacity, should not the event be
bounded in such a way as to include, or at least consider, its aftermath? Can we risk so
modest an appraisal of calamity when each such instance sets the stage for the next?
Consider it in the following terms: As the tsunami wave crossed the Indian Ocean there
were fishermen abroad at sea, but atop the deep ocean it would have passed beneath them
largely unnoticed, perhaps appearing as nothing more than an irregular swell. For these
arguably fortunate few, those who did not have to struggle for their lives against the crush
of water and debris as millions of cubic meters of ocean piled up upon itself as it rushed
into the shallow coastal shelf approaching the shoreline, there was no disaster until they
came home. For them, the catastrophic event called “tsunami” was all aftermath.

25

An Overview
The following study focuses on the Tamil-speaking Cinna Pattanavar fishing
communities of the Union Territory of Pondicherry, the administration that regulates
them, and the NGOs (aracu cārā amaippukaḷ) that responded with relief and
rehabilitation aid in the months and years following December 26, 2004. It explores not
only the narratives each of these communities maintain about themselves and their
relationship to post-tsunami recovery efforts but also how these narratives shape the ways
in which each community constructs its own history and expectations for their possible
futures.

These considerations are important for they will demonstrate the value of

ethnographic knowledge to development planning and post-disaster relief and
rehabilitation strategies.
By defining development in terms of western-styled modernity and disaster as
necessarily requiring external aid, organizations like the World Bank, the United Nations
Development Program, and CRED short-circuit both local mechanisms of coping and
recovery and ways of ethnographically coming to terms with these strategies by on-theground personnel. Relief and development mechanisms that “work,” that is those
strategies that have been effectively put into practice in parallel scenarios, are mobilized
without taking the time to consider how they will interact with local social or political
realities.
What I am absolutely not arguing for in an invasive anthropology that reproduces
the discursive formations of ethnographic science pursued in the first half of the twentieth
century, a period when anthropologists sought to rationalize the colonies in order to make
26

them more legible to administrators and more open to reforms. “If we accept that there
are evolved peoples and backward races,” wrote Algerian Governor-General Jules Carde
in 1930, “and that the general interest lies in raising the latter to the level of the former,
then the principle of colonialism is implicitly justified.”53 Twenty years later, André
Leroi-Gourhan and Jean Poirier wrote that:
Ethnology alone can serve as the valid basis for a policy.
Knowledge of its races, material culture, ways of life,
languages, family and political structures, religious beliefs,
the systematic study of psychology, are the very conditions
for action. 54
But Leroi-Gourhan and Poirier continued in a most interesting way, adding that “this
knowledge is now a response to obligations of an international kind…France has
committed itself to taking all necessary measures for respecting the originality of
overseas societies.” 55 These obligations are hauntingly similar to those expressed by
many contemporary western NGOs, and no less implicated in the critiques that style
development as a power discourse between developed and developing nations.
But a critique of contemporary, western-led development as a “power
discourse” 56 that merely replicates old colonialist imperatives about progress and
modernity does not diminish the need for relief and post-disaster development initiatives
to proceed with fuller cognizance of areas targeted for aid. Too often, external aid
projects rupture in the name of modernity local mechanisms that could and should be
preserved and integrated into more cooperative strategies of rehabilitation or
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development. Stakeholder input is key, but even where this is sought what is still too
often overlooked is any genuine attempt to understand how recipient communities
actually understand their environment and their relation to the political and economic
structures in which they are enmeshed.
In short, what has been lacking so far from international development aid policy is
the sense mutual intelligibility that allows each side – donor and recipient – to fairly
comprehend the other. If the interpellation of state-level relief and disaster response
agencies into international development bodies continues as it has started in the Union
Territory of Pondicherry (see chapter 5), future recipients of relief aid will lose all chance
of ever being full partners in the creation of cooperative rehabilitative strategies, being
reduced instead to little more than subjects of a global development-relief regime.
Chapter 1 explores examples of mythic and legendary flood in the Tamil-speaking
region south India. Borrowing from Charles Taylor’s concept of the social imaginary I
will show how narratives of flood and loss constructed a “flood imaginary” through
which medieval Tamil poets valorized and legitimized their royal patrons. Using a
process Sumathi Ramaswamy calls “labors of loss” these poets imagined for the members
of the Pandyan courts an ancient Tamil continent lost to the sea in a series of great
deluges. This history was later appropriated by Tamil nationalists at the beginning of the
twentieth century in an effort to more favorably measure Tamil history and literature
against the perceived hegemony of classical Sanskrit. Catastrophic flood became a
medium through which a great and noble Tamil past came to be conceptualized.
Chapter 2 shifts into the modern era, examining historical instances of flood along
the Coromandel Coast, especially in the former French territories of India. During the
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period of French colonialism in India, l’Établissement français de l’Inde, adapted local
strategies and created new mechanisms for coping with seasonal storms and flooding.
Excepting their hydrological infrastructure, the foundation of which was in place by the
middle of the eighteenth century, these strategies developed over the course of the
nineteenth century, each new occurrence of crisis response building on previous
mobilizations of relief aid. When the French finally left India, merging their territories
with the newly independent Republic of India in 1954, they left in place mechanisms of
flood mitigation and response that remained largely unchallenged for half a century.
I open chapter 3 with an examination of flood response in the last years of French
colonialism in the subcontinent. I then move to interrogate mechanisms of institutional
and collective memory before theorizing a subset of memory responsible for the
maintenance of specific narratives that equip communities with strategies that increase
local resiliency in the face of hazards. I will argue that memory of catastrophic events has
helped shaped the ways in which people have come to understand the government that
serves them as well as their expectations for future interventions in the wake of an
emergency. The chapter closes with a brief survey of the development strategies pursued
by the independent administration in order to examine how policies left in place by the
French combined with initiatives conceived as part of the Five Year Plans to create an
extraordinary response to a November 1977 cyclone. Key to this chapter will be coming
to terms with what I call “parcenary memory,” those memory forms maintained within
groups specifically for utilitarian, functional mobilization.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on understanding the contemporary narratives surrounding
flood, disaster and relief in the Union Territory. In chapter 4 I will examine how
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Pattanavar fishers on the Coromandel Coast conceptualize flood (veḷḷam), natural disaster
(iyaṟkai cīṟṟam), and their relationship to the sea (kaṭal). I will contrast the institutions of
Pattanavar memory with those of the government of Pondicherry in order to draw
together the several threads responsible for shaping certain beliefs about the French
administration that came to permeate the contemporary administration of Pondicherry.
These beliefs have come to have a tremendous impact on the ways that adequate and
efficient response to the 2004 tsunami came to be imagined. I will argue that by relying
on an outdated and demonstrably false understanding of the historical incidence of flood
in the territories the administration hindered its own efforts at long-term responses
following the tsunami.
Chapter 5 will explore these obstacles further by focusing primarily on housing
rehabilitation projects in the post-tsunami Union Territory. I will illustrate how the ways
in which flood hazard is imagined has had real world impacts on the success of
rehabilitation projects in the now six and a half years since the tsunami. In doing so I
will chart the development of an agency constituted for the sole purpose of coordinating
and managing post-tsunami rehabilitation in the Union Territory. This agency, called
PIA, was created under guidelines regulating voluntary aid societies, granting it
unprecedented freedom in managing its affairs.

In subsequent years, the utility of

existing outside the traditional hierarchies of governance have proved to be too tempting
to officials to dissolve the agency at the conclusion of its original three-year mandate. Its
proposed continuation points towards a new, collaborative model of disaster response in
which the state becomes permanently enmeshed in global networks of relief and
development politics. It is precisely in such circumstances that it becomes imperative to
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put into place strategies and mechanisms for recognizing and understanding local coping
mechanisms in order to better integrate the life worlds of affected populations into the
development schemes created to help them.
Several points must be stressed before moving forward. First, different groups
and polities maintain different narratives in which they maintain memories of particular
events. Second, these narratives differ based upon the communal and affective needs of a
given polity. These needs are not the sole reason that narratives differ from one another,
but this process does account for those differences that cannot be attributed to the ways in
which material experiences necessarily alter how an event is remembered.

Finally,

events so framed are always open to re-framing through dynamic processes of
remembering and forgetting, contestation, and discovery. As groups or communities
change over time, memories often need to be revised in order to better fit a narrative used
to support their altered position.
Gyanendra Pandey has said that events live on in memory as part of an
“undifferentiated eternal present, that is to say, the individual or community in, or to,
which this event occurs lives on in the present, almost unchanged.” 57

History, Pandey

maintains to the contrary, sees events as unambiguously remaindered to past, like a
foreign country “from which we have now moved away.” In the case of disasters the
former process creates the imaginary from within which a community can move into the
future; the latter often erects obstacles that hinder the conceptualization of effective, new
strategies for post-disaster rehabilitation. Both need to be understood in order to develop
response strategies that will serve vulnerable communities into an ever-changing future.
57

Gyanendra Pandey, Memory, History, and the Question of Violence (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Co., 1999),
24.
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-1A Flood Imaginary of the Tamil Lands
A legend inscribed on the walls of a small temple in the Pondicherry region of the
Coromandal Coast of southeastern India tells of a devout man named Viraragava. This
man was a fisher by trade, and he had settled on a dune between two rivers. One day he
returned from sea with nothing but an old log, but since he had caught nothing else he
decided to carry it home anyway, where he tossed it behind his house and forgot about it.
Time passed. One day, Viraragava’s wife went outside to fetch more firewood. Behind
the house she found the old log and having nothing else at hand she took an ax and
prepared to cut it into pieces. But when she struck the log blood gushed forth. Terrified,
she fled. That night, the goddess Ceṅgaḻunīr Ammāṉ appeared to Viraragava in a dream
and told him to place the log on the site intended for her temple. “How am I to find this
place?” he asked. “A cobra will appear to you, and you will place the log where the
snake goes to ground.” Viraragava awoke and waited anxiously for the cobra to appear.
When it did he followed and placed the log where the snake disappeared into the earth. It
was not long before the story of Viraragava’s dream was known for miles around and the
log quickly began to attract the curious and the devout alike. As time passed a temple
was built for Cengalunir Amman on the site, and the town which grew around her temple
came to be known by the devout fisherman’s name: Veerampattinam.
I begin with the story of Viraragava and Cengalunir Amman because the story of
my own research also begins here. The fisher village of Veerampattinam sits between
Cuddalore and Pondicherry, two small but important colonial ports, a bit less than five
hours south of Chennai via the East Coast Road. It is a broad, narrow, town flanked by
32

Illus. 1.1 India and detail of Coromandel Coast

the Chunnambar River to the north and the Ariankuppam to the south. In the center of
town, about 500 meters from the sea, stands a moderately sized temple dedicated to
Cengalunir Amman, whom S.B. Bharathi tells us is the local form of the mother goddess,
Māriyammaṉ. 1

1

See S.B. Bharathi, Coromandel Fisherman (Pondicherry: PILC, 1999), 205‐6. Much has already been
written about the aspect and nomenclature of Māriyamman in southern India – see, for example,
Whitehead (1921), Moffatt (1979), Good (1985), Sudhakar Rao (1991) – and much can be derived from
the various origin myths ascribed to her. Bharathi (1999) records the following in the Coromandel fishing
region under discussion: Siva once came down to earth in the form of the rishi Jamadagni, and he was
joined by his wife, Parvati, in the form of Rēṇukā, who bore him four sons. Jamadagni spent long hours in
prayer, for which he required a supply of water. Renuka brought him water from the river in pots she
shaped on its banks out of sand, a feat made possible by virtue of her great chastity. One morning, as she
bent over the waters to fill a pot, she saw the shadow of Gandarva, the messenger of the gods, cross over
her. Looking up at him she admired his handsomeness and felt a twinge of desire. Her impure thought
caused the pot she was making to crumble and she lost her chastity. When Jamadagni learned what
happened, he flew into a rage and cursed Renuka. He called his four sons together and demanded that
their mother be beheaded. The first three sons loved their mother greatly and refused to do this deed,
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Senkeni Amman, as she is locally called, is a fiercely protective goddess whose
protection can only be guaranteed through the regular and proper performance of puja, or
devotional rituals dedicated to the goddess. Among the Paṭṭaṇavar fisher subcaste in the
Union Territory of Pondicherry, Senkeni is unusual in that her puja requires periodic
sacrifices of blood, traditionally goat or chicken.

Her fidelity to the protection of

Veerampattinam was proven to the community in December 2004. On the morning of
the 26th, after the men had returned with their daily catch; after the fish had been sorted
sold and carted to markets across Pondicherry; as men mended their nets and their boats
and their engines and their wives went about the various duties of the household; in other
words, as daily life went on as it had for all the days, weeks, months and years that had
preceded it, a uncanny spring appeared in the cement tank, or kuḷam, located behind the
temple. Shortly after 7 a.m. water began to flow into the tank. As word spread through
the town of the inexplicable phenomenon crowds of men, women and children came to
the temple to witness the inexplicable occurrence. When a massive wave unexpectedly
struck the eastern coast of India around 8 a.m. many of the town’s residents had already

for which their father cursed them all and they lost their virility. Parasurama, the youngest brother,
finally acceded to his father’s command. Renuka fled and Parasurama chased her with a long knife.
Seeking to escape, Renuka embraced an untouchable Chakkilian woman. Enraged, Parasurama severed
both heads, fulfilling his father’s command. Pleading his filial devotion, Parasurama demanded two boons
from Jamadagni: that both brothers’ virility and his mother’s life be restored. Both requests were
immediately granted, but in his confusion, Parasurama placed the respective heads on the wrong bodies.
Seeing what had been done, that Renuka’s head now rested on the Chakkilian woman’s body, Jamadagni
refused to take back his wife, but he allowed her to earn food from the offerings of the people. Since she
has both a Brahmin head and a Chakkilian body she is allowed to receive both vegetarian and meat
offerings.
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gathered around the tank behind the temple, which was fortuitously located near to the
old bus stand on the main road heading inland. 2
In the days that followed the national press identified one man who had remained
on the beach instead of going to the temple to witness the “miracle.” Mani, a fisherman,
had been too busy completing repairs on his boat engine to take the two minute walk to
the temple. When he noticed the coming tidal wave he raised what alarm he could. He
called six women into a nearby boat, which was speedily washed towards the town.
According to a report published in The Hindu he then rushed to the locked shed that
housed the town’s public address system. Breaking the lock, he was able to raise a townwide alarm. 3 In a town of 6,200 people, most living less than 500 meters from the Bay of
Bengal, only one person in Veerampattinam was reported lost to the sea that day.
Whether through Mani’s quick thinking or Senkeni Amman’s fierce love, this fact is
remarkable along a stretch of coast that was devastated by the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami.
What is the relationship between these two very different narratives in this single
town, one of many affected by the 2004 Asian tsunami? Most of Veerampattinam’s
Pattanavars do not credit their salvation to mundane causes, preferring instead the
miraculous narrative of Senkeni’s intercession. “Whatever the scientific reason,” said a
former panchayat member in 2010, “people always say that was Senkeni Amman.” 4
Fishermen in villages across the Union Territory of Pondicherry have heard and continue

2

L. Ramamoorthy (linguist, Pondicherry Institute of Linguistics and Culture) in discussion with author,
June 2005.
3
Shonali Muthalaly, “A phone call saved an entire village,“ The Hindu, January 1, 2005.
4
Viswanathan (Pattanavar fisher) in discussion with author, July 2010.
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to tell this tale. Some not only accept the possibility of divine intercession but duplicate
the narrative in their own village. It is only when one takes a step back to the level of
NGOs and government officers working with affected and at-risk populations in the
Union Territory that one begins to hear more scientific or historical explanations for the
survival of the Veerampattinam.
In the following chapters I will explore the narratives depicting flood and loss in the
Tamil-speaking Union Territory of Pondicherry (UTP) on the Coromandel Coast of
southeastern India. These narratives can be broadly classed into binary types that can be
cast easily, if erroneously, as dialectics between divine/mortal, superstitious/scientific, or
backward/modern. By the former logic, one that will be explored in the current chapter,
disasters are caused by the actions of gods or the inactions of men, manifest in the failure
of right conduct or the failure to perform proper devotions. By the latter logic disasters
are still often imagined as existing out of the ken of man but they can be mitigated
through judicious combinations of policies and technologies. Catastrophes that may or
may not be become predictable by Providence become preventable by planning. But it is
not simply the case that divine or moralistic explanations for natural disasters are limited
temporally to a distant, unscientific past or to the edges of “modern” Indian society, what
Aravind Adiga has called “The Darkness.” 5 The belief that calamity is the result of
moral corruption is alive and well modern India. “Another tsunami will come because
men and women no longer act as they should,” a retired Franco-Indian air force captain
told me in 2009. He attributed the degeneration to the appointment of a woman as Prime

5

The White Tiger (New York: Free Press, 2008).
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Minister of France. 6 Women had taken control of the house, were prey to profligacy, and
even beat their husbands “ever since that woman was prime minister.” The result would
surely be a second tsunami, he affirmed, one that would “remind us who we are as
Indians.” 7
Come what may of the perceived immoralities of modern Indians in the twenty-first
century, the earliest mythic and legendary floods recorded in India were caused by gods,
but kings protected the people. Much later, historically verifiable floods were often
ascribed to the same causes while protection and recovery were reaffirmed as duties of
the king or of the sovereign state. Karikal Cola is said to have built nearly three
kilometers of earthen embankments to control the flooding from the Kaveri River around
Srirangam at Tiruchipalli. By the eighth century CE dykes were certainly being built
along the Kaveri – two branches of which flow directly through the modern UTP district
of Karaikal – specifically to prevent flooding. Sluices were built to act as spillways to
relieve excess pressure during flood and the tops of the banks were planted with grass to
mitigate erosion. 8

A later inscription dating from the reign of Kulottunka Cola (1070-

1120 CE) reads:
[A]nd since the king gave oral orders stating that some
lands be released – since the tank, full with water, was
spoiled with broken bans because of the storm – in order to
make the paving stone with the name Kulottunkacolan by
digging earth and manking fresh banks…I have donated the
garden land and the wet land in the hamlet of your village,
called Nettaipakkam. 9
6

Édith Cresson, appointed by François Mitterand in 1991.
M. Dayal (retired captain, Armée de l’Air) in conversation with author, March 2009.
8
Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, eds. Dying Wisdom: Rise Fall and Potential of India’s Traditional Water
Harvesting Systems (New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, 1997), 253.
9
G. Vijayavenugopal, ed. Pondicherry Inscriptions, Part II (Pondicherry: IFP, 2010), 157.
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By this order issued by Koluttunka and delivered to the village by a royal officer called a
cōḻkōn, the local assembly in Tirukkanci village resolved to assign the income of two
villages to repair a tank damaged by a storm and to use incomes from these same lands
for any future repair. The matter was important enough to be inscribed both at the tank
and at the temple. 10
Before narrowing our focus to specifically Tamil narratives of flood, it will be useful
to briefly survey several of the more well-known Sanskrit myths, as these were the first to
be translated into European languages and are still used to inform in some way many of
the discussions surrounding flood myths in India. Following this survey I will discuss
myths and literary allusions to deluge of the Tamil south, legends which Sumathi
Ramaswamy has shown to have long shaped ideas about flood and loss in South India. 11
As will be seen, both the Sanskrit and the Tamil corpus ascribe flood to divine causes.
Floods do not simply happen; they are made to happen. But man is left to deal with its
consequences.

Sanskrit Flood Myths in India
Indian flood myths became a subject of great interest to European scholars in the
early nineteenth century. The primary thrust of these early Sanskrit scholars was to
compare myths found in texts such as the Mahabharata, Bhagavatam, and the Puranas
with the Noachian myth of the Bible. Franz Bopp’s Die Sündflut nebst drei anderen der
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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
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wichtigsten Episoden des Maha-Bharata and Félix Nève’s “De l’origine de la tradition
indienne du Déluge” were two of the earliest examples from the first half of the
century. 12 Nève, considered now to be a minor Belgian Indologist, was the first to
seriously attempt to create a center for Indological study at the University of Louvain,
though only a single student of his Sanskrit lectures, Charles Michel, remained in the
field. 13

He was not, in fact, a philologist like Bopp in the strictest sense; he paid little

attention to Sanskrit grammar, etymology, or the comparative linguistics being developed
at the time. His two works on the deluge arose more out his interest in literary history,
religious appreciation and apologetics.
One of the oldest Indian flood myths is found in the Ṥatapatha Brāhmaṇa (1.8.1),
and is generally agreed to date in written form to around the first half of the first
millennia BCE, 14 though almost certainly existing as an oral tale even earlier. The story
is a creation myth identifying Manu as the scion of civilization in the subcontinent:
Manu was brought water for washing. As he washed, a
small fish came into his hands. The fish spoke to Manu,
saying that the smaller fish are the prey of the large, and if
Manu should save him, he in turn would save Manu. So
Manu put the fish in a pot and, in time, when the fish
outgrew the pot and was put into a pit, and finally
outgrowing the pit, Manu carried him to the sea to be
released. Honoring his promise, the fish told Manu that in
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Franz Bopp, Die Sündflut nebst drei anderen der wishtigsten Episoden des Maha‐Bharata (Berlin:
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a certain year a flood would come, and if Manu built a ship
in preparation for that time, the fish would return and see
that Manu was saved. The year came, as did the flood, and
when the water had risen Manu entered into the ship. The
fish swam up to him, allowed the ship to be tied to his horn,
and pulled it swiftly to the northern mountain. “I have
saved you, now tie the ship to a tree and descend the
mountain when the water recedes,” said the fish to Manu.
And thus was he alone saved from the flood. 15
Other versions repeated and expanded the general outlines of Manu’s tale in the centuries
following its appearance in the Brāhmaṇa.

Similar narratives appear in the

Mahābhārata, which is known to have reached a stable written form by the 4th century
CE, 16 and the Matsya Purāṇa, which probably appeared sometime between the 2nd and
4th century CE, though certainly no later than the 6th century. 17
An interesting variation to the common form of this myth can be found in the
Bhāgavata, Purāṇa which many scholars date to the end of the third millennium BCE,
though others recognize that its current form might not have been attained until as late as
the tenth century CE. 18

This vast difference in dating is meant to underscore the

essentially oral (and fungible) nature of the puranas. “Fundamentally they do not belong
in books,” wrote Ludo Rocher. 19 During this long life in orality Manu has been replaced
by Satya Vrata, the king of the Dravida. The king recognizes the fish as Vishnu, who
tells Satya Vrata that in seven days the three worlds will be over-flooded. He is told that
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a ship will appear to him and that he is to board it with all plants, seeds, and the seven
Rishis, and only in this way would he be saved for the next age.
Both of these myths – and many variations – are Sanskrit and predominately
locatable to northern India. There areother flood traditions in the sub-continent recorded
in its many vernacular languages, such as the Bhil creation myth discussed examined by
Wilhelm Koppers. 20 But it is the Sanskrit myths of Manu that attracted particular interest
in the second half of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth. Many
scholars, from the above-mentioned Bopp and Nève to Adam Hohenberger,
A.S.Vaidyanatha Ayyar, and Surya Kanta in early twentieth century were fascinated by
what parallels could be drawn between these myths and traditions found in the Middle
East and the Levant. Ayyar, for example, in a paper given to the Bombay Historical
Society, went so far as to suggest that the flood myth found in the Brāhmaṇa was the
originating legend, concluding:
The Brāhmaṇa account has been pointed out as the source
for the later Puranic versions of India; and the Chaldean
account has been noted as, in all probability, conveyed to
Babylonia by the Dravidians after Ayran civilization and
culture had made its way into Southern India. 21
There is no question that Puranic flood myths eventually spread the length and
breadth of India, where they became familiar if not ingrained in the fabric of the local
legendarium, while other traditions were quite limited in their spread, such as the creation
myth of the central Indian Bhils noted above. I raise these myths not only because of
their ubiquity across the sub-continent, but also because the Sanskrit corpus of flood
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myths stands in stark contrast to another mythic tradition, one that concerns the present
study greatly.

Tamil Mythic Flood and the Caṅkam Tradition
Tamil possesses its own body of ancient literature, the corpus of Cankam
literature, which contains flood myths distinct from those found in Sanskrit. Legends
found in medieval sources mention three great Cankams, or poet academies, that date
back thousands of years. These academies, according to sources discussed below, were
credited with producing the great works of Tamil prosody known to exist during the first
millennium CE. The mythic sage Agastya was said to have written the first Tamil
grammar, Akattiyam, during first Cankam in Old Madurai; the first still extant grammar,
Tolkāppiyam, is said to have been produced during the Middle Cankam held at
Kapāṭapuram, 22 while all other texts – such as the Eṭṭutokai, or the Eight Anthologies –
were assigned to members of the third academy. The earliest text on Tamil prosody is
the Ceyyuḷiyal, the eighth chapter of the third part of Tolkappiyam, which dates to the
second century CE, 23 which falls into line with the majority of evidence that suggests that
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most of these texts were produced between the first and third centuries CE. 24 Whatever
their actual age, these texts fed into the newly invigorated Dravidian and Tamil
nationalist movements that gained momentum after the turn of the twentieth century and
were increasingly used to try to circumscribe an ancient Tamil tradition meant to rival
classical Sanskrit. It became tremendously important in the first decades of the last
century to define not just this tradition but also the geo-political region within which it
was fostered and supported, so-called Tamiḻākam, or the Tamil lands. Understanding
how this region was defined and delimited, not just by Cankam poets but by later Tamil
nationalists, is key the ways in which catastrophic flood came to be understood in the
Tamil regions of southern India.
Since the discussion to follow will treat specifically the loss of Tamilakam to
multiple catastrophic deluges called kaṭalkōḷ (kaṭal = sea, kōḷ = to seize), it will serve us
to first examine what region the term was thought to define.

Vaṭa vēṅkaṭa teṉ

kumari/āyiṭait/tamiḻ kūṛum nal ulakattu: “Between Venkata in the north and Kumari in
the south, is the good earth where Tamil is spoken.” So says Paṇampāraṇār in his
preface to Tolkappiyam. 25 A somewhat more expansive definition is found in the treatise
Kākkaippāṭiṇiyam, offered by David Buck and K. Paramasivan in The Study of Stolen
Love, states:
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In the north and the south, the west and the east,
Venkatam, Kumari, and the sweet-water seas:
The range of a book lies within these four bounds
When one expounds with clarity. 26
These boundaries became important in the early decades of the twentieth century as
various Tamil scholars attempted to establish an ancient Tamil culture worthy to rival the
dominant classical Sanskrit culture in the north.
The first Cankam text to be made available in print was Kaḷaviyal Iraiyaṉār
Akapporuḷ, published by Damodaram Pillai in 1883, though the first critical edition –
complete with Nakkiraṉār’s later commentary and based on the comparison of extant
manuscript copies – was not published until well into the twentieth century. 27 In his
commentary, almost certainly written in the eighth century CE, 28 Nakkiranar uses both
Tolkappiya and Kakkaippaṭiniyam passages cited above to conclude that the Tamil lands
encompassed what are now Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Within this land, he wrote, “the
Pandyan kings instituted the three Cankams, the Premiere Cankam, the Middle Cankam,
and the Final Cankam.” 29

The commentary described the first Cankam as having

endured for 4,440 years under the patronage the 89 Pandyan kings from Kāyciṇavaḷuti to
Kaṭunkōṇ; 4,449 people presented poems, including Akattiyanar, seven Pandyan kings,
and Lords Siva, Murukan, and Kubera. His description ends with a geographical note:
“The Madurai that the sea claimed is where they held their sessions and researched into
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Tamil, they say.” 30 The second Cankam, kept at Kapatapuram by the fifty-nine Tamil
kings from Celiyan to Tirumaran the Lame, lasted for 3,700 years and produced the
grammar Tolkappiyam.
The transition between the second and third Cankam presents us with an
interesting moment. Nakkiranar closes his commentary of the Middle Cankam with a
much more equivocal statement than that used to describe the end of the Premiere
Cankam: “Perhaps the sea took Tamil Nadu then as well.” 31 While firmly asserting that
the last royal patron of the second Caṅkam was Tirumaran the Lame, he hedges
somewhat regarding the absolute causes for the academy’s end. In listing the patrons
who maintained the Final Cankam – whose sessions and research were conducted in the
city of Upper Madurai, which today is understood to be modern Madurai – Nakkiranar
names “Tirumaran the Lame, whom the sea took, to Ukkira-p-Peruvaluti.” 32
Several things stand out from Nakkiranar’s description. The first is that there is
already, for the modern reader, a clearly mythic component to the history of the
Cankams. Were we to take the commentator at his word, we would be treating a lineage
of Pandyan kingship that extended back in time to more than five millennia before any
evidence of a highly developed civilization exists anywhere in the subcontinent, let alone
in the far south. 33 A second mythic component of Nakkiranar’s history is the claim that
the gods themselves – namely Siva, Murukan, and Kubera – took part in the first studies
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of Tamil grammar and poetics. The only named text claimed by Nakkiranar to have
survived in any form from this mythically distant time is the Akattiyam of Agastya
(Akattiyar in Tamil), and even this text is only attested to by allusions to his (now lost)
grammar and a handful of sūtras attributed to him quoted by later commentators and
grammarians. 34
A second fact that leaps out at the reader is the certain claim that a city named
Madurai was “claimed” by the sea and that a second city, Kapatapuram, might have been
over-flooded by deluge as well. Nakkiranar seems less certain on the fate of this second
capital, Kapatapuram, though he names without qualification the sovereign who oversaw
transition between the Middle and Final Caṅkams: “Tirimaran the Lame, whom the sea
took.” It was this last intimation that was seized upon by his successors and, more
importantly, by those in the early twentieth century motivated by ideas of an ancient
Tamil heritage, a pure Tamil language, and a lost Tamil continent.
According to G. Vijayavenugopal, epigrapher at the École Française d’Extrême
Orient (EFEO) in Pondicherry, the Kalaviyal is the only Cankam text to mention a deluge
sweeping away parts of Tamilakam, an opinion seconded by Thomas Lehmann. 35 What
is particularly interesting in the account given by Nakkiranar is the use of the quotative
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‘eṉpa’ (modern eṉṛu), or “they say,” throughout the passage on the three Cankams, for
example:
avaruḻ/talaiccaṅkam eruntār
akattiyaṉārum
tirupuram eritta viricaṭaik kaṭavuḻum
kuṉaṟṟenta murukavēḻum
muriñciyūr muṭinākarāyarum
nitiyiṉ kiḷavaṉum/eṉa ittoṭakkattār
aiññūṟṟu nāṟpattoṉpatiṉmar/
eṉpa 36
They say that five hundred and forty-nine people
participated in the Premiere Sangam, including Akattiyanar
[a disciple of Agastya], [Lord Siva], Lord Murugan…[Lord
Kubera] and others.
Avargaḻaic caṅkam irī iṉār
kāyciṉavaḷuti mutalāka
kaṭuṅkōṉ īṟāka
eṉpattoṉpatiṉmar
eṉpa
They say eighty-nine kings, from Kaycinavaluti to
Katunkon, established the [Premiere] Sangam.
Avar
caṅkam irunta tamiḷ ārāyntatu
kaṭal koḻḻappaṭṭa maturai
eṉpa
The Cankam where Tamil was studied [was] at Madurai
that the sea claimed, they say.
It is instructive to compare instances where the quotative marker is not used, as when he
writes of the second Cankam:
36
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avar
caṅkamirunta tamiḷ ārāyntatu
kapāṭapurattai
eṉpa
akkālattaip pōlum/pāṇṭiya nāṭṭai kaṭal koṇṭatu
They say Kapatapuram is the city in which the second
Cankam researched into Tamil. Like that time the sea took
Pandya Nadu as well.
While there appears have been what amounted to a legendary traditional among Tamil
poets that spoke of three great academic gatherings under the patronage of Pandyan kings
nearly from time immemorial and a myth that said the first Cankam might have been
destroyed by the sea, the same uncertainty does not seem to exist as regards regard the
second Cankam. Nakkiranar follows oral tradition regarding the Premiere Cankam:
“Madurai that the sea claimed, they say.” Tradition, it seems, was more certain regarding
the second academy, presided over by Tirumaran the Lame, “whom the sea took,” who
was both the last patron of the Middle Cankam and the first patron of the Final Cankam.
This narrative was mobilized by medieval Tamil poets as what Sumathi
Ramaswamy has called “labors of loss.” Labors of loss are “those disciplinary practices,
interpretive acts, and narrative moves which declare something as lost, only to ‘find’
them through modernity’s knowledge protocols, the very act of discovery and naming
constituting the original loss.” For Ramaswamy, these lost places “do not exist as such
in our life-worlds.” Rather they are called into being, the “product and outcome” of our
labors of loss. 37 In constructing an ancient Pandyan life-world lost to the sea poets in the
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courts of the Pandyan kings sought to legitimize their patrons by linking them to the
noble history of the study and patronage of the “good tongue,” the Tamil language.
Although it is a difficult proposition to ascribe processes of memory-making to
authors separated from us by well over a millennium, it is not unlike the argument
forwarded by Dutch philologist Herman Tieken. In his book, Kāvya in South India,
Tiecken posits that Sangam literature amounts to little more than invented tradition
perpetrated in the ninth or tenth century CE by a poet or poets belonging to the Pandyan
court seeking to create a “classical” Tamil literary tradition capable of rivaling the
Sanskrit. 38

Although both his method and his core conclusion have been roundly

criticized, 39 Tieken inadvertently raises an important question about the authors of the
texts attributed to the Sangam era, namely: if Nakkiranar’s is the only commentary that
directly reference a deluge that destroyed ancient Tamilakam and all other references are
oblique at best, what was the purpose of suggesting to their audience that some poorly
defined mass of the Tamil lands was swept away by a great flood? What result was
desired and was such a result achievable?
There is little doubt that Pandyan kings sought to establish undisputed links
between themselves and an ancient Tamil tradition. Such claims were de riguer for
kingship in the subcontinent in the first millennium CE. In the northern kingdoms,
Brahmin priests were typically utilized to legitimize claims of sovereignty.
Vedic/Brahman-lead forms of Hindu worship were notably more absent in the south, and
38
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the Pandyan control of the Tamil south was being re-established concurrently with the
rise of bhakti forms of worship in the eighth century CE. Nevertheless, it remained
useful, if not necessary, to establish claims of sovereignty based on ties to a (real or
imagined) historical past.
Just using Tieken’s own examples it quickly becomes clear that Pandyan kings
did indeed seek to establish claims of legitimacy through the patronage of a Tamil literary
tradition. In the Larger Sinnamanur Copper Plate Grant, for example, one of the king’s
ancestors is said to have “corrected and investigated the brilliant Tamil language along
with the Sanskrit, thus becoming the foremost among the learned,” and again, according
to the Davalaypuran inscription, to have “studied Tamil with the help of the Akattiyan
(the Tamil grammar of Agastya)” and “having founded Madurai in the south, set up there
a good cankam…[which] caused Tamil to flourish.” 40 Tieken unfortunately draws the
wrong conclusion from these lines, partly through incorrect translation. 41 What should
be clear is that there was a deliberate effort to link the Pandyan line to an already extant
Tamil literary tradition that kings studied with the help of Agattiyar’s grammar, in other
words, the Cankam.
Serendipitously for Tamils in the south reacting against both British and
Hindustani hegemony in the dying years if the nineteenth century, the rediscovery of
these earliest of Tamil texts followed on the heels of a series of scientific events that led
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to several momentous conclusions.

In an 1864 essay titled “The Mammals of

Madagascar”, Philip Sclater noted a zoological oddity: “while 30 different species of
Lemurs are found in Madagascar alone, all of Africa contains some 11 or 12, while the
Indian region has only 3.” 42 He suggested as an answer to this conundrum that “some
land-connection must have existed” between Madagascar and the subcontinent upon
which the progenitors of modern lemuridae had flourished during the Mesozoic. But as
Ramaswamy has demonstrated, Sclater was not the first nineteenth century man of
science to suggest a submerged Indian Ocean continent. Five years earlier, in 1859,
Alfred R. Wallace read a paper before the Linnean Society in London in which he
attributed anomalous fauna in the Celebes to a sunken continent. The following year
Wallace’s English contemporary, Searles V. Wood, hypothesized an erstwhile southern
continent to explain certain biological and geological curiosities across the Indian and
Pacific Oceans. Long before either of these men, the French natural historian Etienne
Geoffrey Saint-Hillaire posited that Madagascar had once been part of a “fourth
continent” that was “much more different from Africa, which lies so near to it, than from
India, which is so far away.” 43
The second event was the completion of the H.M.S. Challenger’s four-year
project to survey of the Atlantic flood between 1876.

The scientific team on the

Challenger uncovered a fascinating and vast network of underwater ridges and valleys
that the Victorian imagination quickly to ascribe to ancient civilizations long submerged
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under the ocean and described by such worthy ancients as Plato. “Science,” wrote
Madame Blavatsky, “has finally accepted…and thus vindicated the truth of one more
fable.” 44 And while it is true that by the end of the nineteenth century no scientific
survey had revealed on the ocean floor the same phenomena found in the Atlantic,
theories of diffusion were rife in scholastic fields as diverse as biology and folklore. The
lemur was proof enough for many that the African continent and the Asian had at one
time been connected.
Dravidianists gleefully leapt on the findings of the Challenger as confirmation of
the handful of vague lines written a thousand years before. The limits of post-deluge
Tamilakam had never been in question; both Tolkappiyam and Kakkaippaṭiniyam agreed
on its boundaries. Its northern boundary was the Venkata Hills, due west of Pulicat Lake
near Tirupati, now in Andhra Pradesh; its southern border was Kumari, the southernmost
tip of the subcontinent. Everything in between was the “the range of the book,” “the
good earth where Tamil is spoken.” 45 Further confirmation, and perhaps even the source,
of this conclusion appeared in Puṛanāṉūṛu, one of the earliest Sangam texts that have
come down to us. Verse six states teṉā atu urukeḻu kumariyiṇ teṛkum, “there in the south
appears Kumari,” 46 and again in verse seventeen:
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teṉkumari vaṭa peruṅkal
kuṇa kuṭa kaṭalā vellai,
kuṉṛu malai kāṭu nāṭu
oṉṛu paṭṭu vaḻi moḻiyaga
Southern Kumari, northern mountains
eastern [and] western seas bright,
hills, mountains, forests, pasture,
are the lands of [Tamil] language.
But it remained unclear precisely what had been lost to the deluges Nakkiranar claimed to
have swept away the Pandyan courts at Madurai and Kapatapuram.
Taking on the vexed issue of the confines of “Pre-Deluge Pandinad,” S.S. Bharati
attempted to define, once and for all, the extent of the territory described by Nakkiranar
in his commentary on the Kalaviyal. His argument focused primarily on the relative
placement of the rivers Pahruli and Kumari, both of which were mentioned in Cankam
texts. It should be noted that in none of the lines quoted above, many of which are cited
by Bharati, is it made clear that Kumari, the southernmost cape of India, is a river and not
a coastal marker. Bharati labors mightily, however, to establish the riverine character of
Kumari, quoting first Sikandiar, then Ilango Adigal 47 :
vēṅkaṭam kumari tīmpuṇaṛ pauvameṇ
ṛināṇkellai tamīḻ atuvaḻakkē
pa/ṛuḷiyāṛṛuṭaṉ paṇmalaiyaṭukkattuk
kumarik kōṭuṅ koṭuṅkaṭal koḷḷa
Vekatam, Kumari, and sweet-water seas,
Are the four borders within which Tamil is spoken,
The great sea having taken [the] Kumari
Hills [together] with [the] Pahruli River…
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Bharati draws heavily from the corpus of Cankam texts, first to establish the boundaries
of Pandinad, the lands of the Pandya kings, then to argue for the geographical placement
of the river Pahruli to the north of the river Kumari, a topographical feature that is not, he
concludes, to be understood as contiguous with Cape Cormorin/Kanya Kumari. 48
Bharati never questions the veracity of the Cankam poets regarding the story of
the lost regions of Pandinad. He quotes Aṭiyārkkunallār’s 13th century commentary on
the beginning of the Venirkatai of Cilappatikāram – which in its turn drew evidence from
Nakkirinar – to delineate these lands:
At the close of the first or primary period, in the south
(submerged) Madura City, 89 Pandya Kings successively
upheld the 1st Tamil Academy. Of these only seven
sovereigns passed muster as authors and took rank as
Sangam-poets themselves, of whom Jayamakirti Nilantharu-tiruvil-pandyan was one.
In his court was
Tholkappiyam first ushered in [sic]. At that time in their
(Pandya’s) country occurred the destructive deluge that
submerged a vast territory comprised of about 48 countries
or districts and many other tracts besides; and all this lost
land lay between the river Kumari and the river Pahruli
which latter river was the northern limit of the southern
province of the then extant Kingdom of the Pandyas. As all
these were then lost in the sea-swell, the author Ilango here
referred to Kumari sea instead of the old Kumari river as
the southern boundary. 49

48

This is to say that Kanya Kumari does not represent the northernmost bank of an ancient river also
named Kumari, as might seem a logical conclusion given the documentable incursion of sea waters on
coastal lands over time. For comparison’s sake, several older fishermen in Veerampattinam told me
anecdotally that encroachment by the sea on the shoreline during their lifetimes has been as much as fifty
meters in some places. Nevertheless, the kind of encroachment necessary to erase an entire river running
parallel to the coast, and very nearly the memory of it as well, would likely take thousands of years.
Notably, several other fishermen claimed that the sea has, in fact, retreated not advanced since their
childhoods.
49
S.S. Bharati, “Pre‐Deluge Pandinad,” 75.

54

Every description of the mythic Pandyan deluge that has come down to us takes this same
general shape and all seem to be based on Nakkiranar’s Kalaviyal commentarial ur-text.
There is, of course, no way to know what other versions might have existed and been lost
to time, nor how prevalent this flood narrative was in his time, but given the tradition of
oral poetry and transmission that existed across India and dated even before the Common
Era, 50 it is unlikely that Nakkiranar imagined the deluge scenario out of whole cloth.
Not all Tamil flood myths, however, concern themselves only with loss. It was
often the case that (quasi-)divine forces were instead responsible for preventing or
turning back a disastrous flood. On such story, contained in the Cikāḷittalapurānam of
Aruṇācalakkavirāyanar narrates how Siva, “the First Principle,” was the sole survivor of
universe annihilating deluge. In order to remake the world, he made the praṇava, “which
is the sound of the Vedas,” into a boat (tōṇi). Siva entered into the boat with Umā and
sailed the waters until they found a shrine “standing as firm as dharma.” Declaring it to
be the root of the world, he remained there in his boat. When the guardians of the
quarters found him there they cried out, “He has dried up the waters with his third eye!”
The lord of the sea, Varuna, then came there to worship “the god who saves those without
egoism from the sea (of rebirth).” 51
This story introduces several concepts important in both flood myth and the Tamil
flood imaginary. In the story the town of Cikali, which is also called as Tōṇipuram or the
city of the boat, is given its provenance. Siva, too, is provided with an explanation for
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one of his common appellations, Tōṇiyappar, the boatman, a form of the Siva of especial
importance to Pandyan mythology. 52 Vaishnavite bhakti tradition tells of the infant
Krishna surviving the final flood on a banyan leaf. Other stories make the earth a consort
of Vishnu, and images carved in the edifices of Mahabalipuram show her in his embrace,
recovered from the flood by his will alone. Still others tell of how Krishna prevented the
deluge from over-sweeping the earth in the first place by casting his javelin into the
ocean depths.
Versions of these stories also circulated in which kings rather than gods acted as
savior. Just as the Dravida king, Satya Vrata, took the place of Manu in later Sanskrit
flood myths, the first Pallava king, mirroring the infant Krishna, was said to have arrived
in India from Southeast Asia after a shipwrecked Pallava sailor married a Naga princess
and sent the offspring of their union across the sea on a toṇṭai, or creeper vine. Vadimbu
Allamba Pandya is said to have prevented the onslaught of the sea with his foot, while
other Ukkirapandiyan is credited with the Krishna-like feat of drying the oceans with a
javelin’s throw. 53 In a possibly related myth, the Chera king Cenkuttuvan – perhaps best
known for the portrayal of life in his court given in Cilappatikaram – is given the epithet
kaṭal piṟakk oṭṭiya ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ, “Cenkuttuvan who drove back the sea.” He, too, lifted
his spear against the sea, but the even the medieval commentary suggests that this is
rather a reference to pirates or other raiders who made the sea their stronghold. 54
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Tiruvāl combines the feat of Ukkirapandiyan with a version of the
Cikalittalapuranam story that at once reminds us of the close alliances between the
Pandyan court and the Cankams and the fact that Pandyan kings often took the place of
divinities in tales of salvation from natural calamities. Shulman narrates:
“Once the sea rose against the ancient city of Maturai. The
gods were alarmed and, seeing this, Śiva appeared to
Ukkirapāṇṭiyan in a dream and told him to throw his lance
which he had given him against the fearsome sea. The
Pāṇṭiyan awoke and, after being urged again by the god,
threw his spear at the sea, which became calm and lapped
at his feet. Tamiḻcokkaṉ (Śiva) appeared, erected a
maṇṭapa, and said, “this will be the site of the first and
second Caṅkam; the third will be on the banks of the
Ganges.” 55
This narrative – caused in this instance by Indra, who was jealous of the Pandyan king’s
virtuous rule and devotional consecration of ninety-six horse sacrifices – places the scion
of the royal house in direct opposition to Lord Indra, a tactical-literary move which G.
Vijayavenugopal interprets as evidence of Dravidian/Aryan tensions in peninsular
India. 56 By naming the Pandyan king foeman to Indra, a divinity much more closely
associated with northern India, poets could situate themselves strategically in the
simmering tension between Tamil/anti-Brahmin partisans and the political and religious
influences coming from the north.

Ironically, Vijayavenugopal also detects an

Aryanization of Pandya ritual and naming protocols, noting that the word paṇṭiya itself
cannot be adequately accounted for through Tamil philology. He further posits that the
Colas, the dynasty that bifurcated the Pallavas in the north from the Pandyas in the south,
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originally came from the north and in this way introduced many words that have no
Dravidian roots into Tamil.
It is certainly reasonable to assert that kings of the late Pandya dynasty in the mid12th to mid-14th centuries C.E. would seek to assert their own legitimacy by forging
bonds to their historical forbears, the first Pandyan dynasty, which was established in the
southern tip of the subcontinent by the middle of the first millennia BCE. 57

In

hearkening back to earlier Pandyan kings, poets and commentators linked their own
patrons with a greater historical narrative, one that overarched the largest part of the
peninsula. The Pandyan kings of the later dynasty were merely re-establishing the
dominance that felt their due by historical precedent. In this context it should be noted
that these commentaries referencing katalkol and a mighty Tamil empire lost to the sea
began to appear just at the time of a resurgence of Pandya influence in the south, a
resurgence that began with Katunkon’s defeat of the Kālvars at the end of the sixth
century. 58 Nakkiranar’s Iraiyanar Akapporuḷ appeared at the height of the three century
Pandyan empire inaugurated by Katunkon’s victory, sometime between 650-750CE. 59
Adiyarkunallar’s commentary on Cilappatikaram is believed to have been written during
the zenith of second Pandyan revival in the 13th century.
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Why should it be that stories that narrate the sudden and unavoidable loss of
ancient Pandinad be (re-)written precisely at the time of the reappearance of Pandyan
influence in the peninsula? And why should these accounts describe two very similar
calamitous sea-swells separating each of the great assemblies? Finally, why should the
last named patron of the mythic Premiere Sangam, Katunkon, be the same as he who
historically renewed the Pandyan dynasty at the end of the sixth century?
In answer to the first question I would suggest that such stories were intended on
the one hand to legitimize renewed Pandyan sovereignty in peninsular India, as much as
to say “we ruled once and so we shall rule again.” By detailing, or at least alluding to,
Pandyan myth-history medieval commentators on the Cankam poets were inscribing
genealogies of Pandyan kingship at the end of which it was understood came their own
patrons, heirs to the classical Tamil academies. But these narratives did further work for
the poets mobilizing them in the Pandyan courts at the end of the first millennium CE.
While there were no reasons given for why the sea should claim the first two
Pandyan capitals, there are hints given in others stories of flood and loss. Flood is
commonly used as both a destructive and creative force, the two acts often going hand in
hand. As we saw with the story of Manu, a flood came to destroy the earth, but a single
(righteous) man was chosen to survive to repopulate and regulate the earth. Though not
specifically Pandyan, the Dravida king Satya Vrata was credited with the same feat in the
Bhagavata Purana, not a protector of people but a protector of creation itself. Vadimbu
Allamba Pandya stopped the floods with his foot, while Ukkira Pandyan prevented the
fury of Indra from destroying Madurai, and by extension the Pandyan kingdom, by
throwing his spear into the waters amassed against him by Lord Indra. In Cenkuttuvan’s
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story the king is credited with driving back the seas after lifting his spear against in
defense of his people.
Such narratives of (divine) flood underscored the king’s duty to his kingdom by
commenting on and celebrating the actions of his predecessors. At the same time, these
stories rendered the sometimes petulant nature of the gods tangible; only the most devout
– Ukkira Pandya, Satya Vrata, Manu – or those otherwise endowed with divinity could
overcome such terrible fury. In yet other cases, as with Cenkuttuvan, the sea stood in for
the dangers against which a king must stand in order for the kingdom to prosper, just as
Murugan threw his spear across the ocean to defeat the demon Cūr and in so doing dried
up the waters to create the earth upon which the world could grow. 60 Finally, the story
of lost Tamilakam made successive kings heir to an enormous empire with culture and
history to rival the Sanskrit tradition pressing down from the north. This history could be
held as a shield against any whom would seek to demean the stature or importance of the
Tamil lands.
But factual answers to these questions, and just how academics square historically
certain events with those accounted for mythically in Cankam commentaries, matter less
in the construction of the Tamil flood imaginary than do the ways in which these stories
were (and are) received and combined with the many other flood narratives that still
percolate in the Tamil-speaking Indian peninsula. I have already suggested that these
stories were used as a way to legitimize Pandyan rule, poets linking their own patrons to
historical kings in a bid to create an unbroken chain of sovereign right and forging a
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Iḷaṅkōvaṭikaḷ. Cilappatikāram(PākanӉēri : Ve. Peri. PalӉa. Mu. KācivicuvanātanӉ Ceṭṭiyār, 1942), book 24.
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literary and historic past to rival the Sanskrit tradition. What has been made clear by
other writers, particularly Sumathi Ramaswamy, is that later writers and historians with
their own ideological bones to pick appropriated these stories for precisely this reason,
e.g using labors of loss in an attempt to establish the historicity of a lost (Tamil)
continent, a proverbial thumb in the eye of the presumed Indo-Sanskrit dominance across
the sub-continent. What I will do in later chapters is illustrate how imaginary flood
histories continue to shape the ways in which victims understand new occurrences of
inundation and their subsequent relief by the agencies that respond to and prepare for
future flood events.
But before examining these issues in the modern day, let us explore how the first
European colonists responded to cyclonic flood – in their own words, in the words of
Tamil witnesses, and in the words of historians. It was their own experiences far more
than the Tamil flood imaginary that shaped colonial disaster response mechanisms in
French Pondicherry. Let us jump forward into the modern era, for it was the French and
Dutch experience of cyclone on the Coromandel Coast that led to many of the
infrastructural improvements held in such high regard today by disaster management
officials in the Union Territory.
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-2The Colonial Foundations of Flood Response
L’Établissement français de l’Inde, the French colonies of India made up of
Pondicherry and its dependencies – the colonies of Karaikal and Yanam on the
Coromandel Coast, Chandernagar thirty kilometers north of Calcutta on the Hooghly
River, and Mahe on the Malabar Coast encircled by Kerala’s Kannur District – was born
out of the desire to compete with British and Dutch trade in the East Indies. In 1664
Jean-Baptiste Colbert planned the Compagnie française pour le commerce des Indes
orientales, the French East India Company, to capitalize on recent activity in the
subcontinent. The arrival of the French in India had actually preceded the establishment
of the Compagnie française by half a century, placing them in the subcontinent
concurrent with the arrival of the British in the second decade of the seventeenth century,
and the two nations vied for supremacy in the subcontinent for the next century and a
half.
Throughout its development as an urban port center, Pondicherry’s European
rulers made the most of its geographic location. Built originally on large sand dunes
called mēṭu in Tamil, the factory took advantage of indigenous practices to limit sea
incursion into the town.

During a brief period of Dutch control at the end of the

seventeenth century a series of hydrological practices were put into place that set a high
tone for future water management and flood mitigation in the French territories. The
structures put into place in this first period of settlement – what would later become the
Grand and Petit Canals, the Uppar Drain, and a series of canals and sluice gates that
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surrounded the colony and controlled the flow of water – endured into the era of relative
non-aggression that followed three Karnatic Wars and decades of seizure, occupation,
and retreat between the two powers during the largest part of the eighteenth century.
By the time the French regained control of their territories for the final time in
1816 the foundation for the town, the basic shape and design upon which the final town
was rebuilt, had been in place for over a century. What remained for the French to
establish in regards to storm and flood policy were mechanisms of response to
emergency. This is not to suggest that the French administration set out to design
policies that would meet any eventuality. Such policies were established slowly, over
time, and through the lessons of trial and error. What can be traced through this third
period of French settlement in India – the century lasting from 1816-1916 – is the gradual
development of disaster response mechanisms that came to be reworked and remobilized
with each new instance of flood.
In this chapter I will chart the development of flood related policies from the late
seventeenth century until 1916. I will show that each new policy built upon or modified
existing structures, resulting in an entrenched matrix of response patterns that shaped
government reaction to each new instance of storm or inundation. This matrix endured
into the twentieth century and formed the foundation for disaster policy by both the late
colonial French administration and the first independent Indian administrations and, in
turn, set the stage for responses to the 2004 Asian tsunami, as we will see in the
following chapter.
I will begin with the establishment of the French colony at Pondicherry and its
development as an urban center, with and eye on the construction and maintenance of the
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town infrastructure. I will also begin to examine in detail the binaries that still dominate
the discussion of disaster causation in the region: science/myth, technology/tradition,
natural/supernatural, mortal/divine.

A discussion of European efforts to understand

meteorology in India will follow in order to outline the ways in which colonial
administrators came to understand climate and weather in the subcontinent.

Such

knowledge was necessary preparation for those needing to acclimate as quickly as
possible to l’Établissement’s tropical environment.

I will end the chapter with an

examination of specific instances of relief in French India: cyclones and inundations in
1832, 1872, 1885, and 1916 and the Great Famine in 1876-1878. Pertinent to this
discussion is the response to the Great Famine, which affected much of India between
1876 and 1878, as responses to this crisis in turn shaped responses to later crises. Each
“event” illustrates a specific development in the ways in which the French administration
responded to flood crises in their colonies and shaped the matrix bequeathed to the new,
post-colonial administration at the de facto merger of the French colonies with the
independent Republic of India in 1954. I maintain that it is only by understanding the
development of colonial mechanisms of disaster response in the French territories that
can we can begin to understand the state of disaster management in the Union Territory
of Pondicherry in December 2004. The local administration’s first response to the
tsunami was not that different from Governor Alfred Martineau’s response to the 1916
cyclone that devastated French shipping at Pondicherry. It was not until the inefficacy of
these entrenched colonial mechanisms came to be recognized through their mobilization
post-tsunami that the administration in the comtemporary Union Territory of Pondicherry
began in earnest to re-imagine better ways to respond to disaster.
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Early Floods in the First Factory
The first European occupiers of the region were the Portuguese who, according to
Barros, established a factory (feitoria) at Puducheira in 1553 which they kept until driven
away by the Nayak of Gingee in 1614. 61 Three years later, in 1617, Jean Pépin, acting
on behalf of the Compagnie de Saint-Malo, received permission from the “nayacq of
Pondichéri” to build a fort, but he soon abandoned the site and the company never
returned.

The following year, on two separate occasions, Dutch travelers recorded

staying in the area. P. van der Broecke spent the night at the choultrie of Polosére on
February 9, 1618 and Simon Joosten, an agent of the Dutch Company, recorded
sheltering at Poulisjeri later that same year, where he founded, and soon abandoned, a
factory for the Dutch. 62 Pondicherry was not permanently settled by Europeans until the
Nayak of Gingee offered the land to the Danes, who built a permanent house there and
who starting from 1620 had a larger settlement some 150 kilometers south, at
Tranquebar, just north of the boundary of modern Karaikal. 63
By the second quarter of the sixteenth century, then, the site had been established
as a way-station for Europeans traveling along the Coromandel Coast, but it was not until
1664 that Samson d’Abbevile first sited the location on a map, calling it Pudécheira.
Contemporaneously with d’Abbevile’s map a Dutch explorer named Gauthier Schouten,
who traveled in the region between 1658-1665, described the coastline sailing north from
Tranquebar in a long passage detailing the available portages:
j61 See G. Jouveau‐Dubreuil, “Le Puducheira des Portugais au siezième siècle,” Revue Historique de l’Etat
de Pondichéry 9 (1955): 235‐238.
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See “La foundation du comptoir français de Pondichéry en 1617,” Revue historique de l’Inde française.8
(1952): 167‐172.
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See Jean Deloche, Pondichéry hier et aujourd’hui (Pondichéry: Insititut Français de Pondichéry, 2007).
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Porto Novo is not of much importance. Once one passes
four temples one discerns Teguepatnam…further on to the
north one sees Poule Cére, Coulemour, Alemburi, and le
Long Bois, until finally one sees Sandrispatnam. 64
The French returned to the area in 1673 with the arrival of Bellanger de l’Espinay, who
found the Danish house and a small factory when he landed in early February of that
year.

He was quickly followed by François Martin, who as Commissioner of the

Compagnie had been appointed to establish a colony on the site he described as “n’était
autrefois qu’un hameau de pêcheur,” or nothing more than a hamlet of fishermen. 65
During the first two decades of French habitation at Pondicherry, until the Dutch invaded
in 1693, there was little urbanization in what was little more than a sleepy entrepôt.
Lanes were irregular, crisscrossing tracks and there was little attempt to differentiate
native versus non-native habitats. The completion of Fort Barlong in October 1689 – an
irregular quadrilateral redoubt built atop a sand dune running between to the sea and the
marshy lowlands to the west – finally began to establish the settlement as something
more than “a hamlet of fishers.”
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See Voyage de Gautier Shouten aux Indes Orientales, commence l’an 1658 et fini l’an 1665 (Amsterdam:
Pierre Mortier, 1708), 487‐488. Given the ordering of known towns, there is no question that Schouten is
naming towns in geographic position from south to north. Teguepatnam is taken to be modern day
Devanampattinam on the mouth of the Ponniar River at Cuddalore, based on a map printed in
Schwartzberg’s Historical Atlas of India (plate VI.B.4, p. 52). Alambari, some fifty kilometers north of
Pondicherry, was the sight of a small, protected boat landing later chosen by Dost Ali Khan for the
construction of a fort in 1746, gifted to Dupleix for services rendered to Subedar Muzarfarzang in 1750
and destroyed by the British in 1760. Given Schouten’s positioning of Poule Cére between these two it is
unquestionably Pondicherry. Sandrispatnam is likely Sadraspattinam, near the mouth of the Palar River
just south of Mamallapuram.
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François Martin, Mémoires de François Martin, fondateur de Pondichéry (1665‐1694), vol. III (Paris:
Société d’éditions géographiques, maritimes, et coloniales, 1943), 333.
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On examining a map prepared by its Dutch occupiers in 1693, three avenues can
be seen on the far right heading north from a quadrilateral fort (illus. 2.1). 66 A barrier
wall protected the undeveloped section of land to the north of the Uppar River, which
runs horizontally through the center of the map. The river continues to define the border
of the colony as its course turns almost due south close behind the landward wall of Fort
Barlong. It is important to fix the river’s course in one’s head, for this feature defined
much of the later development of the urban center as well as water and flood control
planning later undertaken by the colonial administration.

Illus. 2.1 Pondicherry at the time of the Dutch Invasion, 1693
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VEL 1095, Het Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederland. Fixing this map in the mind will render the
following maps more intelligible. The majority of maps of the region were prepared with the orientation
rotated clockwise 90 degrees, that it with the eastern shoreline at the bottom of the map and cardinal
north to the left‐hand side. The remaining maps in this chapter follow this more unfamiliar orientation,
thus when I write of the Uppar River’s western ingress into the town, for example, the reader should look
towards the top center of the map.These lanes have remained streets even into the modern day (from
east to west): Rue de Saint‐Louis, Rue de François Martin, and Rue de Manakkulam Vinayanagar Koil.
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It was during this first phase of French settlement that the earliest modern-era
cyclonic storm was recorded, occurring on November 19, 1681. In his 1917 monograph,
Le cyclones â la cote Coromandel de 1681 â 1916, which details the history of cyclonic
storms affecting the Pondicherry region, Governor Alfred Martineau described a threeday hurricane centered over Porto Novo, sixty-five kilometers south of Pondicherry in
Cuddalore District, which caused:
Plusieurs petits vaisseaux furent brisés dans la rivière;
beaucoup
de maisons s’effondrèrent sous les efforts de la pluie et la
population se sauva dans l’intérieur du pays. 67
Several small boats broke up in the river; many houses
collapsed under the [heavy] rains and residents sought
safety inland.
Cuddalore District, a part of the Madras Presidency directly adjacent to the French colony
at Pondicherry and recognized as especially prone to damage from cyclone, was named
as the site of landfall for a major storm six years later, in August of 1687. Incorrectly
cited by Yvonne Robert Gaebelé as the first major cyclone to affect the French colony, it
was said to have destroyed five ships in the sea lanes south of Madras and ten smaller
vessels anchored at Porto Novo. 68
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Alfred Martineau, “Les cyclones â la cote Coromandel de 1681 â 1916,” Revue Historique del’Inde
Française 2 (1917), 231.
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Yvonne Robert Gaebelé, Une parisienne aux Indes au XVIIe siècle (Pondichéry: Bibliothèque Coloniale,
1937). The August cyclone mentioned in Gaebelé’s biography of François Martin’s wife is problematic.
Catastrophic cyclones are rare at this time of year on the Coromandel Coast, though not unheard of.
Mandal (1993) recorded only thirty cyclonic storms occurring during August in the Bay of Bengal between
1891‐1989; that is to say, only about 16% of recorded cyclonic disturbances recorded over the course of a
century developed into full cyclonic storms. In contrast, in November during the same period, 65% of
disturbances developed into full storms. By itself, this fact does not present insurmountable
inconsistencies in Gaebelé’s tale. Two other factors, however, also complicate the picture. He based his
account on one given in Les Annales de l’Inde Française, a journal I have not only been unable to locate
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Technology or Tradition: Accounts of the 1745 Cyclones
After the historically problematic storm of 1687 the record of cyclone activity in
the region remains silent until the mid-18th century, when two remarkable accounts
appear detailing a severe storm that occurred in November 1745. The first comes from a
fragment of a letter dated January 11, 1746, addressed to the Conseil Supérieur à la
Compagnie in Paris, presumably written by Governor General Joseph François Dupleix
(governor from 1742-1754) or by an agent on his behalf. Copied from a document now
lost from the Pondicherry Archive, the letter published by Martineau reads in part:
The winter was very bad. We were struck by two
hurricanes, one on the 2nd and the other on the 27th of
November, which laid waste across the land. 69
Remarkably, the letter goes on to blame the uncommon violence of the flood that ravaged
the native part of the town on the actions of one Monsieur de Cossigny:
Plus de 2000 maisons de cette colonie ont été jetées à bas et
plus de 40 personnes périrent dans les eaux don’t la ville
noire fut inondée par la faute de M. de Cossigny qui n’avait
bouché qu’avec de la terre les ansees du pont sans peur où
les débordements se sont communiqués dans la ville avec
une violence aussi suprenante que peu ordinaire sans ces
contrées. 70
More than 2000 houses in the colony were swept away and
40 persons perished in the water that inundated the black
town through the fault of Monsieur de Cossigny, who had
but also authenticate. One wonders whether Gaebelé perhaps meant Annales d l’Extrême Orient, a
journal published in Paris by Challamel Ainé from 1878‐1891, but I find this conclusion doubtful, for even
its succeeding titles do not closely match Gaebelé’s. In his Madras Gazetteer (1908), W. Francis mentions
a cyclone in October of the same year, while Alfred Martineau, in his exhaustive Les Cyclones à la côte
Coromadel de 1681 à 1916 (1917) fails to mention any storm whatever in 1687. In the absence of more
definitive evidence, it is certainly possible that a cyclone occurred in the last half of 1687, but I am
incredulous that it necessarily occurred during the August espionage plot detailed by Gaebelé, a
conflation that may well have served dramatic effect rather than strictest truth.
69
Martineau, “Les cyclones,” 232.
70
ibid. 232‐233.
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blocked [the drain] at the Pont sans Peur with mud
[causing] the overflow to sweep through the town with a
violence never before seen.
This account, written by an official in India to officials in Paris, is the first to
assign blame for the havoc wrought by flood to a human actor. As we saw in the
previous chapter, and as we will see again below, the Tamil flood imaginary did not
conceive of inundation as the result of mortal failure but rather precipitated by
supernatural causes. Unlike the instances of flood appearing in Cankam and medieval
Tamil literature, in which floods were typically the result of gods meddling in the affairs
of men, here is a “modern” account in which an individual is identified and held
responsible, effectively accused of misdirecting flood overflow into an inhabited area of
the colonial ville. Two additional details have much to bear on this accusation: M. de
Cossigny, the man blamed for the disaster, was in fact Jean François Charpentier de
Cossigny, a military engineer born in Marseilles in 1690 who had an active career in the
East Indies, serving both in Pondicherry and on the Mascarene Islands. 71 More
interesting still, in the late 1730s Governor Pierre Benoît Dumas (gov. 1734-1741) – the
predecessor of Governor Joseph François Dupliex – had ordered de Cossigny to refortify
the town. During the planning de Cossigny had asked to reinforce the defensive ditch at
the Villenour Gate in the southwest quarter of the town with masonry in order to prevent
future flooding, but officials in Paris refused to fund the project. 72 When the flood
defenses failed in 1745 they failed at the pont san peur, the span directly north of the
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He was also close relation of David Charpentier de Cossigny, Governor General of Pondicherry from
1785‐1787.
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Villenour Gate, precisely the location identified by de Cossigny several years prior as a
weak point in the colonies flood defenses.
A second, much more detailed account of the inundation is recorded in the diary
of Anandarangapillai, a highly placed agent of the French in Pondicherry who was to
become chief dubash under Governor-General Dupleix. He wrote of a “great tempest
striking” (perungāṛṛaṭittatu) that began immediately after the sun set (astamittavuṭanē
tuvakki) and lasted for twelve hours (muppatu naḷikaiyum aṭittatu). 73 He continued ānāḻ,
inta kāṛṛinuṭaiya piratāpam inna maṭṭenṛu oruvitamāyc sollakkūṭātu, “but the immensity
of this storm should not be described as having such and such a measure, according to
just a single criterion.” 74 Avenues of trees were uprooted and entire plantations of mango
and coconut leveled, causing the ruin of many planters. On the banks of the Uppar River
an entire neighborhood of houses was swept away from a new three-street suburb.
Anandaranga notes as cause for the flooding the failed sluices, the same mentioned in
Dupleix’s letter to the Conseil, but where the governor placed responsibility for the flood
on a human agent, Anandaranga says only that the sluice gave way (anta matakai
piṭuṅkikkoṇṭu, anta veḷḷam oṭiṟṟu, “having burst through the sluice the flood ran [through
the town]”). 75

Anandaranga further confirms what Dupleix’s letter only implies: that

these sluices were built for the purpose of controlling the flow of water into the town by
diverting water into surrounding channels. It is not unreasonable to suggest that had this
infrastructure been improved during renovation by Cossigny several years prior, as
Ān̲antaraṅkap piḷḷai nāṭ kur̲ippu, tok. 1 (Putuvai: Kalai Paṇpāṭṭut Turai, 1998), 218. Pillai’s words
literally translate as “[it] blew for 30 naḷikai,” an astrological unit equal to twenty‐four minutes.
74
ibid. 218. The “wit” here is more sardonic than comical: Anandaranga uses the word ‘piratāpam,’ which
is connotes “greatness” or “magnificence” in the sense of fame or celebrity. Its use here is archly ironic.
75
ibid. 219. The word ‘piṭuṅku’ means to pull out or snatch [out of the way]. The line means literally
“having plucked away that sluice/regulator, that flood ran.”
73

71

Cossigny himself had requested, this particular flood could have been greatly mitigated,
if not altogether avoided.
The newly built quarter mentioned by Anandaranga is a little difficult to place
without definitive supporting administrative documents, but it is still possible to
reconstruct the most likely site of this neighborhood.

Examining a map of Pondicherry

produced in 1739 (illus. 2.2), six years prior to the inundation, we find a more urbanized
settlement complete with the fortifications completed by Cossigny. The Uppar River still
flowed into the town from the west-north-west at le pont sans peur on the western edge
of the colony (illus. 2.2, top-center) and followed its natural course through the town,

Illus. 2.2 Pondicherry and its enclosure, 1739

bearing south behind the western and the south-western bastions of the newly completed
Fort St. Louis, whence it continued into the Chunnambar River south of the town and
thence into the sea. The water from this “ruisseau qui forme l’inondation autour de la
72

place,” as it was dubbed on a 1748 town plan, was diverted at le pont in order to fill a
defensive ditch that had been built to encircle the town.

Within the town, the Uppar’s

watercourse had been extended northwards by the construction of a canal from the behind
the Porte de Dauphine to the colony’s northern border, 76 exiting the settlement at its
northern extreme between the Batterie d’Anjou and the Batterie d’Orleans into another
newly constructed channel meant to protect the north-eastern approach leeward of the
Madras Gate. These two extensions laid the foundations of what was to become the
modern Grand and Petit Canals.
The neighborhood to the north of Fort St. Louis appears consistently in plans of
the town dating back to 1693. 77 Though habitation is sparse, the earlier Dutch mapmaker had lined out three lanes
north of Fort Barlong. Another
map from the same year, “after a
report by two natives,” though
less exacting, also showed houses
to the north and seaward sides of
where the fort later came to be
built. 78 A Dutch plan of the town

Illus. 2.3 1694 Dutch Town Plan

dated 1694 (Illus. 2.3) 79 intimates the intentions the Dutch held for designing an urban
center with clearly demarcated quarters based on vocation laid out in parallel lanes west
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The placement of the defensive wall that surrounded the town to this defines the boundaries of the
core of Pondicherry town: South Boulevard, Anna Salai on the west, and S.V. Patel Road ringing the north.
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VEL 1095, Het Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederland.
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73

of the fort (Illus. 2.4).

Another plan made

by Nyon in 1704, after the Dutch had handed
the territory back over to the French, shows
the progress of urbanization in the years
immediately following the colony’s return to
French control (illus. 2.5). One of the first
priorities of the Compagnie was not the
development of land below the Uppar – as
was entertained by the Dutch – but the
establishment of a new bastion, Fort St. Louis

Illus. 2.4 Detail by Jean Deloche 80

Louis, around which the town would later grow. Maps made after the turn of the
eighteenth century clearly show the development of the town by the French along the
foundation laid out in Dutch maps drawn during their brief occupation of the territory
(1693-1699), an argument made most forcefully by Jean Deloche. 81 Those sections of the
oldest parts of the colony – those shown in illustration 2.5 – were clearly not the same
neighborhoods described by Anandaranga Pillai.
According to Jean Deloche, Muslims were the first to settle on the southern bank
of the Uppar, sometime around 1721, in a curious configuration of diagonal lanes set out
along the path of the Cuddalore Road (see Illus. 2.2). 82 An anonymous town plan drawn
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Illus. 2.5 Pondicherry and its environs, 1704

in that year shows three such lanes already laid out. Since Muslim weavers were well
established in the crook of the Uppar well before mid-century it is also unlikely that the
“houses newly built” mentioned by Anandaranga were in le faubourg des Maures.
By the same measure, the area on the eastern bank of the Uppar, south of the new
fort in ville blanche, had been undergoing extensive restructuring by the French
administration during the same time. Thoroughfares had been straightened around the
newly established Petit Bazar Saint Laurent (1714) and residents were forced to build in
rectangular blocks. Several important civic buildings were fixed south of Fort St. Louis:
the Hôtel de la Monnaie, completed 1736-1738, and the second Capuchin church, Notre
Dame des Anges, constructed 1739-1758.

With the reconstruction of the bridge

connecting the eastern and western quarters of the town across the Uppar at the Villenour
Road in 1738, the southeastern, seaside quarter of the city directly below the fort and well
away from the sluice-gate seems equally unlikely as the location of this disaster.
The clue to identifying the “new” neighborhood identified in Anandaranga’s diary
is the phrase found in Dupleix’s letter to the Conseil which places blame on de Cossigny
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for blocking the arches of pont sans peur. The pont was a part of the Fort de peur,
located at the far western edge of the town at the point where the Uppar’s watercourse
entered the colony, the first defensive bastion north of the Villenour Gate. It was here
that potable water entered the town, and the entry was provided with a regulator/gate to
control the flow of water into the inhabited areas of the town. 83 The area just within the
wall adjacent to the stream – what is now the Petit Canal – had only recently been laid
out and was just beginning to see urban growth by the end of the 1730s. Further
bolstering this conclusion is the fact that this part of Pondicherry town is still prone to
flood during even the most average monsoon, and so it seems to be the most likely
suburb to have been inundated in the way described by Anandaranga.
Anandaranga went into great detail describing the effects of this cyclone. The
town was inundated, and both people and cattle perished in the rushing flood. Houses
both inside and out of the town were laid low and water stood in places up to a man’s
waist. Birds and livestock died in large numbers, their bodies littering the streets for days
afterward. Dead goats were purchased, brought into the city to be butchered and left to
dry in houses, but the unrelenting dampness in the following days prevented drying and
soon the town was filled with a sickening stench so horrific that people remained in their
homes for days, even after the storm stopped and the flood subsided. “Because the wind
had continued to blow in this way,” concluded Anandaranga, “not a single house in the
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town escaped, [but] God preserved us.” (Appaṭi kāṛṛu aṭittatāl paṭṭanattilē oru vīṭākilum
tappamāṭṭātu. Suvāmi kāttār). 84
On November 10, Anadaranga noted the departure of Governor Dupleix to a
retreat at Mortandi Chavadi, “as he finds the rainy season in Pondicherry a nuisance.”
Two weeks later, on November 23, another storm lashed the town, though he estimated
its strength to be but one fortieth of the last (nāṛpatilē oru pangu). 85 According to Pillai
this second storm, unlike the first, had been perfectly predictable: muntiṉa kāṟṟu
aṭikkiṟapōtu oruttarākilum aṟinta soṉṉillai. Inta vicai saṉaṅkaḷellārum payantiruntārkaḷ
(“No one could have predicted the previous tempest [but] on this occasion everybody was
afraid”). 86 Relying on “the sāstras” as unerring proof of the correctness of his (after the
fact) prediction, 87 Anandaranga reasoned that the storm had been inevitable due to a
convergence of three factors: namely that 1) the new moon 2) occurred on a Tuesday 3)
under the influence of the star Kēttai. Fortunately, he concluded, though everyone was
afraid, suvāmi tayavupaṇṇiṉar, “God favored us [with a gentler storm].”
The following Sunday, November 28th, a third storm of middling strength again
struck the town. “Its strength might have been three-quarters that of the first storm, but
some think it was only half as strong.”

Anandaranga dismissed this lower figure,

attributing it to the lesser amount of damage caused, pointing out that “all the mischief
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that could be done having occurred during the earlier storms.” 88 He ended his diary entry
with some final words on the uncommon triple cyclone: “Never before have there been
three storms within the same month. What evil times these may be.” 89 It is worth
underscoring the ill-omen ascribed to this event by Anandaranga.

Remember from

chapter one that mythic Tamil kings had convened three Cankams that were
catastrophically and irrevocably swept away by great deluges. Triplicate eclipses have
been connected the destruction of ancient Dwarka by flood in the Mahabharata and at
least one popular contemporary author made time-index correlations between triple
eclipses and the most calamitous events of the 20th century: World War I, World War II
and the Holocaust. 90
In the entries that follow, Anandaranga made no further comment upon the
occurrence of these three cyclones, neither of the damage caused by them nor the
recovery from their depredations.

His very next entry, for example, describes the

dedication of several images in a newly built church in Reddiarpālaiyam village, between
Pondicherry town and Oḷukarai on Villiyanur Road, listing all of the communities invited
“without distinction” and detailing the care taken to observe caste restrictions on food
preparation.
The evil times foreseen by Anandaranga did indeed blow into French India. The
following year saw the beginning of the Karnatic Wars and fifteen years of Anglo-French
conflict that resulted in the permanent demise of French aspirations in the subcontinent.
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On October 2nd, 1746, another hurricane lashed the sea-roads between Pondicherry and
Madras, destroying a squadron under the command of Bertrand-François Mahé de La
Bourdonnais on the way to blockade the English at Fort St. George in Madras. The Duc
d'Orleans sank with almost all hands; L'Achille, the Bourbon, and the Neptune all
foundered, losing large parts of their artillery and much of their cargo, as well. 91 Though
contemporary sources are unclear, historian Marc Vigié records that nearly 1,200 people
perished in the storm. 92
It is instructive to briefly compare the Tamil and French account of the storms.
Where Dupleix ascribes no significance to the advent of these cyclones, Anandaranga is
keen to comment on the astrological happenstance that forecast the calamitous events of
November 1745. Dupleix’s description was enumerative – 2000 houses destroyed, more
than forty people lost – secular, and above all “modern”; he sought cause in human error,
in “la faute de M. de Cossigny.” Anandaranga’s account, on the other hand, was more
emotional and “scientistic.” His reasoning was no less logical that Dupleix’s – a full
moon under a malevolent star on a particular day of the week – but his science, astrology
based upon the sastras, was decidedly less modern. His portrait of the aftermath, too, was
centered more on the lived experience of the event than on hard numbers. He wrote of
the water level rising to past the thigh, of the hundreds of dead birds littering the streets,
of the devastated plantations, the uprooted trees and the stench of rotting animals.
"Thereby many people were ruined" (atinālē vekupēr keṭṭuppōnārkaḷ) he wrote,
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underscoring less the specific economic losses but rather the experience of those who
suffered.
Strategies to cope with the flooding, both those initiated to mitigate the
eventuality of storm and those undertaken after its occurrence, seemed fruitless to Pillai.
Referencing the same flood gates mentioned in the French account, Anandaranga wrote
that "[with] the strong winds a high flood rushed into the Uppar [River] and burst through
the closed sluices," 93 an account which does not necessarily absolve Monsieur Cossigny
from blame, but narrates the flooding of ville noire as all but inevitable, regardless of
whatever measures may have been taken to mitigate flooding prior to the cyclone. Nor
can it be known if the flood would have been lessened, or even prevented, if Cossigny
had been allowed to reinforce the western ditch near the Villenour Gate with masonry as
he had requested several years earlier. Certainly the problem had been identified long
before the 1745. Efforts to alleviate the distress caused by the flooding also went awry:
“Because it was the case that goats died in great numbers [in the countryside], people
bought them and brought them into the town to be dried, but they were drenched in the
rain and a tremendous stink rose through the town, and people would not go into the
streets for some two or three days.” 94
The point here is not to place a truth value on one narrative over another, for the
ways in which both men described the causation of the events of November 1745 were
inherently logical to each man. One account is not more important than the other because
it details “actual” economic or material loss while the other focuses instead on the social
and personal effects. Rather I am highlighting the similarities over time between specific
93
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Ān̲antaraṅkap piḷḷai nāṭ kur̲ippu, 218‐219.
ibid. 219

80

narrative types discussed in chapter 1 as they have been mobilized at various times to
describe specific (historical) flood events and as they will be deployed again after future
floods discussed in later chapters. We have already seen in historians’ accounts that it is
often the numeration of loss that garners the most ink. The concreteness of such evidence
is considerably easier to parlay into a causal chain. Vigié’s breathless declaration of “on
dénombrait au total près de mille deux cents victims!” 95 leads his reader directly into a
discussion of La Bourdonnais’s disgrace following his unexpected rout by the
uncontrollable forces of weather, which is, after all, more to the point of his history. 96
“Modern” accounts of flood and loss really only begin to appear in India from the
eighteenth century. But together with the growing scientific description of weather in the
subcontinent and its effects on agriculture, folkways, and the human body there remained
a more “traditional” accounting of flood and loss, as exhibited by Anandaranga. In this
anti-modern rendering disaster was understood to be both predictable and unaccountable.
The conceptual binaries of natural/supernatural, science/myth, and mortal/divine has
endured into the modern day, but an exploration of the ways in which events are still
narrativized within these binaries – a process that too often obscures the lessons that can
be learned from crisis events at the cost of better mitigation and of creating more resilient
communities – will be undertaken in chapters 4 and 5. But now let us turn our attention
back to the development of emergency response during the colonial period.
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Siege and Cyclone
A number of smaller cyclones struck the Coromandel Coast over the next fifteen
years – Martineau mentions storms in 1749, 1752, and 1754. Martineau’s source for the
1749 storm seems only to be a letter sent to the East India Company in Madras by one
Monsieur Floyer, dated 11 May 1749. But Martineau does not quote M. Floyer, instead
giving only a gloss of the text, which is primarily a request for a number of cannon be
brought to Pondicherry. Occurring as it did during a lull in the recently quieted Karnatic
Wars this seems a singular request, especially given that the hurricane (fr. Ouragan)
mentioned had already halted an English expeditionary force near Porto Novo.
Pondicherry itself seems not to have been heavily affected.

Floyer’s account as

recounted by Martineau focuses on English losses: the magazine at Porto Novo, the
hospital ship Apollo with all hands, the 60-gun Pembroke, the 74-gun Namor, and 750
British sailors. The damage to the French navy was limited to, in Martineau’s words, un
navire et deux petits vaisseaux, 97 swamping sixty cannon.
There is often very little that can be said with certainty about most of these early
tempests, many warranting little more than a line or two in some colonial brief or
gazetteer. But it is important to recognize that cyclones, even “minor” ones, were
regarded as worthy of report in both English and French sources. Though removed by
over a century from the events described, the compiler of the 1857 Revue colonial still
had this to say of the October 1754 cyclone, couched in a paragraph naming cyclones
between 1778 and 1854:
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On a prétendu à tort que l’établissement et la rade de
Karikal était situés en dehors de la sphere des coups de
vent. Du 8 au 10 octobre 1754, les maisons, les arbres
furent renversés et la moisson détruite par un vent d’Est
très violent. 98
“It would be wrong of us to assume that the [sea] road to
Karaikal is outside the influence of the winds. From the 8th
to the 10th of October, 1754, the houses and trees were
leveled and the harvest destroyed by a very violent easterly
wind.”
Martineau uses this storm to emphasize the rarity and comparatively lessened severity of
storms in Karaikal versus Pondicherry town. As for the Revue, its bare descriptions are
very much the same as those given of sixteen separate events between 1761 and 1830
given by Martineau: 99
1763: A tempest lasting fourteen hours struck Madras with
great violence. Every ship at sea was destroyed with
almost all hands lost…. The Gazetteer mentions that three
French ships were demisted, but does not specify them.
1787: There was a terrible hurricane at Pondicherry.
Remark the date [May 20]: this is not the usual time for
such big storms. 100
1795: A cyclone struck the district of South Arcot, causing
much crop loss.
1811: The ships of was The Dorn and The Chichester were
completely destroyed during a violent storm, together with
several other ships and boats.
1820: A violent tempest in the same region [Pondicherry].
Several landing crafts were lost and there was great damage
to livelihoods.
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This list is not intended to name every storm in the region of Pondicherry in the
last half of the eighteenth century, but rather it is meant to illustrate the ways in which
such storms were framed within the colonial gaze. On the one hand, the paucity of
information could signal a lack of sources available to Martineau. To be sure, the second
half of the eighteenth century was a time of great and enduring conflict between rival
powers in the subcontinent. Pondicherry was occupied and razed by the British multiple
times between 1760 and 1816, and while the French had a policy of removing important
documents under siege (see chapter 4), it is certain that other records deemed less vital
were lost.
On the other hand, the spartan descriptions suggest just what was important to
take away from such events: “much crop loss,” “great damage to livelihoods,” “[two]
ships of war…completely destroyed,” and “every ship destroyed with almost all hands.”
What matters to the unnamed enumerators of these storms from whom Martineau drew
his material is the way in which they affect the capacity of the colonial project. Losses to
ships, sailors, agriculture, and commerce rate far higher than do the kinds of losses
experienced and described by Anandaranga Pillai. When the lives of Indians are
mentioned they appear only when they impact the colonial administration in some direct,
measurable way. An October 1782 storm at Madras was blamed for the destruction of
“every indigenous craft loaded with rice,” precipitating a famine that caused 10,000
deaths by starvation. 101
As has been demonstrated, many of Martineau’s descriptions are no more detailed
than those given in contemporary English sources covering much vaster areas and many
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more aspects of the colonial experience than does Martineau’s monograph. The Imperial
Gazetteer of India, for example, says this about storms:
The number and character of the storms which form in the
Bay, and hence also the distribution of the rainfall
accompanying the retreat of the south-west monsoon humid
current, vary very largely from year to year. In some years,
for example in 1896, no storm of importance occurs, while
in others two to four severe storms of cyclones may be
experienced. The years 1876, 1886, and 1891 were
remarkable for the number of fierce and extensive cyclones
which occurred during this period. 102
It should be said that this gazetteer, or rather any gazetteer, was meant as a general
reference text concerning the geographic, natural, social, and economic features of place,
not unlike the French Revue Coloniale. This passage occurs in a lengthy chapter on the
meteorology of India, detailing the seasons, winds, tides, etc. of the Bay of Bengal and
the Arabian Sea, precisely the kind of information that the earliest European settlers in
India lacked. The initial lacuna in practical information about the living and weather
conditions in the subcontinent was remedied over time through observation and
collection of various data and increased exponentially during the nineteenth century with
the publication of numerous manuscripts on Indian meteorology, discussed below.
Outside of the personal account of the 1745 cyclones left to us by Anandaranga
Pillai, the best documented eighteenth century Coromandel tempest occurred in
December of 1760, during the Third Karnatic War (1757-1763).

The French at

Pondicherry had been under English blockade since the summer. Then, according to an
anonymous chronicler of the Anglo-French Wars,
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[T]he season now beginning to grow precarious, the
admirals Stevens and Cornish prepared to leave the coast of
Coromandel during the monsoons, and retire to the Dutch
island of Ceylon, where they could refit the squadron, and
shelter it from the storms which were expected to come on.
Agreeable to this resolution they set sail on the 23rd [of
October], and committed the blockade of Pondicherry by
sea to captain [sic] Haldane, with five ships of the line. 103
This smaller blockade continued through the end of 1760 when, in the dying days of
December, a powerful cyclone hit Pondicherry. 104 In the words of G.B. Malleson:
On the 31st the roadstead of Pondicherry was visited by one
of those storms not uncommon at that season on the
Koromandel [sic] coast. The effect of this of the English
fleet was most disastrous. Three large ships were driven
ashore two miles below Pondicherry; three others, having
on board 1,100 Europeans, foundered; all the remainder
were severely injured.
Nor did the siege works
escape…Soldiers, unable to carry their muskets, had
thrown them away in despair; all the ammunition, except
that in the store, was rendered useless. 105
Though Malleson does not name the ships, other sources do. The author of A Complete
History of the War in India lists “the Aquitain and Sunderland, two 60-gun ships…[and]
the Newcastle of 50 guns, the Queensborough of 20, and the Protector fire-ship,” 106
accounting for five of the six ships described by Malleson.
In examining this latter account we learn that the Newcastle, Queensborough, and
Protector, “in the general tumult [of the storm] unable to make out the sound of the surf
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against the strand,” ran aground two miles south of Pondicherry town; crew, cannon and
stores were all “mostly” saved. It was the Aquitain and the Sunderland – the two largest
ships in the blockade – and a third, named by Martineau only as le Duc, which foundered
and sank offshore, very nearly losing all hands to the tempest. 107 This third ship, le Duc,
must have been small indeed in order to account for the crew losses not attributable to the
larger ships.
In the available sources we find accounts that focus primarily on quantifiable
losses. Given the provenance of these accounts, this should not be at all surprising. A
Complete History of the War in India, published as it was almost immediately after the
cessation of hostilities between the French and English in India, was addressed to Robert
Clive and as such was clearly intended for a knowledgeable and expectant audience at
home. 108 The omission of casualties might be attributable to a desire to shield the reader
from the grisly realities of war, but it seems much more likely that readers would already
be acquainted with the relative size of ships of the line if given tag-like descriptions (e.g.
a sixty-gun ship, a twenty-gun ship, a fire-ship, etc.). 109
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Another English chronicler of the British in India, Edward Thornton, offered a
somewhat more feeling account, writing in 1859 that:
[T]he English suffered severely from a dreadful storm.
The sea broke over the beach, and overflowed the country,
carrying away the batteries and redoubts. Their tents were
destroyed and their ammunition rendered useless, while the
soldiers, in many instances, abandoned their muskets in
their anxiety for personal safety. Many of the native
retainers of the camp perished. 110
Thornton goes on to describe the strategic effects of the storm, noting that the “widespread waters” made repositioning artillery impossible and prevented the French from
sallying against a British encampment that could only have responded “feebly” if they
had. Following Robert Orme’s assessment, Thornton asserts that “three hundred men
properly armed would not have met with a hundred together in a condition to resist
them.” 111

And it is worth noting again the common diparity: while many soldiers

“abandoned their muskets” for safer locations, Indians were left to drown in the flood.
A French historical account, published in Paris in 1845 by Adolphe Philibert
Dubois de Jancigny and Xavier Raymond, recorded that “[w]ithin a moment, it seemed as
if the heavens had come to the aid of the beleaguered town”:
The English flotilla holding the blockade was broken and
dispersed. The sea burst its limits [the sea-wall?] flooding
all the way to the hedge-wall, submerging and washing
away the batteries and redoubts of the besieging
encampment. The inhabitants of Pondicherry thought they
had been delivered. But the tempest ravaged the town as
well, pulling down magazines and hospitals and destroying
everything within. 112
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Just as other authors had noted, the sea blockade was shattered, but Dubois and Raymond
added new details: repairs within the town were “carried on with great celerity” and the
blockade was reestablished within a week.

Such was the state of the French in

Pondicherry by the first week of January 1761, after eight months of siege and a strong
punctuation mark delivered by a devastating storm, that they were obliged to return
English prisoners captured during a January 5th action “under a promise not to serve
again” because the town was unable to spare the food to keep them alive. 113 By the third
week of January, 114 Pondicherry had fallen to the English in what Dubois de Jancigny
and Raymond called “a fit image and striking resumé of the history of the last three years
of the French in India.” 115
From the known mid-century diarists 116 we can glean little additional information.
Anandaranga Pillai makes no mention of this cyclone at all though he spends almost all
of his September entries to detail the advance of the English towards Pondicherry and
preparations within the town for upcoming hostilities. But in truth by this time he had
long been suffering from illness. 117 As a result of his health neither does his diary detail
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the siege of Pondicherry, nor did he live long enough to see its final surrender on January
16th, 1761. Rangappa Thiruvengadam Pillai, Anandaranga’s nephew, began his own diary
on January 1st, 1761. His first entry reads:
After eight o’clock last night till five o’clock in the
morning, a violent storm accompanied by heavy rain
devastated the town. All the trees were uprooted, and the
flag mast broke and fell turning the entire town into a
forest. Of the fourteen ships of the English that were
anchored in the sea together with one sloop, four ships
sank, three were driven ashore, four lost their masts and
these damaged ships and the sloop disappeared almost
without a trace. 118
The next several entries hold little of interest to the present study, though he does
mention doles being rationed to the French on the January 4th.
Rangappa’s entries for January 10th-12th offer us the best insight into his uncle’s
reticence on the matter of the British cordon. They are, in fact, duplicate entries to those
logged into Anandaranga’s diary on the same days; Anandaranga had simply become too
ill to continue his writing. 119 An English bombardment of Pondicherry began on January
10th.

There is no mention of this in the elder’s diary, though cannonades appear

frequently in his writings. What was detailed in these final pages are the efforts of some
within Pondicherry to leave prior to the British entering the city, Anandaranga’s failing

March of the same year, describes in some detail the astrological influences of his horoscope on the
upcoming year (he marks the date as the start of his 52nd year). He notes the day also being the end of
the 54 year Apasavya Chakra, under which influence “there was a progressively evil
influence…throughout the land [but] from today prosperity will daily increase for 54 years in place of the
adversity that has been seen till now, according to my horoscope and to the Simsumāra Chakra.”
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strength and his efforts to put his affairs in order. His final entry, dated January 12th and
clearly written by another hand, reads:
He said that a letter might be written to Chidambaranatha
Pillai saying, ‘You have paid no attention in spite of my
having sent many men to you. You may not see me
hereafter.’ He [Anandaranga] told me to write such a
peremptory letter and have it dispatched. I wrote one and
brought it to him for his signature. He got up and sat,
ordered the two doors to be opened, and putting on his
glasses, signed it, adding, ‘This must be considered my last
letter.’ I read the letter and wondering why he wrote so,
put it in a cover and gave it to Saravana Mudali to be
dispatched. Afterwards his body was very [….]
At which point the diary breaks off. This same passage appears in Rangappa’s diary,
word for word, with two additions. In a paragraph immediately following the lines
quoted above he writes, “in the night, at five naligai, Maharaja Raja Sri Pillai passed
away,” while a final paragraph describes the funereal ablutions and rituals performed as
well as the inconveniences occasioned by visitors. In a final, oblique reference to the
ongoing siege Rangappa mentions the collapse of a godown under enemy bombardment
on the far side of the town. 120
Obviously 1760-1761 is not the last recorded instance of cyclone and inundation
in the eighteenth century, but due to its occurrence during one of the most important
European military campaigns of the eighteenth century in the subcontinent it is by far the
best documented. Martineau lists with the scantest of details sixteen more cyclones
between 1761 and 1829, several of which have already been discussed. It is unlikely that
all of these storms rose to the level of crisis, but even in such cases – such as the faminecausing 1782 Madras cyclone – Martineau is either unable or unwilling to document his
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accounts with contemporary sources. It is at this point, however, that his catalogue of
Coromandel cyclones becomes very detailed indeed. It is here, too, that we begin to see
the aftermath of disaster more directly addressed by the French colonial administration.

Climate in the Colonial Gaze
During the era of their greatest influence in the subcontinent through the first half
of the eighteenth century the French followed a policy of restoration of the Indian
territories to their legitimate rulers rather than simply expelling and replacing English
dominance with French. 121 The term "legitimate" is of course problematic here, for
Governor-General Dupleix's de facto policy was one of elaborate and intricate
gouvernement indirect, a practice by which the French were able to maintain control over
a region or population through the covert manipulation of its native government. General
Thomas Arthur, comte de Lally, dispatched to command the French expedition in India
when war broke out with England in 1756-57, submitted his view of the French role in
the subcontinent in the following terms:
La politique à suivre,c'est de commencer par exterminer les
Anglais dans l'Inde. Cela fait, il faut donner, en plein éclat
de la Victoire, l'exemple d'une modération qui conciliera le
respect et l'amour de tous les voisins. C’est le moment où
il faudra render toutes les provinces usurpées à leurs
souverains. 122
The policy being followed is to exterminate the English in
India.
If done [properly], this shining example of
temperance will win the love and respect of all our
neighbors. At this point all seized territories will be given
to their [rightful] rulers.
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It was the aggressive adoption of this policy that allowed the British first to establish
suzerainty and then sovereignty over India after the defeat and marginalization of the
French in India at the end of the Third Karnatic War. According to Jean-Marie Lafont
this policy was continued by the French to the end of the eighteenth century, but the
administration at Pondicherry was effectively barred from further practicing the policy by
the terms of the 1763 Treaty of Paris. Regardless of their policies across the greater
region during this period, it is evident that internally the administration at Pondicherry
undertook to control the hydrology of their colony and mitigate the worst effects of
seasonal flooding. That they were not always successful, as we saw above, is not entirely
surprising given that the exigencies of economy or of war often superseded the less than
immediate contingencies of the irregular requirement of flood mitigation.
The most complete record of flood in French Territories – likely in the whole of
southern India – remains Alfred Martineau’s monograph, Les cyclones à la côte
Coromandel de 1681 à 1916. Martineau, Governor-General of Pondicherry for most of
the second decade of the twentieth century, 123 was an amateur historian of some renown.
He focused his attentions on the French colonies, especially on l’Inde Française, with
several notable publications on commerce and political history.124

Martineau also

founded Le Société de l’Historique de Pondichéry and its journal, Revue Historique de
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Pondichéry, first published in 1916. 125 In only its second volume Martineau printed his
nearly one hundred page compendium of historical instances of storm and flood in the
French territories of India culminating with his own account of the disastrous cyclone of
1916, a storm that finally crippled Pondicherry as the major French port in the
subcontinent.
While Martineau’s interest in South Asian weather was quite personal – he was
governor when the 1916 tempest struck – European travelers had been providing
accounts of the seasonal monsoon for nearly two thousand years. 126 The earliest modern
accounts of monsoon were heavily descriptive, the urge to quantify such phenomena
under the rational scope of science not yet developed or wholly necessary to pre-colonial
trade with India. Writing at the beginning of the seventeenth century William Finch, who
arrived at Surat in 1608 under the command of William Hawkins, wrote that:
[T]he winter here beginneth about the first of June and
dureth till the twentieth of September; but not with
continuall rains, as at Goa, but for some sixe or seven dayes
every change and full, with much winde, thunder, and
raine. But at the breaking up cometh alway a cruell storm,
which they call the tuffon, fearefull even to men on land;
which is not alike extreame every yeare, but in two or three
at the most. Monsons heere for the south serve in Aprill
and September, and for Mocha in February and March.
From the south ships come hither in December, January
and February, and from Mocha about the fifth of
September, after the raines. 127
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Edward Terry, a near contemporary of Finch who had been appointed ambassador to
Ujjain in 1617, noted the seasonal rains in contrast to the hot season:
[The monsoons] blow constantly, altering but few points;
sixe moneths southerly, the other sixe northerly. The
moneths of Aprill and May, and the beginning of June till
the rayne fall, are so extreme hot as that the winde, blowing
but gently, receives such heate from the parched ground
that it much offends those that receive the breath of it...but
there is no countrey without some discommodities. 128
While such accounts continued to appear in the succeeding centuries it was only
from the middle of the nineteenth century that colonial officers stepped up their efforts to
catalog and classify every aspect of their empire, what James Scott has described as a
“project of legibility” 129 intended to simplify complex realities in order to make statecraft
possible.

This process creates “elaborate artifacts of knowledge” that necessarily

privilege certain facts over others. This process in manifest in official narratives that
frame storms as endangering the material instruments of the colonial apparatus, whatever
other risks they may pose to indigenous populations.
Weather patterns in the sub-continent attracted a great deal of attention from
colonial administrators, due in large part to the damaging effects of climate on commerce
and manpower. The cataloging of instances of cyclone on the Coromandel Coast was
part and parcel of the over-riding disciplinary regime determined to make the every
corner of the empire legible beneath the colonial gaze. Future administrators needed to
know what they were getting into, whether they were new to the colonies or simply new
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to the district.

As colonial influence expanded in the subcontinent, so too did the

boundaries of and need for utilitarian, documentary data.
As part of this project gazetteers, district guides, census ethnographies, and a
myriad of other publications were prepared for the benefit of administrators, military
officers, and other colonial personnel. Though information in such reference works was
sometimes negligible there was often at least some mention made of the prevailing
weather conditions that awaited new officials, merchants, and colonists. As with the
earliest descriptions, general accounts about the Indian climate revolved around two axes,
the wet season (monsoon) and the dry.

In addition to the scores of reports and

memoranda written by district collectors, tāsildārs, and other officers of the colonial
government, there were numerous publications on specific aspects of climate or storm
that were collated from this data: J. Glaisher’s 1863 Report on the Meteorology of India
in Relation to the Health of the Troops Stationed There, C. Meldrum’s 1873 Notes on the
Form of Cyclones in the South Indian Ocean, H.F. Blanford’s 1881 Note on Cyclones of
the West Coast, and a series of Cyclone Memoirs published serially in the late 1880s
under the direction of J. Eliot. There were also a variety of articles written about specific
incidents of storm in periodicals like The Indian Forester and Indian Meteorological
Memoirs.
One of the earliest of these monographs produced was J.E. Gastrell and H.F.
Blanford’s Report on the Calcutta Cyclone of the 5th October 1864. 130 Unlike gazetteers
and district guides, Gastrell and Blanford were able to give a complete accounting of the
cyclone, from a meteorological description of its formation and progress to a lengthy
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exposition of the havoc wrought to property, materiel, and life.

Their account is

particularly remarkable for very human face they put on the calamity, giving over nearly
three times the space to loss of life and vocation of the local population as they do to the
impact on colonial infrastructure and commerce. Their total estimated mortality from the
cyclone topped 48,000 concluding that “the deaths by the sickness which rages in the
districts swept by the storm-wave…would, in all probability, not be overestimated at
25,000 to 30,000.” 131 Adding impact to their report, the authors included first-hand
accounts from ships’ logs, lighthouse journals and the like in a series of appendices. One
such account read:
You may imagine it was not pleasant. We watched as
much as we could…the rise of the water; and sure enough,
though I did not see any actual bore, the water all at once
suddenly rose as if by magic, and slowly rolled towards us.
The top of the wave appearing to be only two or three feet
lower than the top of the bund [sic]. The people then
seized me and dragged me out of the ruined hut; and tried
to run away from the water….Finding it impossible to
make head against the wind, we sat and laid on the road,
forced to await the approach of the water. Of course I gave
myself up for lost. 132
1864 was a particularly bad year for cyclone damage on the western coast of
India. The storm described by Gastrell and Blanford on 5th October was followed by
additional cyclonic landfalls further south. The Imperial Gazetteer of India lists one
striking Masulipatnam, penetrating seventeen miles inland, inundating 780 square miles,
and killing upwards of 30,000 people. 133 The district collector at Kistna, G. Thornhill,
wrote to the Provincial Governor at Madras, “never before, anywhere, has so much loss
131
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occurred due to a cyclone. The cyclone-tidal surge combination resulted in a major
calamity. There are no words to describe it.” 134 Disasters on this scale had likely been
hardly imaginable to the English who found themselves displaced in the distant East, but
officers of the crown remained starkly utilitarian in their analysis of need during crisis,
writing for example in the 1880 Famine Commission Report, a necessary precursor to the
development of the Famine Codes, that:
…..the earlier despatches of the Bengal Government, while
breathing a tone of sincere compassion for the sufferings
occasioned by famine, are busied rather with its fiscal
results, as affecting the responsibility of the Company
towards its share holders, than with schemes, which would
have seemed wholly visionary, for counteracting the
inevitable loss of life. 135
The importance of understanding meteorology to the colonial project in south Asia is
underscored by the frequent references made to it from the mid-nineteenth century on.
The effect of climate on colonial officers and associated employees was of the utmost
importance to the East India Company, as Glaisher’s 1863 Report mentioned above
suggests. Six years later a civil surgeon by the name of Andrews contributed the entry on
climate published in D.F. Carmichael’s 1869 Manual of the District of Vizagapatam in
the Madras Presidency, in which he gave details on the general climatology of the
district. He wrote of the heaviest showers falling from April to the beginning of the
southwest monsoon in June. “In Jeypore country the heat is intense in the day, but the
nights are cool; the monsoon sets in early and is very heavy; it frequently rains
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incessantly for weeks together.” 136 These heavy rains, coupled with temperatures that
exceed 100 degrees “for weeks together,” were considered by Dr. Andrews to be
extremely injurious to the English constitution, and he dedicated three pages of his fourpage article to regional diseases caused by the Indian climate in the English man,
focusing especially on what he broadly described as “fevers” that so often attacked
Company men. Though it is probable that he was referring primarily to malaria, there
were other tropical effects as well – like Martin’s “extreme lassitude and mental
depression” – that contributed to the vague definition of “fever.” Notably, he attributed
the occurrence of leprosy as well to “the effects of a saline atmosphere.” 137
A similar description had been given a decade earlier by Robert Montgomery
Martin in his British India. He opened his exposition on Indian climate with a now
familiar definition: “The monsoons or prevailing winds within the tropics, as on the
Coromandel and Malabar coasts, are denoted the southwest and the northeast.” The
climate of Bengal was “tolerably cool” between November and January, but otherwise
unbearable, while in Madras the heat was “tempered by the sea.” His description of the
onset of monsoon itself is quite romantic and worth quoting at length:
I have known men and beasts to drop dead [of heat] in the
streets of Calcutta….When the monsoon is on the eve of
changing…respiration becomes laborious, and all animated
nature languishes. The horizon assumes a lurid glare,
deepening to a fiery glare…. [the] lambent flame [of
lightning] illumines each pitchy mass, until the entire
heavens seems to be ablaze…but at Madras…the scene in
one of awful grandeur. During the rains the air is saturated
with moisture; and the pressure of each square inch of the
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human frame causes extreme lassitude and mental
depression. 138
Others were more circumspect in their descriptions. As late as 1907 Baden Henry
Baden-Powell used monsoon as a foil for other climatic events rather than as an event
worthy of comment in itself. In Administration of Land Revenue in British India he gives
only a single page to weather in India, most of which was devoted to describing what he
called simply “the rains,” which could vary from steady rainfall to occasional downpours
to “the air [only] becoming somewhat moister.” 139
But Baden-Powell’s work implied a key connection that is uncommon in the
colonial literature at large, namely that between climate and its effects on larger
structures: economic, military, cultural, and infrastructural,a connection that was made
explicitly by T.C. Hodson in his 1931 Census Ethnography:
In Bengal the thatched roof is hog-backed to increase the
resistance of the gable to the roof-lifting cyclones, while of
the west coast the typical Nayar house has picaresquely
[sic] cocked gables on a very steeply pitched tiled roof the
better to resist the torrential rain.140
This is the only mention Hodson made of the Indian climate, but it is telling in that it
links traditional local practice directly to long-term strategies for mitigating known risks,
a subject that will be taken up in detail as regards the Tamil lands in chapter 4. Let it be
said in preface, however, that local mechanisms for coping with regional climate have
often ignored in the conceptualization of both colonial and post-colonial “modernizing”
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projects. Given the early and frequent attention to meteorology, it should be surprising
that once in to print in the mid-19th century so many descriptions of climate in India
remained largely unchanged over the next half century, but in the process of making the
colonized “legible” colonial administrators needed facts that gave them a synoptic view
of an otherwise complicated picture.

Grouping facts into artifacts by the colonial

apparatus required “collapsing or ignoring distinctions that might otherwise be
relevant.” 141
French officials and scientists were also interested in the climate of their colonies,
but interestingly some of the most prescient comments about climate in India came from
a political scientist. Joseph Chailley – a doctor of law, professor at l’École libre des
sciences politiques, journal editor and founder of an institute dedicated to the study of the
development of the colonies – offered very much the same kinds of details regarding the
Indian climate described by Martin, Andrews, Baden-Powell and the various gazetteers,
but he came to very different conclusions. Unlike his predecessors he first made it very
clear that the monsoons were “the critical period of the year” because the harvest – and
thus the survival of the whole of India – “depends on the character if the rainfall.” 142 He
readily admitted that the climates of India were “harsh and trying,” and that “sun and rain
combine to develop a humidity and a tension which are alike weakening,” but he came to
a rather different conclusion than his predecessors, namely that English administrators
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must “make careful and attentive study of local hygienic conditions” that these conditions
might be adapted the service of the administration. 143
Chailley was of course not the first Frenchman to record his impressions of the
climate in the colonies. 144 Concurrent with English observers, the French were also busy
cataloguing information about their colonies in the mid-nineteenth century. Unlike the
contemporaneous British accounts discussed above, French writing on meteorology often
sought to capture a different perspective:
Les chétives masures d’argile des malheureux natifs se
détrempent sous cette avalanche continue, leurs toits
s’écroulent et les ensevelissent, ou bien ils se trouvent
exposés à toutes les intempéries de l’atmosphère et
périssent en grand nombre. C’est l’époque d’une immense
misère qui n’epargne pas meme les riches et les
conquérant; les reptiles les plus odieux, inondés dans leurs
gîtes, s’élarcent à la surface de la terre et cherchant un
abri parmi les habitations des hommes. De nombreuses
varieties de couleuvres, de mille-pattes, de scorpions
remontent vos escaliers, enhavahissent vos demeures et
s’intoduisent dans tous les appartements. Il est impossible
de faire un pas dans sa chamber la nuit, sand lumiére, sans
s’exposer à une morsure qui peut être mortelle. Il faut de
défier de tout ce que l’on touché; un dard cruel peut vous
assassiner au fond d’une botte ou dans la manche d’un
habit.
The wretched houses of the unlucky natives get drenched in
the unceasing avalanche [of rain], their roofs collapse to
bury them or leave them exposed to the inclement
conditions to perish in great number. It is a time when the
wealthy and the conquerors suffer alike [with the poor].
The most odious reptiles, flooded from their holes, seek
143
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refuge in the homes of men. All variety of snake, centipede
and scorpion take shelter in back stairwells and in every
room. It is impossible to walk across the room at night
without a light for fear of exposure to a bite that might
prove fatal. One must be wary of all one touches, for a
cruel sting might be found in a shoe or coat sleeve. 145
And while there are no monographs similar to Gastrell and Blanford’s written about
Indian cyclones, that a similar interest in storms was entertained by French writers and
audiences is evidenced by such texts as Zurcher and Margollé’s Trombes et cyclones
(1876), Gauthier-Villars’ Nouvelle etudes sur les tempêtes, cyclones, trombes ou
tornados (1897) and two separate volumes describing a particularly fierce Atlantic
hurricane: Duquesnay’s Mémoire du cyclone de la Martinique (1891) and Édouard
Fortier’s Un Cyclone dans Les Antilles (1894). 146

General almanacs and colonial

gazetteers with general meteorological information as well as specific regional data
began to appear in the mid-nineteenth century as well, though these tended towards
enormous compendiums spanning the breadth of the French colonial world. 147
In short, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards there were produced a great
many works specifically treating the climates of the colonies. The circulation of these
works gave colonial administrators a baseline knowledge from which to approach storm
and inundation in the colonies to which they might be sent or already found themselves
assigned. Part of the motivation behind the publication of “disaster memoires” and other
such monographs, while giving the historian deeper access to the contemporary
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perceptions of major events, was perhaps little different from the voyeuristic pleasure
derived of books documenting various contemporary calamities and the “disaster
tourism” that has followed recent calamities in Haiti and Asia. But more significantly
these works contributed to the project of legibility undertaken to provide colonial
administrations with the synoptic gaze necessary reduce the chaotic realities of the
colonies to objects of rational observation.

Le Établissement Français dans l’Inde
In tracing the genealogy of emergency management in the French territories of
India the last decades of the eighteenth century have little to reveal. The town was
immediately reduced to a ruin (Illus. 2.6), and over the next half century Pondicherry was

Illus. 2.6 View of the Ruins of the Citadel, September 1762
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under the direct control of the British more often than it was the French. Whatever was
rebuilt during the brief periods of French control was razed again when the British
regained the town in 1778, 1793, and 1803.
When the town was finally ceded to France in 1816 there was nothing left but
“ruins and desolation.” 148 The outer boulevard as it exists today was not laid until 1824,
the grand bazaar two years later, nor the canal extended north into the nearby village of
Muthialpet until 1827. Even Martineau, with unfettered access to the French files in
Pondicherry, could offer only the barest of details for the cyclones that occurred between
1761 and 1830, using only two and a half pages to discuss fifteen separate storms: in
1795 “Un cyclone s’abbattit sur le district du South Arcot, causant des pertes immenses
aux récoltes”; in 1807 “il y un violent ouragan à Madras”; again in 1818 “Violente
tempête à Madras”; and again in 1827 “Tempête à Madras, six navires brisés et beaucoup
de pertes subies sur terre.” 149
It is possible that, given the political unrest in Pondicherry in these years, the
primary records from which Martineau was able to draw for his study were British, and
he in fact cites the Imperial Gazetteer several times. Of the nine storms which occurred
during the British occupation only two reference Pondicherry, and knowledge of one of
these came to Martineau only through a 1842 report written by then Governor du
Camper, who compared the 18 November 1842 storm to one that occurred in 1800 but, as
Martineau opined about the earlier storm: nous ne possédon aucun detail sur cet
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événement, “no other details come to us.” 150 Reliably accessible government records
made prior to 1823 – the year when the colonial administration began to annually collate
the Bulletin des Actes Administratif – do not even exist in the modern Pondicherry
archive.
These Bulletins are an invaluable resource, but in the first quarter century of its
existence it published no administrative orders issued in response to any of the various
emergencies or crises that came to appear so numerously in the last half of the nineteenth
century: cyclone, inundation, hurricane (ouragan), famine (disette), aid or relief (secours).
Despite the fact that these terms all begin to appear quite frequently in bulletins,
dispatches and arrêtés after 1854, it of course cannot be assumed that such things did not
occur prior to that during the first four decades of Le Etablissement. We in fact know this
to be so by entries in British gazetteers and by Governor du Camper’s referential letter
cited below. Rather these issues did not have the administrative traction that they came
to have in later years.
The first major cyclone to strike the colony after the re-establishment of French
control came in early December 1830. According to a letter written by Governor de
Mélay to the foreign minister on January 29, 1831, 151 the storm destroyed a large part of
the crops, destroyed nearly all of the fruit trees and damaged houses for a radius of six
miles around the town.

The botanical garden, the first of its kind in India, was

completely devastated and “the promenade, recently completed at great cost, was littered
with debris torn off the sea wall by the double action of the rain and the sea.” The
governor called the Conseil privé in order to discuss what measures should be taken by
150
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the government for the immediate relief of the poorest inhabitants, “a great many whom
are without shelter from their ruined huts.” Governor Mélay continued to explain, almost
apologetically, how the necessary expenses of relief would likely impact revenue. “We
should have put in effect the orders of the Ministry, especially as regards the current
discrepancy between receipts and expenses, which only aggravates the difficulty of our
position.”
The relief measures finally settled upon were to set the tone for all future relief
efforts undertaken by the French administration. A three man committee was appointed
to distribute Rs. 500 in aid for the reconstruction of paillotes, a word which was only
used to refer to Indian houses of the meanest stature. A further Rs. 108 was dispersed
equally among the 54 inhabitants of Tangattitu, an island of coconut plantations inside
the mouth of the Chunnambar River. Nearly 500 damaged trees were felled and removed
but, oddly, the cost of their removal was the responsibility of the island’s inhabitants,
each of whom had been given money to rebuild their destroyed homes.
Affected populations engaged in vocations necessary to trade were assisted on
credit. Weavers in Orleanspuram and Desbassysnspuram were advanced nearly 500
pagodas to rebuild, twelve pagodas per house, over twenty times the amount given to the
poorer plantation workers south of the town. Interestingly, the repayment of the amount
given to the weavers was guaranteed by the privately owned textile manufacture Poulain
and Company, a move that only served to underscore the importance of the weavers to
the financial success of private French enterprise; the move is further remarkable for the
fact that the financial stability of Poulain and Company had only been recently been
guaranteed, in fact only the previous year, through an injection of funds from Arbuthont,
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a firm based in Madras. 152 Chelinque owners, those who plied the cargo between the
ship and shore in small masula boats, were advanced 100 pagodas to rebuilt their
launches as well as given a onetime relief of Rs. 46 each, slightly more that the weavers.
Betel growers – a frequent recipient of future relief aid – were also given aid, while nonbetel farmers’ requests for relief were rejected on the grounds that damages totaled less
than half the value of their farms. A plantation owner who lost 94% of his coconut and
83% of his total crop was only given a tax remission of 64%. Consequent to the storm,
manpower was reduced by the administration to minimize economic impact over the
following year. Predicted general receipts for 1831 were revised downwards from 50,000
to 30,000 francs, even through taxes on alcohol were expected to jump from 52,000
francs to 63,000; land tax forecasts (les redevances foncières) were similarly reduced
from 277,000 to 267,000 francs.
Several things can be surmised from the pattern of relief laid following the 1830
cyclone. The first is that while the administration had stabilized since the handover
fifteen years prior there was still a great deal of uncertainty between Paris and
Pondicherry. There is implicit in de Mélay’s letter a certain expectation of support from
Paris. Nevertheless, it appears that the local administration was caught unprepared for
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any large-scale crisis, the eventuality of which was perhaps foreseen by the Ministry in
its issuing fiscal orders the governor admitted to not carrying out. The second fact that
can be teased out of de Mélay’s account is the close relationship between local weavers
and Europeans in the town. The importance of cloth manufacture to Pondicherry during
this period cannot be overestimated, but it is notable that the only monies guaranteed to
be repaid by a third party were those given to the weavers.
The third fact that can be drawn out from the relief schedule outlined by de Mélay
is the relative status of laborers in the colony. The poorest inhabitants, those day laborers
on the l’île de cocotiers, those most likely to suffer the longest from the after effects of
the cyclone and those likely living in the meanest conditions received the least, two
rupees per family, an amount deemed sufficient to rebuild their damaged homes but not
so much in total (only 31 pagodas) that its loss through non-repayment would greatly
impact the colonies finances.

Similarly, farmers of limited external importance –

subsistence farmers and those raising food for consumption in the colony – were denied
any relief at all while those with trade value – plantation owners and betel nut growers –
were given significant ex gratia aid that amounted to twenty times what the poorest
laborers received in addition to substantial loans. Weavers, too, received large loans
from the government that were guaranteed by a third party, and while these guarantees
cannot be equated with ex gratia doles received by laborers and chelingues they do
amount to a distinct advantage in terms of ease of recovery over other victims.
One final characteristic of the response needs to be taken forward from the 1830
cyclone. The relief committee that was appointed for the oversight of aid became a
common feature of disaster response in the French colonies from this point forward.
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Over time its constitution would enlarge and alter, eventually enfranchising Indians as the
French administration gave more rights to local Tamils. These committees came to
reflect in a small way the political environment that pertained between the Indians and
the French at any given time.
Shortly after the colony recovered from the 1830 cyclone an order was issued by
Governor de Mélay to regulate charitable contributions for the “amelioration of the poor
from their circumstances,” presumably a direct consequence of experiences during the
prior year. The text of the Arrête relative à la perception de contributions directes et
indirectes cited as its motivation the “inevitable fraud” likely to result from the
contravention of fair distribution of aid by the government. The order went on to set
specific rates of duty on everything from grains and salt, to bangh and alcohol, river
passage enumerated by species and number, and littoral shellfish and shark fin in order to
fund monetary efforts at relief. 153 Interestingly, the ordinance specifically guaranteed
that complaints of fraud would not be summarily dismissed by the court because of
defects in the complainants’ paperwork, providing that there was sufficient proof to
proceed.

This provision seems to have been included in an effort to make such

complaints easier to file by those most likely to be the subject of such frauds, namely
those poorest and least educated Indians least able complete formal procedures in French.
This ordinance formed a foundation upon which flood response orders were issued for
more than a century. Together with a handful of arrêtes passed by mid-century and the
continued evolution of the disaster management committee first given shape in 1830, the
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French administration appeared committed both to financing emergency response and
ensuring that such response was just and equitable.
Betel cultivation seemed particularly targeted by the administration for crisis
related regulation and taxation. An 1849 ordinance registered penalties on illegal betel
nut cultivation, citing the 1832 arrête and an earlier administrative order from 1826.
Crops and proceeds from such cultivation would be confiscated and the growers would
be fined between five and twelve francs – monies intended to finance future relief costs –
and imprisoned for up to five days. 154 Yet another order, enacted four months after a
November 1852 cyclone destroyed much of the betel crop, temporarily prohibited the
export of betel from Villenour district for three months and imposed a one-sixth
reduction of taxes on its sale when exportation to Pondicherry and its suburbs was reinstituted in July. Penalties for contravention of this temporary order were again tied to
the 1832 and 1849 ordinances. 155 The betel growers themselves were also given ex
gratia payments to cover subsistence during the sales ban, 156 a provision that was to be
given to fishers in Pondicherry a century and a half later.

Planning on the Past
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century a curious change in crisis policy in the
broader Indian Ocean colonies can be noticed in official documents. Relief aid in the
form of government guaranteed loans and ex gratia payments had been common in
l’Etablissement since 1830, but the great famine in southern India in 1876-78 that elicited
widespread sympathy in both Britain and France and prompted the 1880 Famine
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Commission in British India marked a shift: the first outpouring of private sector relief
subscriptions in French India. On the floor of the 28 December 1877 Ordinary Session of
the Conseil Colonial, Ponnutambipillai spoke eloquently and at length:
“[I]n the face of the dolorous circumstances that have come
to India this year, please permit me, in the name of my
constituents, to publicly honor the great solicitude of the
government and the remarkable devotion of the generous
souls (des cœurs généreux) who have done such
exceptional relief work….The merchants, moved by noble
sentiment, are uniting in their efforts to assure the
provisionment of our town…Indeed, after encouraging a
great many donations in both India and France, aid raised
by the representatives of this chamber as well as those
placed in local government, much good has been
achieved….The Indian population is profoundly moved by
[your] interest and generous assistance [and] this public
expression of our sincere gratitude is the only thanks it is in
our power to give.” 157
In his speech on the council floor Ponnutambipillai noted the combined efforts of
government and the private sector as well as the contributions of the Catholic Church in
the figures of “Abbé Desaint of the foreign mission and many honorable inhabitants of
Pondicherry.” He was also keen to mention the assistance of the Viceroy of India, who
agreed to export grain from English ports to both Pondicherry and Karaikal “for the
duration of the famine,” noting with pleasure the humility of the French governor in
asking for foreign aid. 158
Governor Adolph Trillard, in his comments opening the session, noted other
factors in mitigating the crisis.

He spoke of charitable alms, notably those of the

monsignor of Flaviopolis and its missionaries, “whose distribution of abundant alms has
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lightened our load to a great degree.” 159 Trillard also noted a lessened severity of the
famine in Karaikal, which he attributed to la constitution de sa propriete fonciere et a
l'organisation particuliere du travail agricole, “the nature of landed property and the
specific nature of agricultural work [there].” But even more telling is how he described
the situation in the other colonies:
Dans les autres Etablissements, il y a eu aussi de la gêne et
des privations, par suite de l’elevation du prix du riz; mais
les populations les ont supportees courageusement,
comprenant que les ressources disponsibles devaient etre
d'abord affectes au soulagement des grandes miseres. 160
In the other colonies [of Mahe and Yanam] there was also
inconvenience and privation, due in part to the rising cost
of rice, but the inhabitants have bravely endured, chiefly by
apportioning the available resources to those in most need.
It is not surprising in the least that charity, particularly from a religious organization that
had long hewn to a path of giving alms to the most vulnerable, formed a great portion of
the relief given during the famine. Trillard’s vocal praise of private citizens in Mahe and
Yanam is more interesting, particularly as they were named apart from the populace in
Pondicherry. Though it only hints at what conditions must have been among the most
indigent in the town at the peak of the crisis, it does suggest somewhat less amity in the
town than in the French hinterlands.
Eleven months earlier, on 6 February 1877, Deputy Secretary of State,
Commodore 161 Roussin, telegrammed from Paris confirming a vote by the assembly to
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approve a credit of 100,000 francs for famine relief in the Indian colonies. 162 This action
alone was remarkable evidence of the extreme urgency of the situation in India. Prior to
the famine Pondicherry had been self-sufficient in matters of emergency management;
rarely had it been necessary for the colonial administration to request direct aid from
Paris, as the Ministry noted with due appreciation five years earlier, in 1872, when five
years of remarkably heavy cyclonic activity caused the administration to spend nearly
60,000 francs on relief and repair between 1867 and 1873. Vice Admiral Pothuau,
Minister of the Navy and the Colonies, wrote a lengthy letter to then Governor Pierre
Aristide Faron commenting on l’Etablissement’s efforts at flood relief.

His last

paragraph was a remarkable admission of Paris’s own shortcomings and Pondicherry’s
success:
Je vois, d'ailleurs, avec satisfaction, que vous comptez
trouver dans le ressources ordinaires du budget de la
colonie les moyens d'effecteur les réparations les plus
urgentes que peut réclamer l'Etat des routes et de édifices
endommagés par ce cyclone. Je ne pui que vous encourage
dans cette voie, car le situation du budget de l'etat ne
permettrait, vous le savez, d'allouer aucun secours à la
colonie sur le fonds du Trésor public. 163
I see with much satisfaction that you expect to find the
means within the regular operating budget of the colony to
affect the most urgent repairs to the roads and buildings
damaged by the cyclone. I encourage you in this direction
because, as you know, the current state of the budget will
not allow relief aid to be allocated from the public treasury.
In fact, in prior years in which cyclonic activity begat debate in the council and cost
outlays for relief or repair was approved and publicized in the various décrets, arrêtes,
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decisions, etc., in each case in the public record, necessary funds were always made to fit
within the existing operating budget of the l’Etablissement. The 100,000 franc credit
approved by the assembly in Paris in February 1877, then, was not only extraordinary for
its size – in fact sixty percent larger than the combined expenses for relief registered in
the years 1867-1873 – but for its metropolitan provenance.
In October 1877, Governor Trillard asked permission to publish a public
subscription for aid against the famine and consequent threat of cholera, underscoring the
burgeoning cosmopolitan environment in which aid for distant disaster was beginning to
circulate. Vice Admiral Albert Auguste Gicquel des Touches approved the request in a
telegram from Paris on October 27th saying that the request for donation would be
distributed as an insert in Le Moniteur de la Flotte, 164 an publication whose intended
audience included every person served by the French fleet, be they sailors in Bordeaux or
colonists in Africa and the Indies.
In the long term, Pondicherry and its dependencies seemed to have endured the
privations and sufferings caused by the long famine with the assistance of government
and religious charities, but even more important were the work and contributions of
private citizens, the apparently abiding sense of communitas, and organizational
strategies put into place before the crisis took hold.

As the draught ended – a

circumstance foreseen by Governor Trillard in his December 28, 1877, comments
regarding the “favorable change in monsoon conditions and the influence of the
northeasterly winds which have already exerted an effect on public health” – Admiral
Pothuau expressed his gratitude “to those who showed their devotion during the crisis
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that traversed the colony.”

Governor Trillard, in an earlier dispatch to Paris, had

requested that several “honorable Indians” – Sandirapillai, S. Subrapillai, Arunagirichetty
and Cinnakichenachetty – be recognized for their tireless efforts during the famine.
Pothuau agreed, giving to each man a gold medal and assuring the governor that he
would consider more commendations. He closed his communiqué with an expression of
personal gratitude:
Now that the colony is finally released from this long crisis,
I would like to personally express my gratitude to you for
your devotion and charity and for the measures which you
have taken. 165
In subsequent years private sector donations became increasingly common as an
internal method to fund relief aid in the colonies. Following a cyclone in New Caledonia,
Governor Clément-Thomas approved a motion requested by the Ministry in Paris to open
another public collection in the French settlements of India to aid victims of the
disaster. 166 A central collection committee was established with both French and Indian
members including the Tamil councilor general, Maridas Duraissamipillai, and K.
Lakshmanissamichettiar, described on the register only as a “notable resident,” a move
that further underscored the increasing importance of Indians in the politics and policy of
the French colonies in the dying years of the nineteenth century.
By 1885 the government in Paris had seemingly grown weary of the stream of
crises to strike their Indian subjects. Torrential rains in late 1884 had flooded both
Pondicherry and Karaikal, causing never before seen levels of damage. Martineau’s
account itemized property damage at over 800,000 francs, with 180,000 francs for
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immediate relief aid to individuals and an additional 57,000 to parish relief subsidies.
While Martineau suggested that l’Etablissement asked for one million francs in relief
subsidy, a January 1885 letter from the Under-Secretary of the Colonies, Félix Faure,
coupled with telegrams sent between Paris and Pondicherry the previous month belie that
assertion:
After receiving your telegram of 22 December, Admiral
Peyron communicated with the Council of Ministers who
decided to ask the Assembly for a credit of 500,000 fr. for
the aid of the French population of India [in] this terrible
trial of flood. This credit was immediately approved by the
assembly and demonstrates the sentiments of solidarity
which the capital feels for its colonies. 167
This communiqué followed on the heels of two telegrams sent in response to the
governor’s initial request for aid: a December 30th telegram which confirmed the receipt
of the governor’s request for 500,000 franc credit for repairs resulting from the flooding
that asked for a survey of the disaster detailing damages to roads and bridges and
estimating the cost to re-outfit masonry bridges with metalled bridges and a second on the
following day that read: Vous ouvre les trois cent mille franc restant. Envoyes rapport,
devis. Urgence. “You opened a 300,000 franc credit. Send report immediately.” And as
had increasingly been the case over the last decade, private charity rivaled assistance
given by the administration. Martineau singled out five Indians by name, all of whom
were Chettiars – two private dubashes and a third a municipal councilman – for their
singular efforts at relieving the town’s distress as well as the mayor of Oulgaret who,
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“with great zeal,” distributed out of his own resources food among the residents of the
town. 168
By the end of the nineteenth century several facets of the emergency response
mechanism in Pondicherry had been firmly established. Since 1830 each new storm
disaster begat an oversight committee was appointed with duties that covered damage
surveys and fair distribution of relief, and as the century advanced Indians were
increasingly appointed as members. During the same period a series of laws were passed
to insure equity and prevent fraud arising from relief operations. During the last quarter
of the century, after a period of consecutive years with excessively heavy rains and
flooding, public collections and private charity became a much larger factor in
emergency relief, not only in India but across the French colonies, while at the same time
there developed in l’Etablissement a new reliance on direct assistance from the metropole
in stark contrast to the fiscal situation pertaining in the colony prior to 1875. This brings
us finally to a period of decline into stagnation in emergency response in the French
territories that endured for well over a century.

I will the close this chapter with

Martineau’s own account of the 1916 cyclone, an event that set the mold for emergency
response strategies in an independent Pondicherry in the last half of the twentieth century,
the period that most shaped expectations in the wake of the 2004 tsunami.
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The 1916 Cyclone and 20th Century Status Quo
“The entire population was kept awake the entire night by
the noise of the tempest and the anxiety it induced.
Residents busied themselves to secure their homes against
the growing damage they were powerless to
prevent…Power was suddenly lost at 9 p.m., plunging the
town into a impenetrable darkness, leaving residents with
no other means of illumination, causing even greater panic.
The ceaseless rain penetrated nearly every European, brickbuilt home leaving their occupants to pass the night in a
most precarious condition. The situation was much worse
in the slums of the native town, where residents found
themselves deprived of shelter in an instant.” 169
Alfred Martineau, as has already been noted, was Governor of Pondicherry for the
majority of the second decade of the twentieth century (1910-1911, 1913-1918) and an
accomplished historian of the colonies. His monograph on Coromandel cyclones remains
the most complete histories of storm in India and reading it one comes to recognize in
Martineau the character of a story-teller. While his narrative is often detail oriented and
highly descriptive, as a writer he was very clearly moved by the plight of men rendered
powerless by the forces of nature, and he made it clear that the forces unleashed during
the 1916 cyclone were unquestionably the motivation behind his study:
The Indians who assisted during this cyclone [in 1916] had
never seen its like, even in their childhood; the oldest
among them remember only that their fathers talk about a
disaster that may have been comparable, the cyclone that
ravaged the colony in 1842. 170
In introducing his study of the 1916 storm he describes the natural desire to compare
events but notes, too, that it is often impossible to accurately judge events at a distance.
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“In this matter we can make only approximate judgments, though comparing the
evidence suggests this last [cyclone] to be the most violent.”
Recovery efforts took their shape from prior mobilizations of flood relief
strategies in the colonies. As in all instances of natural disaster since 1832, a survey
committee of eleven members was constituted within a week of the disaster. 171
Surprisingly, as it was originally constituted the committee included no Indian members
at all and had to be amended less than a week later. 172 The damage caused by the storm
was indeed spectacular. All roads, rail, and telegraph connecting the town to its suburbs
and beyond had been disrupted. In the majority of cases, connection was re-established
within days, though the road linking the town to the fisher community at Kalapet was
impassable for six weeks. Messages to Madras and to Paris had first to be carried 25
kilometers to Villapuram. The textile industry was struck with particular violence with
three major cotton mills – Gaebelé in Kosapalaiyam, Savana (formerly Poulain et Cie.),
and L’usine Rodier (Anglo-French) – all taking major losses. Heavy residential losses
were also recorded. Damage in the French quarter was estimated over a quarter million
rupees. In the larger, native section of town – by this time referred to as la ville indigene
in preference to la ville noire – “was treated most cruelly,” in the governor’s words; the
number of houses destroyed or “very heavily damaged” was counted at 18,857.
Prior even to the constitution of the disaster commission, the administration
approved an initial sum of Rs. 50,000 to see to the immediate needs of the town, the first
priority being the distribution of rice. It then fell to the commission to decide the most
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practical and efficient ways to distribute further aid. In a circular published on December
7th it was announced that Rs. 25,000 had been approved to be distributed to families
inhabiting houses destroyed in la ville indienne. Each house would be apportioned
between one and three rupees for reconstruction – notably less than had been given to
victims of the 1832 flood – with higher amounts given to those in the town center where
it was assumed that building costs would be higher and materials harder to find. The
circular further assured that cases in which the fixed maximum was insufficient could be
appealed to local committees appointed by individual communes. In an effort to insulate
itself from inevitable criticism the commission made its intentions clear:
We wish to remind members of the local committees that
this aid is not an indemnity representing the absolute value
of the damages. [The amount] is the aid judged by the
Colony as necessary to allow the population to try to
provide expenses for their immediate need. Having
established the mean rate per hut [paillote], the total has
been fixed in respect to the proportion given previously
under similar circumstances, notably in France. 173
The committee was finally enjoined to keep well maintained records of all payments,
including the signature of each recipient.
The next duty of the commission was to see to the removal fallen trees, a need of
seeming little significance in itself but one that had plagued relief efforts in Pondicherry
since 1832. In order to speed removal the administration auctioned rights to the trees on
the condition that winning bidders accept responsibility for their removal. An unforeseen
consequence of this market solution to tree removal was that timber prices in the territory
plummeted and the administration had to step in again to offer price supports. 174
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Any expectation of aid from the capital was dashed when a subsidy approved by
the state to the colony several years earlier was withdrawn due to the cost of the war in
Europe. Neither was l’Etablissement able to underwrite any additional expenses out of
the operating budget. As a result, notwithstanding the Rs. 25,000 already approved by
the commission for the reconstruction of paillotes, “it was left to the victims to repair
their own losses, which they undertook with the fortitude that animates man in even the
most desperate of circumstances.” 175
There was for Martineau no natural law derivable from the history of Coromandel
cyclones that might allow him to predict the future. “The only certainty,” he wrote, “is
that such calamities will occur again,” and for this reason he pointedly made no attempt
to draw historical conclusions. Here he stood in marked contrast to Anandaranga Pillai
and others who followed – and who still follow – customary sastric sciences that they
believed to be indeed capable of making such predictions. Martineua wrote of his study
that “c’est un simple récit des luttes de l’homme contre les forces aveugles mais toutes
puissantes de la nature,” “it is a simple narrative of man’s struggle against the blind,
insuperable power of nature.” 176 And this short view is unfortunate, for as an historian
Martineau was in the best position to see that the decisions he made had been shaped by
the decisions of his predecessors: the formation of disaster commissions, the inclusion of
respected Indians in the formation and execution of emergency policy, the privatization
of debris removal, and the ever-increasing use of internal public donation schemes and
lotteries to raise relief funds.

None of the relief measures approved by Martineau

appeared for the first time in 1916, and examined over the long durée it should have been
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possible to see the progression of response mechanisms developing over the course of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
These were the mechanisms that were in place and in practice in the dying years
of l’Etablissement and which were part and parcel of independent administrations from
mid-century until the 2004 tsunami. As we shall see in the following chapter, the
regimes of emergency response developed by the French were still very much in place
after independence and continued to form the basis for crisis management even into the
21st century. It was not until ninety years after Martineau’s study pointedly took no
lessons from how own history that the administration in Pondicherry finally began to reevaluate the ways in which government could better respond to disaster.
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‐3‐
Intermezzo: Entrenched Regimes of Response
By the mid-twentieth century the matrix of patterns of response to flood in the
French territories of India had been established and remained largely unchanged until the
monumental paradigm shift signaled by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. As discussed in
the last chapter, at least from 1830 the administration of l’Inde française responded to
flood reactively, instituting a matrix of response mechanisms that continued to develop
over the course of the nineteenth century; new instances of cyclone begat responses
rooted on decisions made by previous governors, each subsequent administration keeping
most of what came before, modifying some, and adding somewhat less.

By 1916

entrenched regimes of response to crisis had ossified into patterns that are recognizable in
the initial response to the 2004 tsunami.
In this chapter I will discuss these patterns as they were mobilized in the dying
years of l’Etablissement and the first decades of the independent Union Territory of
Pondicherry. I will limit my discussion to those instances that can be reasonably said to
belong to what I call “parcenary memory,” a theoretical amplification of what Jan
Assman called “communicative memory,”178 because it was only through the deployment
of such memories that beliefs about the functional, administrative history of the Union
Territory came to be established.

Policies enacted by later administrations did not

develop through the studied examination of historical documents but rather through the
structures of everyday discourse. Their creation was more often rooted in what people
said about policy than what documents showed about them.

Having examined the

development of the historical policies of flood management in chapter 2, I now turn
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towards drawing out how these policies were imagined and understood by later
administrators who made decisions based upon a framework of beliefs erected around
them post-1954.
Using archival documents from the 1940s and 1950s I will describe the crisis
management strategies in place at the time of the de facto merger of the French territories
with India in 1954 before exploring the exceptional and unprecedented response to an
enormous cyclonic event in early November 1977. Drawing from archival sources and
interviews with long-time administrators I will then tease out the two over-arching
narratives that most shaped decision-making regarding flood response in the Union
Territory prior to 2004: that the French administration was somehow “better” at planning
and response and that historical data that could have framed policy discussions was
destroyed during the merger. This will set the stage for the remaining chapters, in which
I will discuss the shift that took place in the Union Territory regarding mechanisms of
disaster management carried forward into the 21st century.

Reactive Responses and Responsibility
After the end of World War II France was almost immediately confronted with
efforts to decolonize the empire. The establishment of the French Union under the
charter of the Fourth Republic – primarily a political calculation intended to remove
indigène status from French subjects – had failed to avert the beginning of the First
Indochina War in December of 1946 or the Malagasy Uprising in 1947. In India,
l’Etabblisement français allowed a referendum in the following year, 1948, allowing the
Indian colonies to decide whether or not to join the newly independent Republic of India.
Chandernagore, the northernmost enclave located on the Hooghly Rover, elected to join
125

India while the other four colonies chose to remain a part of the French Union.179
Though the writing was on the wall, so to speak, for the moment France retained control
over its southern Indian colonies.
On March 31, 1948, the residents of Oulgaret petitioned the colonial
administration to repair a drainage culvert along the road to Bommianpet, a drain meant
to direct the flow of rain water safely away from residences. Three weeks later, on April
21, the Finance Commission of the Assemblée Représentative de l’Inde Française
referred the request to the Department of Public Works for review, a decision that the
debate transcript makes clear was far from unanimous:
Paquirissamypoullé: “I don’t understand this attitude on
the part of the Finance Commission. This petition was
presented to us on 31 March, and it is now 21 April. What
purpose is there in referring this matter to Public Works?”
Lambert Saravane: “The Finance Commission is not
responsible for the execution of works.”
Saint-Jean: “But this is an urgent case!” 180
Nine months later, in December, hand-loom weavers Pondicherry town petitioned the
assembly for relief from their “miserable lives.” 181 Their request was transferred to the
Service du Ravitaillement where it languished, evidence of the now weakened ties
between l’Etablissement and the weavers’ community. And again, in September 1953,
sixteen agriculturalists in Cotchery, Karaikal District, requested the administration
provision them with a bridge across the Nattar River, which became impassible during
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monsoon. 182 The Finance Commission refused the request on the grounds that there was
no pressing need to provide such a structure during a time of looming budget deficits.
There is discernible in these documents a sense of ennui within the French
administration in Pondicherry.

This is not to suggest that the administration had

disassociated itself from the needs of its Indian citizens, but rather that the debates
recorded from this period evoke a feeling of exhaustion. The French no longer governed
l’Etablissement as if they expected to remain in the subcontinent for the foreseeable
future. 183

Despite this there remains a sense of responsibility to the towns as

infrastructures in themselves, particularly Pondicherry town, where maintenance and
improvements continued even while new projects were no longer commonly approved.
In a report published by the Public Works Department in 1941, two projects intended to
improve the existing through-flow of water through the town were detailed. Building on
prior infrastructure projects, Public Works proposed to completely pave the Grand Canal
to its northern extremity at the channel dividing Pondicherry town from Kuruchikuppam
and extend the southern reach of the canal to the railroad bridge connecting the port spur
to the main trunk line. 184 It was not so much the urban center but the hinterlands that felt
the pinch.
Storms continued to affect the region during final decades of l’Etablissement, but
none were to strike again with the force of the 1916 cyclone. Response strategies,
however, remained stable during this period, relying on the precedents set by prior
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administrators. Instead of innovating mitigation strategies or seeking to improve the
resilience of the populations most vulnerable to storm, under the leadership of Governor
Bonvin – who acted as governor from 1938-1945 – the territories settled into an
unresolved tension between meeting the colonies immediate needs and not exceeding the
now precarious finances of the colony. 185
The first crisis met by the recently established Territoire d’outre mer – what
l’Inde française came to be known as under the French Union – was not a flood but a
series of fires. The worst of these destroyed thirteen paillotes in Mariammankoilpet, la
Grand Aldée, Karaikal. Smaller fires burned houses around Pondicherry town in April
and May of 1951. In a report submitted to the chief administrator of Karaikal, Police
Chief Forgeat not only estimated the total damage (Rs. 865) but itemized the damage per
household. 186 This is an interesting document in that while damage surveys had been a
standard response mechanism since 1830, Forgeat’s report gives the only glimpse at what
such surveys entailed.

Unlike the larger, neighborhood fire in Karaikal, fires in

Pondicherry seemed to occur discretely across the town in areas ranging north to south
from Periapet to Ariankuppam and east to west from Pondicherry town to Bommianpet,
not far from the site of the drainage culvert debated three years earlier. These fires were
not itemized in the same way as they were in Karaikal, but damages were valued at much
higher rates: Rs. 18714 in damages for the fifteen separate fires named. 187 Furthermore,
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where the victims in Karaikal were guaranteed full assistance to cover their losses, those
in Pondicherry were offered only a 25% subsidy. 188 While tempting to do so, it is
precarious to draw too broad a conclusion from this disparity. We have already seen
evidence of stronger currency values in Karaikal as well as Trillard’s assessment of
Karaikal’s resilience relative to Pondicherry’s during the 1876-8 Famine, and as we will
see again in the response patterns that followed the 2004 tsunami, Karaikal has long been
administered largely independently of, and often quite differently from, Pondicherry
town. This is yet another piece of the pattern of crisis response in the territories that only
becomes perceptible over the long durée, but it is precisely this independence that came
to result in such vastly different outcomes in Karaikal post-tsunami.
The last major floods faced by a French administration hit the Coromandel Coast
in 1952, but they set into motion rehabilitation projects that are particularly interesting for
the ways in which they spanned
the transition between the colonial
and independent administrations.
The cyclone the battered the coast
of November 30, 1952, destroying
the pier at Pondicherry (illus. 3.1),
Illus. 3.1 Pondicherry Pier, 1954
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but it was the storm’s effects on Karaikal that garnered the most attention in chambers. 189
On December 4th Commissioner Ménard wired a credit of Rs. 10,000 for the
immediate relief of the town to the administrator at Karaikal. He also sent two cases of
condensed milk. A second credit of Rs. 140,000 was provisionally charged against the
annual budget for Supply Department for the purchase of rice. 190 On December 5th a
telegram was sent to Karaikal – though it did not arrive until the 8th, hinting at the
disruption caused by the cyclone – approving the continuation of repairs of roads in the
territory, though internally the order was premised on the expectation of forthcoming
expense reimbursements by Paris. 191
Two months later, with aid still not forthcoming from the capital, a representative
of the government in Kariakal opined:
[J]e suis persuadé que celle-ci nous viendra en aide. Mais
pour éviter qu'à juste raison on ne nous applique le vieux
dicton "aide toi et le ciel t'aidera," j'estime indispensable
que vous fassiez vous même un effort pour remédier à cette
situation par augmentation des recettes ou diminution des
dépenses.
“I am convinced that [Paris] will help us. But, just in case,
in the spirit of the old saying “Help yourself and Heaven
will aid you,” I believe it would be advisable that you make
an effort to remedy the situation either by increasing
revenue or decreasing expenditures.” 192
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Debate transcripts record that the next speaker was a man named Devaissigamany, but
the record makes no note of his words. 193 The only hint of the content of his comments
comes in the response given by Holstein:
I am in absolute agreement [with Monsieur
Devaissigamany]. If there are no cotton exports, resources
diminish and the life of the territory is diminished. For
many weeks now these exports have been halted, and I
must tell you that our allowance of francs pondicheriens is
in large part exhausted. Councilor Devaissiga-many is
perfectly correct to underscore this point: where there is
nothing to be had, even the king loses his rights.
This is one of the few indications we have of the precarious financial position of the
territory during the last years of the colonial period. Nor do we find an answer until
nearly nine months later when, on October 25th, the reply from Paris was read into the
record of the eighth session of the Representative Assembly:
The cyclone of November 30th, 1952 caused tremendous
damage in Karaikal, and a demand was made against the
Overseas Department for a subsidy for the aid of the
victims and the execution of repairs.
In light of the urgency of the situation, the local budget
agreed to advance a credit of Rs. 134,463 (in consideration
of a subsidy request made to the Department) to distribute
as aid and to begin urgent repairs.
The Department responds that is cannot grant the subsidy
but only a refundable advance.
However, in order for this measure to be approved, the
territory must show [that it has] matching funds. 194

193

This gap is interesting in itself. File 391 holds both handwritten and typed copies of the debates, which
compare accurately to one another. Yet the comments of Devaissigamany are conspicuously absent in
both, each only noting that he spoke. Given other debates that took this period of the administration –
specifically debates on the language of address in chambers – my guess it that Devaissigamany addressed
chambers in Tamil and the stenographer lacked the necessary skill to keep accurate notes. This is,
however, only conjecture.
194
8ème Séance du 25 octobre 1953, MISC IV/2, file no. 352, NAIPRC.

131

The communiqué from Paris is the last word from the metropole on investment relating to
disaster relief in the colony. Additional resources for the rehabilitation of the battered
colony would have to be sought elsewhere. Elsewhere arrived in the form of a landowner
in French Indochina, identified in territorial documents only as M. Amirda, who
contacted the administration in August with a request to give 25,000 francs “for the relief
of the December 1952 cyclone disaster in Karaikal,” 195 though serendipitously the gift
was not formally accepted until October 23rd, 1953, only two days prior to the formal
refusal of Paris to subsidize continued rehabilitation.
During the last years of the French administration in India, the Territoire d’outre
mer seemed beset from all sides by expenses related to emergency relief and flood
mitigation. Beginning with the series of fires already discussed – fires that actually
began in the previous year when a man named Manjinikavundar requested government
aid to rebuild his house destroyed by fire in Cinnakalapet 196 – the number and variety of
debates, reports, projects, and orders recorded by the territorial government in published
records and internal documents far exceeded any prior period..
The year 1952 was, by all accounts, a particular heavy monsoon. By the time the
cyclone struck the Coromandel Coast in late November, the local administration in
Karaikal had already invested Rs. 17,220 in a project to build drainage canals in the flood
prone areas of Thomas Aroulpet, Darmapuram, and Puduttur and requested an additional
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Rs. 3,500 to complete the project just days after the cyclone.197 Extremely heavy rainfall
in October 1953 and again in 1954 exacerbated the economic difficulties arising from the
insufficient revenue that resulted from the damage caused to exports by the 1952 storm.
In fact, the October 1953 total rainfall of 318mm more than doubled the average October
rainfall in the ten years preceding (158.048mm), and nearly tripled the October average
for the previous five (table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Karaikal monthly rainfall totals, 1950‐1954 198

Reportedly heavy August rainfall in Yanam, located some 600 kilometers north of
Pondicherry on the Godavari River, increased pressure on the territory’s already over197
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taxed hydraulic infrastructure by damaging key structures designed to mitigate flooding
in the territory’s northernmost enclave. Bunds were breached during the rains, as were
sluices built to divert waters away from the settlement.

A report delivered to the

Assembly on October 1, 1953, noted that 1034 houses had been destroyed by the
inundation and offered for consideration a relief proposal that tiered ex gratia payments
based upon estimated losses that had been developed by Yanam’s mayor, M.M.
Madimchetty Satia, and Canacola Tataya, an Assembly representative: 199

et

100% pour les sinistrés ayant de 2 à 10 Rs.
75%
11 à 20 Rs.
50%
21 à 30 Rs.
25%
31 à 75 Rs.

Following the end of World War II, Pondicherry and its dependencies were left
very much to their own devices in the face of a series of chronic environmental crises that
struck the territory with unusual ferocity: fire, storm, and flood taxed Pondicherry’s
resources from 1950 to 1954. The colonies of French India had been reorganized into the
Territoire d’outre mer for the specific purpose of granting them more autonomy from the
central government in Paris. With colonial unrest growing from Malagasy to Indochina,
Paris had decided to give its Indian subjects a direct hand in deciding their political
future. Chandernagore voted to join the newly independent Republic of India in 1948,
but the other four French colonies elected to remain French. There seems in this period
loss of interest from the metropole in the direct administration of its Indian subjects, but
this is not particularly surprising. Since the end of World War II the capital had made
political concessions towards its colonies with the slackening of central control, first with
the establishment of the French Union in 1946 then with their reorganization as the
199
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Overseas Territories. Paris also had much more pressing matters than the welfare of
subjects who chose willingly to remain so: the Malagasy Uprising had resulted in tens of
thousands of deaths, the Indochina War was only just getting underway, and Algeria was
under foment.
One result of this peculiar self-determination among French Indians was that the
emergency response strategies mobilized by Alfred Martineau in 1916 were very much
the same strategies deployed by Bonvin, Ménard, and their contemporaries in the dying
days of French India. Without policy input from Paris the Pondicherry administration
continued to mobilize post-crisis in ways that had proven to be at least moderately
effective in the past. These same responses were adopted post-merger as more dominant
concerns pressed on the new Union Territory. Through the first decades of independence
these ossified into a matrix of response that remained largely unchanged even in light of
large disasters that came to strike India in the last decades of the twentieth century. By
their own admission, disaster events that could have served as object lessons in how
better to respond to disasters – Bhopal (1984), the Orissa super-cyclone (1999), the Bhuj
earthquake (2001) – instead had little perceptible effect on how administrators in
Pondicherry conceived disaster management. Instead, contemporary administrators of
the Union Territory began to harbor unrealistic beliefs about former French policies.
These beliefs proved to be fertile soil in which grew policy legends that dominated the
discourse of emergency response in the Union Territory of Pondicherry for decades.

Communicative versus Parcenary Memory
Jan Assman has explored the implications of the concept of “cultural memory” as
it was developed early in the twentieth century by Maurice Halbwachs and Aby
135

Warburg. 200

While both of these earlier theorists used fundamentally different

approaches, and in fact derived these approaches independently of one another, both
Halbwachs and Warburg sought to move away from the biological and “racial”
frameworks

that

dominated

turn-of-the-20th-century

discourse

about

collective

knowledge and move instead towards a new socio-cultural understanding of the processes
of shared memory. Building on Halbwachs, Assman’s works makes a clear distinction
between “communicative” memory – what he understands as the stuff of “every day”
communication – and “cultural” memory, from which groups derive an awareness of
their unity. The distinction from communicative memory is its “fixed point” distance
from the everyday, each point representing a fateful event in the formation of the group.
He then moves one step further to make deeper distinctions between potential and actual
memories within the subset “cultural memory”.

Collective
Memory

Communicative

Cultural

Memory

Memory

Potential Memory

200

Actual Memory

See Jan Assman, Kulturelle Gedachtnis (C.H. Beck: München, 1992). See also Jan Assman, “Collective
Memory and Cultural History,” New German Critique 65 (1995): 125‐133.
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For Assman, communicative memories are made up of “those varieties of
collective memory that are based exclusively on everyday communication” 201 – jokes,
gossip, rumor, water-cooler storytelling and the like – things that Halbawachs would
simply have classified as “collective memory.” Communicative memories are generally
agreed to have a relative lifespan of eighty to one hundred years. 202 I am moving one step
beyond these, to what I call “parcenary memories,” or those memories mobilized at the
stratum of the everyday within a particular group that serve to propagate knowledge sets
necessary for the functional continuation of the group as self-defined. In the modern
administrative departments of the Union Territory of Pondicherry it is neither
communicative nor cultural memories that shape the understanding of constituency
needs, regional events and the policies developed to treat them but rather parcenary
memories that perform this role. Within government these bits and pieces of shared
memoria are perhaps more fragmented than a body of parcenary memory that resides
within a family or community, and I will discuss these in more detail presently, but there
remain certain narratives that span the divides of department and hierarchy.
Before delving more deeply into parcenary memory and the value in
distinguishing it from other kinds of memory, it will be useful to consider the
composition of cultural memory in general, for it also shapes long-term decision-making
processes. Where communicative memories are marked by proximity to their subjects –
the everyday stuff of interpersonal communication – cultural memories, as defined by
Assmann, are typically contained within more official or commemorative apparatuses.
Cultural memories are encapsulated in/by liturgy and rite, poem and literature, monument
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and memorial. The “potential” category of cultural memory exists suspended in its state
of potentiality in archives, monuments, and the similarly static. They enter the mode of
actuality when contemporary context or usage “puts the objectivized meaning into its
own perspective, giving it its own relevance.” 203 Above all, cultural memory remains
fixed

in

time

accessible

and

yet

perpetually

re-interpretable

through processes of (re)activation
and mobilization in contemporary
contexts for specific purposes. Two
monuments illustrate this point. The
first is a tsunami memorial erected in
Illus. 3.2 Tsunami Memorial in Veerampattinam

the fisher village of Veerampattinam

Ariankuppam District, Union Territory of Pondicherry (Illus. 3.2). It is a simple white
plaster statue of a mother holding a child; the second memorial, located at the southern
edge of Karaikal town, is a more intricate monument made up of a tiled mosaic depicting
an image of the tsunami hitting a beach (Illus. 3.3). The monument itself is set inside a
larger memorial park set between Seagulls Resort and beachfront, due south of the old
French lighthouse. Simply by mobilizing these images to illustrate a point about memory
the potential memory captured within each monument has been activated, moving each
from a potential memory to an actual memory through the mere act of observation.
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Illus. 3.3 Tsunami Memorial in Karaikal

The processes that mobilize potential memories into actual memories are easier to
trace within rite and religion. The images shown in illustration 3.4 show five panels
within the Senkeni Amman temple in Veerampattinam. The images shown inscribe the
beginning of the temple’s origin myth: 1. There once was a devout [fisher] man, 2. Who
went fishing one day, 3. [and all] he brought back was a single log. 4. [One day while
looking for fire wood] his wife cut into the log, which [immediately] began to bleed. 5.
This [strange event] caused people from all around to come and give puja to the log.

Illus. 3.4 Senkeni Amman Temple Foundation Narrative, panels 1‐5
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This story is known in various amounts of detail to all of my local informants, as
well as to many non-fishers from the surrounding areas and as far away as the fisher
villages surrounding Karaikal. The potential cultural memory of the founding of this
temple is locked in these images, an accompanying Tamil text inscribed in stone beneath
each image, and the personal memories of every individual who knows the story. But its
potentiality is actualized every year during an eleven day festival that begins the day
before the nālām veḷḷi (fourth Friday) of the Tamil month of Ādi. Each year the context
differs from the year before based on the happenstance of the previous year and
expectations for the next, but it is within this specific, annual context that the legend of
Senkeni Amman is recast and bestowed continued relevance. 204
It is tempting to apply Pierre Nora’s concept lieux de mémoire to the images given
above, and indeed doing so can shed a useful quality of light on the problem of memory
in the Union Territory. As Nora defines them, lieux de mémoire “block the work of
forgetting,” and like Assmann’s actual memory remain “forever open to the full range of
its possible significations.” As a result they are necessarily self-referential in the
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The greatest disruption to the mobilization of Senkeni Amman legend came in 2005, seven months
after the Boxing Day tsunami devastated the region. As was discussed in chapter 1, the survival of
Veerampattinam and its residents during the tsunami was attributed my many Pattanavar fishermen to
the direct intercession of Senkeni, a form of Māriyamman who in the Coromandel region typically takes
on the character of Ellaiyammaṉ, or goddess of the [village] boundary (see chapter 1), in which form she
is understood to be the protector of the village and its inhabitants. Within the context of their recent
salvation from catastrophe, Senkeni’s role as protector of the village assumed new significance during the
annual enactment of the rituals of her festival. Of course the transition between the potential and the
actual modes of cultural memory are not limited to obvious cultural formations like commemorative
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texts, rites, and monuments. Every July 14 , for example, the French Consulate in Pondicherry organizes
celebratory activities surrounding Bastille Day. While the social memory of the territory’s French legacy is
culturally more distant than Senkeni Amman’s, it also attained new relevance in 2005 as French
generosity following the tsunami was more evident than ever to the average citizen. In other words,
Pondicherry’s ties to its former colonizer were highlighted by the active mobilization of fraternité in the
early months of 2005.
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extreme. 205

Nora’s theorization of lieux also offers functional distinctions between

archival, duty, and distance memories, where the first defines the urge behind
Martineau’s monograph (and its sources) explored in the previous chapter and the last
gives us a conceptual framework for understanding the continued mobilizations of
Atlantis/Lemuria/Tamilakam and the Great Deluge/kadalkol explored in the first chapter.
But Nora’s theorization is rooted in occidental assumptions about memory and
history, assumptions that cannot carry nearly as much water when applied in the postcolonial memorial environment, for Nora makes a distinction between what he considers
to be “real memory” and history which, when applied to an place like India, echoes
colonialist assumptions about India’s lack of History, with a capital ‘H’. Lieux de
memoire, “sites of memory,” come to exist only at the moment real memory dies, an
affliction he equates with western modernity’s loss of the sacred:
“Museums, archives…monuments, [etc] – these are relics
of another era, illusions of eternity…These are the rituals
of a ritual-less society; fleeting incursions of the sacred
into a disenchanted worlds; vestiges of parochial loyalties
in a society that is busily effacing all parochialism.” 206
In partial response to Nora, and serving as a possible bridge between Nora’s lieux
and parcenary memory, Paul Ricoeur offers in place of a distinction between real
memory and history one between mnēmē and anamnēsis, or passive and active
remembering.

The issue for Ricoeur is not the death of living memory-as-history

(Geschichte) and its inadequate replacement by history-as-narrative (Historie) but rather
the difference between memory “acting” and memory “acted upon.” In the first instance,
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mnēmē, memory is passive yet operates on the mind eliciting recall, “the popping into the
mind of a memory”; in the second, anamnēsis, memory becomes “an object of a search
ordinarily named recall, recollection.” 207 Recollection traverses the period beyond initial
impression (imprint) and return (recall).
These processes can work for Ricoeur on both memory of (personally) lived
experience and memory of (learned) historical narratives, which is marked by its
externality.

The latter is “essentially a narrative taught within the framework of a

nation,” but because the student of history cannot himself witness the events narrated
they exist at first only in “the province of hearsay and didactic reading….a certain
violence coming from outside presses in on memory.” “Historical memory” comes only
once there is “a genuine acculturation to externality…a gradual familiarization with the
unfamiliar.” 208 Elsewhere Ricoeur calls this process “The Succession of Generations,”209
but it is this process’s “bond of filiation” that offers us the key to understanding
parcenary memory. It expresses the transition between the interpersonal bond and the
anonymous relation, and it is along this breach/suture that parcenary memory sparks into
life.
Let us, then, examine these distinctions in the context of the images above. The
five images presented from the temple (illus. 4) do not in any way represent parcenary
memory. As icons that portray the history of the foundation of the temple they represent
Nora’s archival and Assmann’s potential memory. They instantiate anamnēsis, insofar as
they draw forth from the knowledgeable viewer memories of a story well-known, but
they do not shape meaningful action within the ownership community in the way that
207

Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 4.
ibid. 394.
209
Time and Narrative (Chicago: University of Chigaco Press, 1984).
208

142

they might cause the casual/non-member viewer to read the accompanying text or
perhaps ask questions of attending priests. They also represent a duty memory insofar as
knowledge of the narrative depicted is necessary for membership within the community
that worships Senkeni Amman, but they remain at their core external to the viewer. The
story of the founding of the temple only “presses in on the memory” when recall is forced
upon the viewer through the act of viewing.
In contrast, the tsunami memorials shown in illustrations 2 and 3 appear casually
as lieux, as part of the class of “museums, archives…monuments” that represent
“illusions of eternity.” And indeed the tsunami memorial in Karaikal (illus. 3.3, 3.5) can
certainly be read as representing a parochial loyalty in “a society that is busily effacing
all parochialism.” In fact, it is difficult to even establish for whom it is intended.
Located at the southeastern extreme of Karaikal town on the northern bank of the
Arasalar River, the monument stands amidst the ruins of the erstwhile Seagulls restaurant
resort.

Illus. 3.5 Karaikal monument in context, looking north towards the lighthouse
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The monument proper stands approximately 100m due south of the French-era lighthouse
that stands near the mouth of the Arasalar, several kilometers from the town center. The
monument grounds are bounded by a chain link fence approximately five feet high and
entered from the south through a heavy steel gate that remains locked. To the west, just
beyond the left edge of illustration 4, stands the husk of a seaside restaurant/resort still
under reconstruction from damages sustained during the 2004 tsunami. To the east,
beyond the fence, is a new promenade-cum-seawall – raised about one meter from sea
level – that as of August 2010 still led pedestrian approximately one kilometer north
towards nowhere in particular, though the wall itself will offer some protection against
unusually high tides. The beach is several hundred meters to the east; a children’s
playground sits several hundred meters due west, at the edge of the resort area, behind
what appears as an auto stand (though autos rarely appear).
On multiple visits during varying times of the year between 2008-2010 – from
sunny August to rainy monsoon, the high heat of the school holiday, and again into June
and July – I rarely saw many people here. The beach has been largely abandoned to sea
eagles and ruminant animals. Large, dire warnings have been posted against swimming
in the sea, and it was only during my last visit in August 2010 that any vendors were
present. Their presence, finally, suggested at least a moderate increase in traffic to the
beach, 210 but when asked none of the three vendors – two brothers and a son – could
remember the monument ever being open to the public. 211
There is, nevertheless, a certain logic to the site chosen for the monument. Prior
to the end of 2004 the area had been a popular location for families and young couples
210
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and it received heavy promotion from the Union Territory’s tourism department. 212
Unlike many of the beaches to the north of Karaikal and near Pondicherry town, the
strand north from the mouth of the Arasalar was isolated by its location against
encroachment by fisher communities and the beach was wide and flat, popular features
with foreign bathers, and it was always the intention of the Karaikal administration and
subsequently the Department of Tourism to rehabilitate the resort into an even more
attractive tourist draw. 213 Should this plan come to fruition, Karaikal’s tsunami memorial
would encapsulate a potential memory and be a powerful instantiator of anamnesis: every
visitor to the resort who gazed upon the tiled image of people fleeing from a giant wave
would be called upon to imagine the terrors of tsunami. But in its present state no such
processes occurs. The vendors with whom I spoke seemed to give little thought to the
presence of the monument behind them; its impact is circumscribed first by the
surrounding fence and second by its being located at the farthest, least trafficked edge of
urban Karaikal. As for reminders of the sudden and uncanny dangers of the ocean – for
is it not this for which such monuments in part stand to remind us – more immediate
icons in the form of signs at the promenade entrance warning against bathing already
exist to remind even the most casual visitor that risk abides in the inexplicable sea.
The instance of the monument in Veerampattinam (illus. 3.2) is of an altogether
different nature. It is first and foremost located in the center of a lived environment, just
a few steps south of the central path that leads from the town center (and the Senkeni
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Amman temple) to the shore.

The work of everyday life goes on all around it.

Fishermen pass it before launching and see it upon their return to the beach. Fishwives
and third-party vendors haggle over price-per-weight within sight of it. Not only is it
centrally located within a fisher habitat (see chapter 5), but it open and accessible to the
public. No fence controls its ambit, no gate prevents entry. Its form, too, invites a
different type of engagement with the memorial than what is possible with the monument
in Karaikal, where the image depicted is one of danger and fear, much more even that a
similar monument erected at Kanya Kumari, the southernmost point on the subcontinent
and a site geographically connected not just to tsunami but also to the mythic history of
kadalkol and the loss of Tamilakam discussed in chapter 1.
The memorial at Kumari is at one
stroke both more accessible than Karaikal’s
and more abstract (illus. 3.6). A wave towers
over a partially submerged catamaran and
two disembodies arms. The first is held up
as if to restrain the flood while the second
carries a puja thali, an offering to god to
protect her people.

The broken “country

craft” recalls the same senses of fear and
danger engendered by the boats swept up in
the wave in Karaikal’s mosaic while the

Illus. 3.6 Tsunami Memorial at Kanya Kumari

restraining hand and the offering to the divine hew more closely to the emotional content
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of the statue erected at Veerampattinam (illus. 3.2). While the imagery might simply be
interpreted as a loving mother protecting her child from the
dangers of the sea others, particularly the fishers, understand it more
metaphorically. The woman is the goddess, the child her “children” of Veerampattinam,
and her role is to protect them. Another possible reading is that the woman represents
Bharat Mata, Mother India, protecting her citizens from danger.

While nobody in

Veerampattinam ever described the imagery of the memorial to me in this way, as will be
detailed in the following chapter, many fishermen do have clear expectations that such
protection should be provided by the state.

Within this political environment, the

Veerampattinam’s memorial could well become an index of these expectations.
There exist, then, a variety of types of tsunami memorial.

Those in Kanya

Kumari and Karaikal were designed essentially as Noraian sites of memory, places meant
to be visited by tourists (internal and external) using icons intended to excite sympathy
and elicit a sense of latent danger or risk. A second type is the (primarily) Christian
Ebenezer erected for the purpose of giving thanks to God for those protected from the
tsunami.

Two such examples are monuments found near the Danish fort in

Tarangampadi, just a few kilometers north of Karaikal, and at San Thome in Chennai:
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Illus. 3.7 Tarangampadi Memorial

Illus. 3.8 San Thome Memorial

The inscription on the plaque at San Thome is exemplary of the intent behind such
monuments:

St. Thomas Pole
In gratitude to God
for saving Santhome from
tsunami 2004
These operate within the broad corpus of tsunami monuments meant to elicit recall in the
viewer, but their intent in wholly religious. Rather than calling forth memories or images
of tsunami in particular or disaster in general, Ebenezers are meant only to call into
memory the greatness of god, and as such have little bearing to the current discussion.
The tsunami memorials of the third type – those of a more “local” provenance like
Veerampattinam’s – operate outside of the confines of lieux de memoire. Instead of
working to recall an historical event now separated from the linear flow of lived
experience such memorials are tied more intimately to quotidian concerns.
Veerampattinam’s Mother statue is woven into the fabric of everyday life in such a way
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that it no longer bears on daily instances of recall yet remains more subtly a part of the
background against which the everyday occurs. Unlike the monument in Karaikal it is
open and available to small, daily acts of commemoration like garlanding. But it also
stands in marked contrast to other “open and available” monuments like Kanya Kumari’s
abstract sculpture and the Ebenezzers discussed above. In the first instance the sculpture
is not designed to “invite” such acts; in the latter two instances the religious content of
the monument resists casual appropriation by quotidian Hinduism. 214 Yet it is precisely
such memorials that point the way towards understanding the ways in which parcenary
memory works with a specific group.
Parcenary memory should not be confused with “duty memory,” the third of
Nora’s lieux, together with “archival” and “distance” memories. Duty memory is defined
as the possession of specific memory-sets required to retain membership within a group.
Duty memory implies a level of endogamy that can be read into the Mother monument.
Unlike the other monuments discussed so far, the statue on the strand at Veerampattinam
displays no English. All of its markings, both its official plaque and the graffito affixed
to its pedestal, are in Tamil. The potential memory within can only be actualized by
Tamil-speaking observers. With the passage of time and the eventual waning of interest
in the events of tsunami casual observers without community-centered socialization into
the motivation behind its erection may well come to see the monument as only a
metaphor for the duty of the greater to protect the lesser, be the greater Senkeni Amman
or the state. But such a reading still requires us to define which community is responsible
214
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for the maintenance of the memory. Is it only local Pattanavar fishers, all fishers in the
UTP, the affected community as a whole, all Tamils, or even all Tamil speakers? The
notion of duty memory as defined by Nora collapses under the weight of a group so
resistant to definition.
Parcenary memories, on the other hand, are a polythetic characteristic of those
who hold them, neither necessary nor sufficient to retain membership within group sets
like [administration of Pondicherry] or [disaster-affected community]. Once mobilized
such memories operate closer to Ricoeur’s mnēmē than to Assmann’s potential memories,
but recall that for Ricoeur historical memories can only exist once true externality if the
memory has been achieved.

Put another way, because historical narratives are not

directly observable by those who remember them, they exist in the words of Ricoeur in
“the province of hearsay.”

Parcenary memories, by virtue of the way they are

perpetuated across multiple generations within the same community, also do not
necessarily preserve lived experiences, but because they represent the habitus within
which daily life and normal decision-making processes take place at the group level,
parcenary memories are lived in. They operate actively within memory insofar as they
shape the foundation upon which decisions are made or policies are developed.
Parcenary memories are not lieux de mémoire because lieux insist upon membership
within the group so remembering. Parcenary memories are maintained within groups
(Nora would call them “real memories”) but not necessary for membership within them,
all the while subjectively shaping actions and decisions taken by or on behalf of the
group. They are passed between individuals as a subset of communicative memories but
collate and disseminate information held crucial to the future potentialities of the larger
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group.

Typically passed between family members, they can also exist within

organizations and often form the basis for policy legends that can exist beyond the
temporal limits of communicative memory.
What then are the roles of these particular modes of memory – potential, actual,
and parcenary – in the realm of development programs and crisis management schemes?
Martineau activated potential memories when he accessed the administration’s archive to
write his monograph, but even having faced a cyclone in 1916 he did not presume to
make any policy-minded conclusions about historic or future instances of flood in the
French territories; in other words, he did not access parcenary memories. “It is simply a
description of the struggles man has made against the spectacular forces of nature,” he
wrote, concluding that “[i]t simply is not possible to predict when cyclones will occur,
only that similar calamities will come at the hours chosen by destiny.” 215 Yet what was
his purpose if not to prepare his successors in some way for the colony’s regular dangers?
What is the purpose of maintaining any record whatever of past crises and relief
strategies, both successful and unsuccessful, if not to prepare for foreseeable challenges?
Contrary to Martineau’s use of them, the administrative archive in Pondicherry housed
the potential memories of their Indian territories that served as a benchmark for response
in the post-merger Union Territory.

Parcenary Memory and Risk Assessment
Understanding mechanisms of memory becomes keenly important once we begin
unraveling disaster response and mitigation strategies in the half century between
Pondicherry’s de facto merger with the Republic of India and the 2004 Indian Ocean
215
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tsunami. The reasons for this become abundantly clear the moment one begins casting
about for data about this five decade span, a time during which records keeping and
institutional memory in the Union Territory all but disintegrated, a phenomenon that will
be examined in detail in chapter 4. In point of fact, very few records remain to detail this
period, and what records do exist are largely lost to researcher and administrator alike
through a combination of disinterest, instability and perplexing or merely failed archival
policies.
Piecing together the period between 1954 and 2004 becomes, then, a work of
excavation that has parallels with a Foucaultian archaeology of knowledge. The process
for making sense of the needs of its constituents – needs regarding flood mitigation,
development, personal and governmental responsibility – grows organically out of a
matrix of rules and agreements about “how things were” pre-merger. These beliefs
coagulated into parcenary memories insofar as they were shared within across the disaster
management community and then used to shape decision-making related to particular
issues. The process of coagulation and propagation gradually morphed these sets of
“memories” – knowledge not personally experienced but perhaps “had on good
authority” – into policy legends that re-echo pretexts, decisions, and justifications
through subsequent administrations.
Parcenary memories necessarily form the majority of data available on cyclones,
floods, disasters and their aftermath in the period 1954-2004. Many official records have
been destroyed or lost through neglect while local and panchayat records of many at-risk
coastal communities were lost when fisher community panchayat offices, often only
several hundred meters from the shore, were over flooded in 2004. Coming to grips with
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the realities of the administrative ennui that I am suggesting took hold in the Union
Territory in these years requires a careful collation of such memories with the records
that are available: state-level annual plans, special reports, speeches and news clippings,
and the odd official document. 216
The earliest memories about the coast, the port, and the fisher communities abide
with the oldest residents of Pondicherry, very few of whom are old enough to remember
an operational French port in the territory. The old pier, the one damaged by the 1952
cyclone, is as much as anything an object of fond remembrance. One informant, a highly
placed government official with whom I was chatting one day off the record, remembered
using the remnants of the pier for swimming games during her childhood, but while she
claims to remember the “terrible storm” that destroyed it, I was unable to establish with
any certainty other data points that would have established her as being old enough to
have such a personal memory. Even so, such memories are important as they establish
the shape taken by other memories. More importantly, such memories exhibit a kind of
slippage called mnemonic typification, 217 a process through which one historical moment
is mistaken with another, similar moment. Such slippages often occur as a result of a
certain density enjoyed by history: “eventful” moments clump together in memory while
contrastingly long periods of time pass during which nothing of particular note seems to
occur. For the ethnographer these phenomena present certain challenges, not the least of
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which is the dating of specific events. Thus, while it is likely that the informant cited
above who “remembers” the 1952 cyclone that ruined the French pier is actually too
young to remember that specific storm and is instead substituting a later storm as a standin, without firm evidence to the contrary it is impossible to prove such an assertion in a
cultural surround in which little importance is placed on knowing the exact date of one’s
birth.
Yet I will assert that for the reasons people even maintain such memories the
actuality of them, the truth or falsity of the resulting assertions, is less material than the
fact that they are maintained in the first place. It is not of particular importance whether
the storm she remembered actually took place in 1952 or sometime later. The fact that
she “remembers” a storm of great enough severity to destroy a structure fundamental to
the economic health of the city informs her response as a government official to later
instances of cyclone.
It is rarely possible to guess the outcomes of lessons so learned in the face of a
future crisis, but actions based upon such lessons are as likely to have good results as bad.
For example, in the days leading up to Hurricane Katrina striking the Gulf Coast there is
a great deal of anecdotal evidence that many older residents of Mississippi and Louisiana
made choices to evacuate or not based upon parcenary memories of Hurricane Camille.
In her book Rising from Katrina Kathleen Koch pointedly notes that Camille was a
hurricane benchmark for Mississippi residents: those who survived Camille in 1969 – the
most powerful hurricane ever to hit the United States – were often less likely to evacuate
in the face of Katrina. One resident of Waveland, Mississippi, baldly stated a common
(mis)perception in the run-up to the U.S. disaster: “we were here in 1969 for Hurricane
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Camille and we didn't get a drop of water, so we're going to stay.” 218 Patrick Turner, a
survivor of both Camille and the earlier – and much less severe – 1965 Hurricane Betsy
remained in his New Orleans home in 2005 precisely because neither storm had been as
bad (in New Orleans) as predicted.

It was not until an August 29th telephone

conversation with his son, at the height of the storm, that Turner admitted that such
evidence is rarely an accurate predictor of future outcomes. 219 In a trenchant reminder of
the dangers posed by drawing the wrong conclusions from past experience, Max
Mayfield of the National Hurricane Center pronounced, “I think Camille killed more
people during Katrina than it did in 1969.” 220 Indeed, history is not always the best
teacher.
But then sometimes it is. Remaining in the same region, Grand Bayou, Louisiana,
is an isolated town located south of New Orleans. With origins said to go back three
centuries as a Native American fishing hamlet, the modern fishing hamlet survives the
regular threat of hurricane through a community-driven mechanism of assent. “We know
how to get ourselves out of harm’s way, official announcements or not,” said one
resident. 221 For the length of living memory, community members have decided for
themselves if and when to evacuate and have relied on their own means to get to safety,
as a community forcing even the most stubborn to leave when necessary. In 2005,
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residents evacuated in only two hours two days before Katrina made landfall; no
residents were left, and no residents were lost.
Back in the Indian Ocean, after the 2004 tsunami there was a great deal of interest
in regions in which casual observation would have suggested more suffering than was
actually experienced. Reasonable questions were asked about why some communities
seemed more resilient while others were devastated materially and otherwise. While few
coastal regions were spared from physical destruction, some appeared to be better
adapted for quicker recovery following disaster, and it became reasonable to ask why this
should be so.
Natural scientists and others across South and Southeast Asia noted the low
mortality rate among wildlife, particularly elephants and leopards, following tsunami.
Many animals that would otherwise have been nearer the coast had moved inland
sometime prior to the coming of the wave, a fact that became evident afterwards when
animal counts were conducted and beasts were found further inland than would normally
have been common. In the Nicobar and Andaman Islands, too, there was proportionally
less loss of life reported because islanders had begun to move into the inland highlands.
When questioned, many islanders noted having observed the strange, almost nervous
behavior of certain animals in the hours immediately before the waters crashed ashore. 222
One of the more remarkable stories publicized after tsunami came from Indonesia,
all the more remarkable for being a natural comparative study for disaster preparedness.
The region of the Indian Ocean in which sits Indonesia is particular prone to tsunami.
The Institute of Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Geophysics has identified

222

K. Sivaramakrishna (Professor of Anthropology and Forestry & Environmental Studies, Yale University)
in discussion with the author, April 2008.

156

78 highly damaging tsunamis that have affected the region since 1700. An additional
eighteen, causing only “medium” damage, have affected the region during the same
period. 223 The huge majority of these have been caused by tectonic movements, though
the 1883 Krakatau volcanic eruption is by far the most notable exception. Simeulue, a
small island in the Aceh Province, off the western coast of Sumatra and only forty
kilometers south of the tsunami’s epicenter, survived two tsunamis in the three months
between December 26, 2004 and March 28, 2005 with only seven casualties. A third
tsunami, in February 2008, caused another 30 casualties but only three deaths. But why
should this be so?
The answer rests in an examination of the islands use of parcenary memories. In
1907 a devastating tsunami struck Sumatra. The earthquake itself has been little studied
and is poorly understood, its effects little documented. What is known is that at the time
there were no paved roads on Simeulue Island and because the quake struck during
monsoon, the dirt paths that connected the villages on the island had been reduced to
muddy, impassable bogs. There is no accurate record of the number of fatalities suffered
during the 1907 tsunami, but local lore places the number around 70% of the island’s
population. This story had been told and retold in the families and communities of
Simeulue for nearly a century when the 2004 tsunami struck, and every villager has a
version of the story. The narrative had so penetrated the local culture that the word
smong, which means “the ocean coming onto the land,” remains in the local lexicon. 224
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According to Brian McAdoo, et. al., within minutes of the December 2004
earthquake coastal communities were heading towards higher ground and in some cases
even to prearranged meeting places in the interior highlands. In the islands northernmost
town of Langi, residents had only eight minutes to respond to the first tremors, yet none
of the towns approximately 800 residents perished. Island-wide, residents had on average
twenty minutes to respond to the quake. On the southeast coast, near Sineubuk, residents
all mustered on a ridge north of town where the community had already built bamboo
frames to await evacuation, and like efforts in Grand Bayou, they had done so without
government support. It is not clear that this site had been the community’s established
place of evacuation since the 1907 event, or whether it was used for other purposes, but
communities across Simeulue were and remain prepared for flooding disasters by
maintaining a body of oral history that included parcenary memories passed from the
survivors of the 1907 disaster to the modern day.
Such was not the case in Jantang, on the Sumatran mainland 225 kilometers from
the quake epicenter. Here along the oil-rich coast, eye-witnesses say the first waves
appeared twenty minutes after the shaking stopped, and all wave activity had ceased
thirty minutes thereafter.

Survivors described sounds like gunfire coming from the

direction of the ocean, and with the recent history of fire fights between the Indonesian
military and GAM, the Free Aceh Movement, residents assumed another skirmish and
fled inside their homes for safety. By some estimates, nearly 50% of Jantang’s 10,000
residents died during the thirty minutes following the initial wave surge. Of the survivors
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interviewed by McAdoo’s team, none were aware of local seismic hazards nor did they
associate the ground shaking with potential risk.225
While the comparison of Simeulue to Jantang is instructive, it would be no easy
task to apply their lessons directly to communities on the Coromandel Coast. For one
thing, the regions of India most strongly affected by tsunami – from central Andhra
Pradesh to Nagapattinam District in Tamil Nadu – are not themselves at high risk from
earthquake. Seismic events striking the southeastern coast of India are likely to have
originated thousands of miles away, so it is improbably that tremors upon which to base
evacuations would be felt. Neither is there a long history of tsunamis occurring along the
Coromandel Coast. While the eruption of Krakatau in 1883 was certainly noticed in
India, it did not wreak the havoc as tsunami. Similarly, the 1907 tsunami that was a
catastrophe in Simeulue hardly registered in India. The lessons best learned are lessons
of preparedness, resilience, and self-reliance in the face of a government that might be
incapable of efficiently responding to a natural disaster, and lessons of the attention that
ought to be paid to what warnings do appear that might signal oncoming peril. Such
heralds are already recorded in the folklore of local fishermen, and while this lore in itself
would not have predicted the 2004 tsunami, more likely risks often are predicted using
this kind of knowledge.
Communities in both Simeulue and mainland Sumatra have mechanisms in place
through which they identify hazards and assess the risks associated with those hazards.
In Jantang in 2004, one of the main hazards to the health and safety of its residents was
the continued skirmishing between the Indonesian army and armed members of the
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separatist Free Aceh Movement who desired control of the area's oil fields. It was
understood that sounds of explosion or gunfire signified danger, and the easiest way to
minimize that danger was to retreat indoors. Unfortunately for residents of Jantang, this
strategy turned out to be tragically wrong under the specific circumstances of 26
December 2004.

Community members acted in a way understood as risk-reducing

against known hazards.
Sadly, the kind of circumstantial dissonance witnessed in Jantang can hardly be
avoided; there will be instances in which risks assumed given evidence will prove to be
incorrect. What is perhaps most tragic at sites like Jantang is that loss could have been
minimized had an early warning system, such as has been discussed by development
officials in the region for many years, been operational. The fact that residents failed to
recognize the hazard for what it really was signified no fault of their own; given evidence
they acted in a way long proven to be effective at mitigating known risks. The fault here
lies rather with those in administrative positions who, knowing the hazards of the wider
region and privy to the discussions that surrounded them, have repeatedly failed to
provide a means for quickly correcting false assumptions about immediate hazards
because, as a UNDP project officer for the southern Indian stated it to me, “well
established early warning systems can reduce risk and save development gains.” 226
The conceptual understanding of smong as a local hazard is the result of the
process of parcenary memory-making, a kind of joint heirship to an event that no one
living personally experienced. It remains conceptually parcenary rather than collective
precisely because the narrative has not been stabilized within and across communities on
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Simeulue still continues to mobilize actions; the memory does not yet possess the
externality required to make the event Historie. Every informant will narrate their own
version with similar object-lessons, but there is yet to be a recognized, codified ur-text
that might in turn ossify behavior. Through this process not only were hazards defined
but so too were their inherent risks, and in so doing individual communities across the
island were able to establish internal disaster response strategies. Each community had
designed and maintained evacuation plans that designated safe locations and provided, at
least to a limited extent, for their short-term provision.
It is these kinds of memories which must be examined in order to uncover the
means by which local hazards can be anticipated by local populations. And it is these
kinds of memories, adopted and appropriated as they often are, that can be used to
socialize certain survival behaviors into a population that has no personal experiences of
uncommon hazards that are nevertheless (at least somewhat) predictable and specific to
the local region.

That such disaster response socialization already takes place, as

sociologist Dennis Miletti has noted, 227 is why no one takes an elevator to escape a
burning building, or that Hawai'ians move to higher ground when they feel the earth
quake. Such responses to uncommon but not unthinkable events need to be taught
precisely because, while they are uncommon, their occurrence can be anticipated.
But the proper socialization of disaster response need not necessarily be a lifelong process. On Pentecost, an island in Vanuata, east of Australia, a governmentoperated television satellite truck begun to circulate weekly after the 1998 earthquake in
Papua New Guinea. Through the truck, a UNESCO video explaining how to survive a
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tsunami was shown, from recognizing the warning signs to evacuating to higher ground
to seeing to the health and safety needs of survivors in the immediate aftermath. When
another earthquake struck Sumatra the following year, islanders evacuated to the
mountains immediately upon feeling the tremors. Even though a small tsunami wave
inundated the island half an hour later only three of its five hundred inhabitants died. 228

Postmerger Risk Response in Pondicherry
After 1952 no severe cyclones affected Pondicherry in the last years of French
occupancy or during the years preceding the de jure merger. Abnormally heavy rains fell
in October 1953, 1954 and 1962, but nothing historically exceptional. Torrentially heavy
rains fell in November 1960, in fact the heaviest rains recorded between 1901 and 2002 at
644mm, 229 but there is no retrievable record that shows even this to have caused
emergency in the territory. Following the de jure merger cyclones considered to be
“severe” by observers occurred with astonishing regularity, 230 with eight such storms
making landfall in the first fifteen years of independence, but for reasons that will be
examined in chapter 4 there are no longer many contemporary documents that describe
these storms or quantify their impact.
We are left, instead, with personal narratives of such storms, which too often are
subject to mnemonic typification. It is nonetheless possible to draw conclusions from the
stories people tell. Whatever the objective truth of the matter might be, it is clear today
that people believe that the period between 1954 and 2004 can best be characterized by
decreased personal responsibility, increased reliance upon the government for support
228
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and relief in the face of disaster, and increased dissatisfaction with the actions taken by
the administration in the name of improving the lives of vulnerable populations. Data
gleaned from annual plans confirms the relative inability of the young administration to
provide those things deemed most necessary by both sides – government and recipient –
and the frailty of Nehruvian imperatives to improve the lot of poor Pondichériennes.
Schemes undertaken during this period, though geared towards quality-of-life
development, were not successful at mitigating the risk of loss from future crises but did
chip away at the traditional, local level structures that had endowed communities with a
certain self-sufficient resilience in the past.
Traditionally in fisher villages in Pondicherry and Karaikal the panchayat
would collect a portion of the daily catch to reserve for various purposes, included relief
in the case of community emergency, 231 added to collections taken by the local Amman
Koil, or temple of a protective form of the mother goddess.232 In times of distress, funds
gathered from these collections could be distributed among the needy without resorting to
government aid.

In places where traditional structures are still strong, as in

Veerampattinam, the panchayat may directly organize relief in the face of less sustained
need following small crises like fire or localized flood:
AM: What measures are usually taken by the Panchayat
[during emergencies]?
Viswa: Our panchayat will arrange for food to be cooked
for the village [and] some big-shots in the village will take
care of expenses.
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Vishwanathan (fisherman, Veerampattinam) in discussion with the author, July 2010; Kankayan
(fisherman, Veerampattinam) in discussion with author, July 2010; Arulraj (fisherman, Vambakira‐
palaiyam) in discussion with author, February 2009; Veerappan (fisherman, Kuricchikuppam) in discussion
with author, May 2009.
232
E.g. Senkeni Amman (Veerampattinam, Solai Nagar), Angalamman (Vambakirapalaiyam,
Keezhakasukudi), Renuka Devi (Karaikal Medu), etc.
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AM: What about transportation? What if evacuation is
required?
Viswa: We use individual vehicles. The fuel expenses are
paid by the panchayat. 233
Such local structures were not uncommon even in the recent past, but the power of the
panchayats in Pondicherry fisher villages is now very much on the wane.

Older

fishermen, like Viswanathan quoted above, speak with some bitterness the about what
they feel to be external efforts to weaken the traditional mechanisms that structure daily
village life. The semi-forced resettlement of villages since 2005 has only served to
accelerate the perceived decline of tightly-knit, largely self-governing communities
seeking little day to day interaction with state/central governments.
There is a general agreement among older fishermen that significant change
began approximately thirty years ago. This placement in time tracks pretty accurately
with the November 1977 cyclone, prior to which most memories are notably less exact as
they fall victim to mnemonic typification.

Puthupattar, a somewhat controversial

community leader in Vambakirapalaiyam, put it most succinctly:
Many floods have happened, but I can’t remember the
years correctly. Thirty years ago a flood attacked the shore
and damaged a lot of boats, but there was no damage to the
village because the village was very distant from the shore.
Now much of the shore has been eroded. Now also many
nets are caught in the surf and swept away…The panchayat
used to give some help in those days, but now only the
name persists. 234
Puthu

is

wistful

when

talking

about

the

old

Pattanavar

community

in

Vambakirapalaiyam. The changes in the last thirty years he attributes not directly to
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Vishwanathan (fisherman, Veerampattinam) in discussion with author, August 2010.
Puthupattar (fisherman, Vambakirapalaiyam) in discussion with the author, August 2010.
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changes resulting from storms but rather to development schemes designed improve the
lot of fishermen in the territory:
[When] the government began to develop the sea for
tourism it did not worry about [fisher] people [in
Vambakirapalaiyam]. Veerampattinam has a good shore
now because of efforts to deepen the backwater, but
Kottakkuppam village shore was badly affected by this
work. Some government officials came here and advised
the village leaders to relocate, but I argued and said “the
government is giving a lot of money to fund the harbor
development project but does not seem interested in
helping the people.” 235
The harbor project mentioned by Puthu was part and parcel of the development schemes
initiated by the administration as part of the Five Year Plans organized by the central
government in the 1960s. 236
Similar memories percolate among fisher communities in Karaikal District.
Speaking of the 1977 cyclone, Tandavasamy – one of the few fishermen old enough to
have learned French in primary school – noted that “before this there were no warnings
from the government, but our community sensed the symptoms of cyclone and avoided
fishing [at these times].” 237 Even after the cyclone, “the only help for us was self-help
(tanuṭavi).”
The impression that the older fishers have that they were left pretty much to their
own devices following the merger is pervasive, and it feeds the contemporary narrative
that the government has in general done little to improve the quality of life of fisherfolk.
In writing proposals for consideration under the Second Five Year Plan the newly
235

Ibid.
To clarify, the first Five Year Plan was instituted under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru in 1951. Pondicherry’s transitional administration was nominally involved with the Second Five
Year Plan (1956‐1961) but did fully integrate itself into the central planning process until the Third Five
Year Plan (1961‐1966).
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constituted department of Planning and Research inadvertently gave support to this claim
in their own efforts to distinguish the new Indian-led administration from the old,
colonial leadership. “So long as the State was under the French,” announced the first
page of the proposed programs submitted to the central government for consideration
under the Plan:
[p]retty little was done for a progressive improvement of
the economic and social structures of the people. Except for
the cases of Medical, Education and Public Works
Departments, scarcely any department for undertaking
agricultural improvements and provision of other social
services existed. 238
This perspective served the immediate interests of the new administrations, and it has
become a common refrain in Pattanavar and other fisher communities in the territory, but
it does not bear up under scrutiny. As was explored in the previous chapter, even though
the French often pursued policies that benefited their economic position in the
subcontinent, most strategies were tailored to at least tangentially further the interests of
certain categories of Indian subject, e.g. weavers, betel-nut growers, or chelingues.
In order to interrogate (the truth of) the fisher narrative it becomes necessary to
excavate the official record of measures taken on behalf of fisher and other at-risk
communities. The administration immediately identified what it saw as the shortcomings
of the French administration – namely that they did not care about Indians qua citizens.
Before undertaking a series of development projects, the new administration felt it
necessary to cast themselves in contrast to their predecessors. But what was really at
stake was the transformation of the economic system in Pondicherry from colonial to
post-colonial. Agricultural development took precedence, but new development oriented
238

Proposals for the II Five Year Plan (Pondicherry: Planning and Research, 1955), 1. Italics added.
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departments were set up (or reorganized from existing departments) expressly for the
purpose of “meeting the needs of a State embarking on a program of all-round
development, calculated to raise the economic and social levels of the masses.” 239
Highlighting the new priorities the Agriculture department was budgeted over two lakh
rupees for new projects. By comparison, the Department of Fisheries received less than
one eighth of the investment in agriculture (totaling only Rs. 25,000) while roads were
budgeted nine times that (18 lakh).

The only investment in flood control was the

revetment of the bank at Ferampeta, Yanam, for a miniscule investment of Rs. 3,000. 240
The programs proposed for the fisheries department bear some examination at this
point, because while certain programs did impact coastal fishing indirectly, it is more
likely that the common impression of the government as uninterested in fisher concerns
arises from the schemes developed and publicized from this period forward. These same
programs, updated for technological improvements, appeared again after tsunami and
were publicized by PIA as great quality of life improvements for fisher communities.
Included in the plan were provisions for building cold storage lockers and setting up
Fisherman Cooperative Societies.

A final proposal was to provide training in

mechanized fishing and other modern methods.

Where cooperative societies were

deemed “essential for their development,” mechanized fishing still existed in a liminal
state between the present and the future. It was imagined that mechanized fishing units”
would be set up to “demonstrate to the fishermen the efficiency of mechanized fishing,”
but as yet no provision was given to subsidize the move from artisanal to modern fishing
methods. Well into the 1960s, it was expected that the majority of fishermen would
239

ibid.
Other water control projects were identified costing over five lakh, but the administration decided
these projects should instead be delayed until III Five Year Plan.
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continue to rely on catamarans, and logs were still imported from Kerala for their
construction. 241 The only one of these schemes to catch on was the development of
fisher co-ops, which continue to thrive today. Unfortunately for the administration, as
these are organized and managed by the fishermen themselves, the government gets little
credit for their institution. On the other hand, what later turned into the unfulfilled
promise of the other projects fed the narrative of a government unable, or unwilling, to
assist the fisher community.
By the end of the Second Five Year Plan views on how to improve fisher
communities had changed to a small extent.

In the Pondicherry administration’s

proposals for consideration under the Third Five Year Plan are listed several additional
expenses undertaken in the interim.

While only Rs. 25,000 had been earmarked under

the II Plan, a draft of the III Plan estimated more than seven lakhs of already incurred
expense, though it is difficult to determine where exactly all of this money went. Added
to the institution of coop societies was the collection and distribution of fish seed (Rs.
0.19 lakh), a 1/3 subsidy on synthetic twine for nets (.20 lakhs), a salt subsidy for
preserving catches (.12 lakhs), and the provision of credit for the purchase of supplies
(.58 lakh), and a subsidy for co-ops to obtain modern fishing craft (.73 lakhs). While
these additional expenses under the II Plan are many, they only total Rs. 1.82 lakh. And
while 22 fishermen were trained, costing approximately .35 lakh, 242 the provision of cold
storage units were delayed until the III Plan.
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V. Jayanand (Joint Project Director – Fisheries, PIA) in discussion with the author, May 2009.
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The cost is assumed based upon the amount budgeted under the III Plan (.37 lakh) for the training of
25 more fishermen.
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With the publication of the III Five Year Plan the Pondicherry administration did
take a more determined position on flood control, but an examination of the proposals
shows only one new project tangentially related to flooding while six others aimed
directly at the problem merely maintained measures put in place by the French prior to
1954, primarily in the strengthening of flood banks in Karaikal and anti-erosion projects
and drain improvement (Uppar, Petit and Grand Canals) in Pondicherry town. The plans
submitted to the central government in Delhi during these transition years set the stage
for what followed from subsequent, fully independent administrations in Pondicherry.
The first Annual Plan submitted to Delhi by Planning and Research (FY 1966-1967) still
named projects listed in the III Plan (1961-1966) as development goals. Plans submitted
for the IV Five year Plan (1969-1974) still list the same projects submitted under the III
Plan.
Flood Mitigation Projects under III Plan 243

Flood Mitigation Projects under IV Plan 244

1. Strengthening of flood banks at
Paravandayanur, Tirumalai Arasanar, and
Nandalar rivers (Karaikal)
2. Ring bund at Iskitippa, Yanam
3. Improvements to Uppar drain, RC3-RC4
4. Drainage in Verichikudi village
5. Anti-sea erosion in Pondicherry

1. Strengthening of flood banks at
Paravandayanur, Tirumalai Arasanar, and
Nandalar rivers (Karaikal)
2. Ring bund at Iskitippa, Yanam
3. Improvements to Uppar drain, RC3-R C4
4. Drainage in Verichikudi village
5. Anti-sea erosion in Pondicherry

In fairness to the administration, the strengthening of flood banks in Karaikal was
completed during III Plan at a cost of Rs. 137 lakhs, but explanations for the
administration’s failure to complete, or even begin, the other projects was not exactly
forthcoming, even while the importance of such projects was recognized. In fact, the IV
plan budgeted more that Rs. 68 lakhs for schemes “designed to protect agricultural lands,
situated near the banks of rivers, from getting flooded during the rainy season to the
243
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Planning and Research, Draft Proposals for III Five Year Plan (Pondicherry: GoPY), 40.
Planning and Research, Draft Proposals for IV Five Year Plan (Pondicherry: GoPY), 126.
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detriment of standing crops,” 245 even while this amounted to less than half of what had
already been spent to reinforce flood banks in Karaikal. Initiatives in Iskitippa and
Verichikudi had been dropped and re-assigned to the IV Plan for reasons described only
as “administrative difficulties.”
Plans to reinforce the shoreline in Pondicherry town had similarly been delayed
despite the situation being defined in the direst terms:
The portion of the road in RC 23 from the Government
Distillery up to Solathandavancouppam in Pondicherry has
been badly eroded and already about 50% of the houses
have collapsed. There are a number of houses in the stretch
of road, costing a few lakhs of rupees. Unless some
immediate protective measure is taken, the road may get
washed off and a lot of private property affected….
To the South of the Government Distillery, in the first line
of beach, serious erosion has taken place and there has been
local subsidence at several places. Repairs have been
sanctioned from the maintenance budget of the PWD. But
these repairs cannot be a long term measure, as further
erosion is anticipated during the monsoon period
endangering the entire town. 246

As noted in the excerpt above, maintenance of the shoreline had already been sanctioned
from the operating budget of the Public Works Department, but more permanent
solutions had already delegated to the Irrigation and Power Ministry along with the
Planning Commission, recalling the conflict over the Bommianpet petition discussed at
the opening of the present chapter.
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ibid.
ibid., 129. Italics added. The government distillery was located at the northern extreme of the colonial
town, outside of what would have been its defensive walls but south of the canal dug separating
Pondicherry town from Kuruchikuppam. Solathandavankuppam is the third fisher hamlet north of the
town, now integrated into the metropolitan fabric through decades of urban sprawl.
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While this shell game was occurring between the departments of the territorial
administration, cyclones continued to beat the coast. Storms in both 1966 and 1969 were
severe enough to merit moderately accurate recall by fishers in both Pondicherry and
Karaikal and yet underscore what fisher communities came to see as the administration’s
inability to cope with floods. Coastal flooding in 1966 was severe enough to maroon
people in Uppalam and Dubrayapet and as far inland as Lawspet and Karuvadikkupam.
Catamaran fishers in Kuruchikuppam were enlisted to rescue those stranded, just as they
had been by the French during prior emergencies. 247 Rather than relying on government
assistance, communities had to necessarily rely on each other and the mobilization of
traditional coping and mitigation mechanisms such as choultries and temples 248 and
panchayat emergency stores. 249 Traditional coping mechanism further mitigated damage,
but at the same time government schemes intended to reinforce community resilience
often had consequences that worked in direct opposition to these.
By 1969, despite over a decade of public concern for the social uplift of
vulnerable groups in the Union Territory, coastal fisher communities in Pondicherry were
still very much fending for themselves in the wake of cyclonic storms. A storm in
October left the Sankaraparani (Chunnambar) River in high flood damaging houses and
inundating paddy in Ariankuppam district. The following month a heavy cyclone struck
the coast between Kakinda and Machilipatnam in Andhra Pradesh, causing heavy damage
247

Veerappan (fisherman, Kuricchikuppam) in discussion with author, July 2010; Arulraj (fisherman,
Vambakirapalaiyam) in discussion with author, March 2009. The use of Kurichikuppam fishers to rescue
marooned neighbors has also entered local folklore (see P. Rajan, Glimpses of Pondicherry) and official
history (see F.C. Antony’s Gazetteer). For earlier instances recall, for example, inundations in 1884‐1885
that stranded communities as far inland as Oulgaret, discussed in chapter 2.
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P. Raja (folklorist, Tagore College, Lawspet) in discussion with author, November 2008; Dr. V. Nallam
(amateur historian) in discussion with author, March 2009.
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Puthupattan, in discussion with author, August 2010; Viswanathan, in discussion with author, July
2010; Tandavasamy, in discussion with author, August 2010.
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in Yanam and distracting the territorial administration from still recovering fisher hamlets
in Pondicherry. Government relief efforts in Yanam included cash doles totaling Rs. 1.19
lakh for housing rehabilitation, Rs. 6,400 for fisher relief and Rs. 45,000 for cultivators.
An additional Rs. 93,000 was given as subsidized loans for home repairs, but no relief
committees were established as in the past, even as recently as the 1966 cyclone.
In the meantime, citizens in Pondicherry town found themselves without
assistance. In an effort to obtain assistance not forthcoming the government, residents in
Veerampattinam lead by Puthupattan approached Nicole Durieux, the wife of the French
Consul-General, and asked her to intercede on their behalf. Mme. Durieux saw to the
establishment of a primary health clinic in the village as well as work opportunities for
local women and daycare facilities. This last was not an anganwadi, or government
daycare center, but set up under the auspices of several French charitable
organizations. 250 French intervention at this moment of government failure only
confirmed to the community that the French had always been more responsive to their
needs than the new Indian administration had ever been, and over the following three
decades very few government-led initiatives did anything to counteract this belief.
The best documented cyclone of this period struck the coast on November 11th,
1977. Unlike other storms in the period, one official report published by the Revenue
Department acknowledges that prior warning of the coming cyclone had been given by
the Meteorological Department in Chennai. As a result, certain preventative measures of
which there is no earlier evidence were taken by the administration. According to the
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N. Balasubramanian, director CERTH – India, to the Social Welfare Department, GoPY, 13 July 2005,
Personal Files of Puthupattar, Vambakirapalaiyam, Pondicherry. The clinic is still the primary health
provider in Vambakirapalaiyam, though it is now operated solely by CERTH –India.

172

Revenue Department report, the storm was expected to make landfall between Chennai
and Pondicherry by the morning of November 12.

In early reports and bulletins

broadcast on All India Radio squally weather was expected to create 1.5 to 2 meter tidal
surges and wind speed in excess of 100 kilometers per hour, or what would only measure
as a category 1 storm on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale. 251 Despite the only
moderate severity of the storm, the administration decided to take precautionary
measures:
As the cyclone was to cover a wide area and its course
could not be predicted with any great accuracy, this
Administration took all necessary steps to warn the people
and also to evacuate them to safer places. 252
Coastal announcements were the responsibility of the Ports Department, which by long
tradition raised visual alerts for ships approaching in the sea road as well as for smaller,
local fisher craft. 253 One engineer who started working for the Ports Department only
months before the cyclone remembered remembered not just the raising of the hurricane
“flag” but also autos fixed with loud speakers moving though the coastal neighborhoods
in Pondicherry. He confirmed that, at least in the territorial center, coastal residents had
at least 36 hours warning of the approaching storm.
Other residents, especially those in Karaikal, disagree with government claims.
With a growing body of experience suggesting an administrative disinterest in the fisher
251

See National Hurricane Center, “The Saffir‐Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale,” accessed March 11, 2011,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/sshws.shtml#_ftn1. Given the extent of resulting damage, it seems unlikely
that the cyclone that eventually struck the coast was only a category one. Unfortunately no hydrological
data has survived. See C. Ramaswamy, Review of Floods in India during the past 75 Years (New Delhi:
Indian National Science Academy, 1985), 141.
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Revenue Department, Report on Cyclone and Flood Damages: November 1977 (Pondicherry:
Government of Pondicherry, 1977), 2.
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See “Cyclone Warning Sugnals,” Port Department, Government of Puducherry, last modified
November 2, 2007, http://port.puducherry.gov.in/Port_data/Cyclone.htm. This visual cue was at one time
a series of flags but by 1977 these had been replaced with a complex system of lights. Today these signals
are published on the website of the Pondicherry Ports Department.
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communities, some contemporary community leaders give accounts that contradict the
government’s narrative:
In 1977 a heavy cyclone came. A lot of boats were
damaged during 1977. Houses were damaged, too. [AM:
What precautions were taken?] There was no prior warning
given by the government, but people in the community
sensed the symptoms of the cyclone and avoided going to
fish.
Many homes and trees collapsed during that
cyclone. 254
Tangavadivel, today a community leader and former panchayat president in Karaikal
Medu, recalled even earlier storms that he says “washed away the whole shore” but
remembered 1977 happening as a young man still learning his trade under his father’s
watchful eye.
In 1977 a big cyclone hit here. Most of the villages here
are placed on top of sand dunes [mēṭu] and by that are
saved from floods. There was no loss of life then, only
material loss like boats and nets. But there was no warning
[from the government] before the storm came. 255
Such stories contrast greatly not only with government narratives that state that
“[r]epeated warnings were issued to people in the vulnerable areas through mike-fitted
jeep and also by beat of drum,” 256 but also with those told by fishers in hamlets bordering
Pondicherry. Some who remember the 1977 cyclone admit to evacuating and resettling,
though none of the Pattanavars with whom I spoke remember the source of the warning
(port warnings, radio, jeep, or drum). 257 Others deny that flood was ever a problem in the
immediate vicinity of Pondicherry, until recently:
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Tandavasamy, in discussion with the author, January 2009.
Tangavadivel (fisherman, Mahatma Phule Nagar), July 2009.
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Report on Cyclone and Flood Damages, 3.
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Ramalingam (fisherman, Vambakirapalaiyam) in discussion with author, July 2010; Viramurugan
(fisherman, Veerampattinam) in discussion with author, October 2008.
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I cannot remember the year correctly [but] thirty years ago
flood attacked the shore and damaged lots of boats. But
there was no damage to the village because the village is
very distant from the shore. Now most of the shore lands
have disappeared into the sea. [Before thirty years ago
there was] no danger here. Flood came occasionally, so no
problem. 258
And, concludes Puthu, if flood was never a problem then there was never a need for the
government to issue such warnings.
The last assertion is disingenuous in the extreme. Whatever the materials of
Puthu’s memory, it seems likely that in Pondicherry warnings were issued and
preventative measures taken while in Karaikal such actions were lacking. Whatever the
truth of the matter might be, these are the prevalent narratives. In addition to warnings
being issued via various media, other actions taken by the administration in anticipation
of the storm included: the assignation of specific duties and responsibilities to each of the
line departments to be undertaken during and after the emergency, the opening a crisis
control rooms in both Pondicherry and Karaikal, the shutting down of power supply in
high-risk areas (especially in Karaikal), the regular clearing of debris from roads by fire
and police personnel, and the targeted warning of fishermen in coastal villages by
members of the Fisheries Department. 259
After the initial cyclone passed, a second storm warning was issued on November
14th and as a precautionary measure evacuations to safer areas continued in both regions
of the territory. The second cyclone did not strike the coast until the 19th, and then in
only Andhra Pradesh, but from November 11th to the 19th the Revenue Department
reported that the entire district administration was geared towards rescue and relief.
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Puthupattan, in discussion with author, August 2010.
This last is worth noting again, as it directly contradicts accounts given by numerous informants.
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People were shifted to public buildings, community halls, and temples and as more
people were left without shelter increasing numbers of people – up to 10,000 daily – were
fed at emergency centers run by the central administration, municipalities, and commune
panchayats. One aspect of the immediate relief operations underscored by the Revenue
Department was the efforts of temples to feed cyclone victims out of their own coffers. 260
Damage surveys estimated that approximately 8,000 huts had been affected,
13,500 acres had been at least partially submerged, and 600 country craft and 57
mechanized boats had been destroyed. The Revenue Department’s report, completed two
weeks after the cyclones, only sketches the details of the relief measures proposed. What
can be gathered from the report is that the majority of the relief measures taken were
directed directly from the state level. Proposals were submitted for each sector by the
concerned departments.

Sector-wise proposals of state or municipal services – e.g.

Electricity, Public Works, Panchayat, and Animal Husbandry – were limited to cost
estimates. Residential and occupations sector proposals warrant more notice. Relief
measures can be summarized as follows:
Housing: “Since the sufferers have to be given necessary assistance for
the rebuilding of their thatched houses/huts immediately, gratuitous relief
and housing subsidy as contemplated in the Government of India’s
guidelines for distribution of relief to the victims of Natural calamities
circulated under their letter No. U-13030/1/74-Delhi dated 31st January,
1976 will be given.” 261
Agriculture: the immediate re-sowing of 3000 acres plus 50kg urea, free
of cost; the rejuvenation of an additional 10,500 acres of partially
submerged land with 20kg urea, free of cost for farmers owning > 2 acres
and at 50% for those owning < 2acres; distribution of pesticides and
260

Report on Cyclone and Flood Damages, 4. This corresponds with contemporary research on this
cyclone that noted the prevalence of temples and choultries in relief efforts. See James Lewis, “Tamil
Nadu Cyclone, November 1977: A Comparison of Newspaper Reports,” Disasters 3(2):123‐125.
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fertilizers at same rate; 50% subsidy of planting materials at a rate of Rs.
500/acre (betel), Rs. 150/acre (banana), and Rs. 100/acre (groundnut);
provision of taccavi loans (in cash and kind) up to Rs.450/acre to be repaid
annually over 3 years.
Fisheries: full replacement of mechanized boats with engines (Rs.
88,000/boat); Rs. 100/- per catamaran subsidy; 50% subsidy/50% loan to
replace lost nets (Rs.2000/net)
These three measures bear consideration. The first, the provision for housing relief, fell
under rules outlined by the central government and were, more than any other relief
measures, automatically given. What came of this money is up for question, as no
documents can be recovered within the Union Territory that detail housing reconstruction
in 1977. There were separate housing development programs in process through FY
1977-1978, and these will be discussed in chapter 5, but it is unlikely that any effort was
made to integrate these earliest development schemes with the immediate rehabilitation
required post-cyclone.
The fisheries and agricultural measures are more interesting. In the report the
Revenue Department defined the territory as “predominantly agricultural,” and the
resources given to the rehabilitation of the farm sector reflect this impression. But where
the most economically vulnerable cultivators – those controlling less than two acres – are
given the most assistance in the form of ex gratia payments and provision of materials, it
is rather the most economically productive fishers who receive the most aid in the form of
100% replacement cost of mechanized boats and engines. The report numbers “about
4,500” fisher families living in the coastal regions of Pondicherry and Karaikal who were
“extremely hard put on account of the cyclone and the preceding heavy rains, as they
could not go out to sea for fishing.” The Revenue Department concluded that:
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“Unless immediate assistance is given to rehabilitate [the
fishers] in their occupations by a suitable scheme which
would incorporate a liberal element of subsidy and loan, the
fishermen community would experience great distress.” 262
Notwithstanding this grim assessment of the quality of life of 4,500 fisher families, the
administration chose to give as relief what amounted to loans of Rs. 1000 and ex gratia
payments for boat repair that would not cover one tenth of replacement cost, 263 and this
to families who in 2010 earn on average less than Rs. 60 per day. 264
In addition to the above measures, one further program was instituted in light of
the flooding:
After the severity of the calamity was over, rescue and
relief operations were carried out. By the combines efforts
of all departments normalcy was sought to be restores
speedily. Anti-epidemic measures were also taken by the
Medical and Public Health Departments conjointly with the
Municipalities and Commune Panchayats. A massive
inoculation drive against cholera was started in both the
regions and so far about 20,000 persons [have been
inoculated]. As a result of these measures, there has been
no epidemic out-break of disease. 265
The inoculation campaign had already reached nearly 10% of the combined population of
Pondicherry town and Karaikal only one week after the storm, and authorities continued
to inoculate both people and wells against cholera. Given these massive relief efforts –
rivaled eventually only by the 2004 tsunami recovery efforts – it is almost a wonder that
there is still such firm denial of government assistance in the wake of storm disasters,
especially this one, within the Pattanavar community.
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Throughout the present study I have been outlining the specific ways that the
French administration gradually developed disaster management policies over the course
of the nineteenth century that were then allowed to languish by independent Indian
administrations post-merger, 1954-2004. The 1977 cyclone seems to put the lie to this
assertion, but I would counter that 1977 exhibits an extreme anomaly in the way that
post-merger administrations in Pondicherry responded to the threat of cyclones and their
aftermath.

Nothing before or after the November 1977 cyclone suggests that the

strategies pursued in its wake were either mobilized from existing standard operating
procedures or maintained for mobilization during later storms. And while extant official
documents and even media reports in the Union Territory during this period are
exceedingly rare, the parcenary memories maintained within the affected communities
and the administration simply do not support the suggestion that the response to 1977 was
typical.
To the contrary, all of the narratives surrounding storm and flood in the last three
decades excepting the Revenue Department’s Report suggest that Pattanavar impressions
of administrative disinterest are not far from the truth. To be sure, in the five years since
tsunami the stories told in fisher communities have been shaped to fit a narrative aimed at
procuring more development resources. This narrative is mobilized to elicit sympathy
and foster increased expenditure of within the Pattanavar communities. But there is
broad agreement – in communities, in the administration, and in NGOs – that prior to
2004 the mechanisms of disaster response in the Union Territory were inadequate, almost
entirely reactive, and some would even say ill-considered. Surprisingly, given the much
vaster scale of the tsunami disaster, the scope of damage and relief in the wake of the
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1977 cyclone was eerily comparable. Had the administration been able to draw lessons
from 1977, relief efforts in the last days of 2004 could have been more rendered more
speedily and effectively. Instead, in the words of Santirabal Singh, Chief Engineer of
Public Works, “After tsunami we had no idea what to do.” 266 Strictly speaking this
simply was not true. But nobody knew where to look.

266

Er. Santirabal Singh (Chief Engineer, Puducherry PWD) in discussion with author, November 2008.
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-4Before: Problems of Memory, Problems of Response
Pattanavars in the Union Territory have very little good to say about the
administration in the years preceding the 2004 tsunami, and much that is mixed in its
aftermath. But an examination of the narratives maintained within the community shows
much that is mixed, too. With the advent of Independence and their gradual inclusion
into the development initiatives in the system of Five Year Plans, fisher communities
appear to have come to rely increasingly on the state. Though sometimes slow to
acknowledge it, community leaders across the territory do admit – sometimes with anger
at their own constituents – that such reliance on the government has weakened their
communities. According this narrative, traditional structures like panchayats, choultries,
and temple collections – once the signposts of strong, self-reliant communities – have
gradually disappeared over the course of the last thirty years.
Informants across the spectrum of relief and rehabilitation ranging from
government officials and NGO workers to the fishermen themselves agree that traditional
mechanisms of resilience – that is, the ability to withstand and recover from the negative
effects of risk – have been replaced with reliance on external actors, an expectation of
doles and handouts, and a weakening of community character. “Fishermen used to take
care of their families,” said one fisherman. “Now sons are beating their mothers for
pension money for drink.” 267 Echoed another, “the government may give money for
houses [to be built after tsunami], but these men, they drink it all away!”268 For many on
the relief-giving side of the equation this has everything to do with how well-equipped
267
268

Veluthat (fisherman, Vambakirapalaiyam) in discussion with the author, June 2010.
Puthupattar, in discussion with the author, June 2010.
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communities are to respond to disasters in the first place. Community resilience is
greatly impacted by the quality of first responders, and these are not the same as those
designated the role by officials but rather members of the community who are in situ
when disaster strikes. 269 And resilient communities – like those in Simueleu and Grand
Bayou discussed in the previous chapter – are more easily rehabilitated.
At the end of the last chapter I posed a conundrum: if the response to the 1977
cyclone was so effective, at least from the point of view of the Revenue Department’s
own report, why did the administration not adapt and adopt it as a template for future best
practice? If the administration acted preemptively by warning vulnerable communities of
the coming storm, aiding in the evacuation of low-lying areas, and making provisions for
quick relief in the immediate aftermath through the deployment of relief camps and
emergency food kitchens, why is there no memory in the affected communities of
“positive” responses to imminent risk by the administration? Such forgetting can be
ascribed to two separate processes, the first linked to archival memory and the second to
parcenary.
Remember from chapter 3 that archival memory is but one category of Nora’s
lieux de memoire, one that preserves memory-as-artifact within institutions. It is the urge
to record, classify and retain every iota of history, though for what purpose never need be
defined. There is no requirement for archival memory to be retrievable; the mere act of
preserving it within an archive it enough to make it a memory-site. It is gestural: “There
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See, for example, Virginia García‐Acosta, “Historical Disaster Research,” in Catastrophe and Culture:
The Anthropology of Disaster, ed. Susanna Hoffman and Anthony Oliver Smith (Santa Fe, NM: School of
American Research Press, 2002) and Renos Vakis, “Complementing Natural Disasters Management: The
Role of Social Protection,” (WorldBank 2009), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/
Resources/SP‐Discussion‐papers/Social‐Risk‐Management‐DP/0543.pdf.
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stands the archive, and within in lies a (our) history.” Whether it is ever accessed is not
the point. 270
But let us examine the second process first. Parcenary memories are preserved
precisely because of their utility.

In a community that has come to depend upon

government assistance, narratives that confirm response, relief and attentiveness
undermine narratives of neglect and of deficiency. “The government has done nothing,”
said one man employed as a builder during Veerampattinam’s housing rehabilitation
project begun in June 2010. “They used to give a loan for boats, but it is not sufficient
because we have to buy the net and all these things. We can’t do anything. We can’t
save any money. And the government is doing nothing.” 271 The sentiment that the
administration should be even more present, that fisher safety is the responsibility of the
government, hints at the breadth of the expansion of the government into people’s lives in
recent decades, particularly as it is most often expressed by fishermen in their early
twenties living in communities with weakened panchayats. “The government should help
us,” said Arul. When asked what responsibility he bore during flood or other crisis his
answer was pointed: “No, not me. First the government, definitely. Then the NGOs.” 272
This submission to the direction of agencies charged with the welfare of state
subjects contrasts strongly with the image of self-reliance and state-subject cooperation
maintained by older Pattanavars. As recently as 1968, fishermen in Kuruchikuppam had
been enlisted to use their catamarans to rescue flood victims stranded by inundations
throughout Pondicherry town, a cooperative strategy of rendering aid that had first been
270

The India Office Records maintained by the British Library seems the quintessential example of this. It
is, of course, accessed and its records mobilized daily. But it seems likely that therein lie records that will
never again be examined, but it is enough that they exist within its fourteen kilometers of shelves.
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Joseph (day laborer, Vambakirapalaiyam) in discussion with the author, July 2010.
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Arulraj, in discussion with the author, June 2009.
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deployed in the mid-nineteenth century. 273 Others remember proactive evacuations as
recently as 1977: “At that time we vacated out hamlet and resettled here again.” 274 But
frustration about the level of relief assistance is regularly expressed in a temporally vague
way, though specific instances of dissatisfaction can often be pinpointed based on the
specific details of memory.

For example in 1987, remembered as the year M.G.

Ramachandran died, “the state helped us but they could not fulfill our needs. They
provided only to a few victims, but the remaining [victims] were helpless.” 275
There is general agreement among fisherfolk that for the duration of living
memory their villages have been left largely to fend for themselves.

This has not

necessarily been perceived as a detriment to the community.

Residents in

Veerampattinam have long-established donative practices that the panchayat has used to
sustain the community in times of crisis. 276 Similar practices prevailed in all Pattanavar
communities in the Union Territory until very recently. For example, certain days would
be announced for the benefit of the common village fund. All fish caught on that day
would be given to the panchayat. Some of the money raised would be given to the
fishermen who participated in the catch, but most would be kept by the panchayat to plan
festivals and community welfare programs. Panchayat leaders have also been active
273

See chapter 3.
Ramalingam (fisherman, Manal Medu) in discussion with the author, June 2010. I say “proactive”
because despite the 1977 Revenue Department report discussed in chapter 3, fishermen do not
remember evacuation orders being given, only that they chose to evacuate. In the construction of
narratives in which Pattanavars are left to fend for themselves in the face of a government imagined to be
unengaged in the plight of fisher communities, the fact of official evacuation efforts undermines the
fishers’ own sense of agency.
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Ibid. MGR was a popular film actor – especially among the minavar, or fisherman, communities in
Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry – who turned politician and quickly rose through the ranks of the Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK). In 1972 he broke away to form his own party, the Anna Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam (ADMK). He was elected Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu in 1977 and served until his death in
1987.
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Murugan (fisher) in discussion with the author, August 2010; Kankayan (Veerampattinam panchayat
president) in discussion with the author, August 2010.
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advocates for the community in the face of unwanted development schemes devised by
the administration over the years. The Veerampattinam fishers worked with the fishers of
Vambakirapalaiyam and Manal Medu to advocate against a new harbor planned at
Tangathittu, l’île de cocotiers, a small island located in the mouth of the Ariankuppam
River behind the breakwater dune that currently serves as a protected landing for fishers
in Manal Medu. But where the hard-scrabble living that characterizes life in the fisher
hamlets once fostered self-reliance, or at least a grudging understanding that if the
community needed something it needed to acquire it by its own means, 277 there is now
perceived among the younger generation a notable languor that roughly coincides with
development initiatives started in the late 1970s:
There has been a change in mentality among the
fishermen… Everybody wants nice things – you know like
TV, scooter, AC – but they are not willing to put in the
hard work for it…[it started] when the government started
giving FRP boats [and] people started to think they could
go off alone. 278
These are the words of Murugan, a younger son of Tandavasamy, elder and former
panchayat leader in Kilinjil Medu, Karaikal District. Encouraged by his father not to be a
fisherman, Murugan went to college before becoming the merchant marine, and in so
doing he offers an almost unique perspective on the rupture between traditional practice
and government-driven modernization. But his opinion on this is little different from that
of many of his elders. Puthupattar, a community leader in Vambakirapaliyam since the
late 1960s, noted the same change in the following terms:
People are changed very much from the past. Before we
earned money for daily subsistence, but now the situation is
changed. People are bound to earn more money [so] the
277
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For example, the medical clinic discussed in the previous chapter.
Murugan, in discussion with the author, July 2010.
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thoughts to make money have increased. Thatched houses
were enough for us at that time. 279
Puthu’s perception is not significantly different from Murugan, though they differ by a
generation. The concept of “mentality” used by the younger, English-educated man is
one that percolates within the circles of disaster management, government and nongovernment alike. The idea of a “fisher mentality” is one worth examining in depth. It
goes to the core of the contradictory narratives about flood response in the Union
Territory. Broadly speaking, the first is constituted by memories that reject evidence of
government intervention in the face of crisis. The second is supported by documents that
hold countervailing evidence that various sorts of aid have indeed been made available to
the community.

While the latter narrative is largely rejected by members of the

Pattanavar community, the equally widely held belief – particularly among younger
fishers – that government assistance for the acquisition of trade tools and supplies is not
“aid” but rather the community’s barest due belies the claim of government disinterest in
the community.
The change in mentality noted by Murugan, Puthu, and others is rooted in the
development measures initiated during the period of transition between the 1954 de facto
transfer and the 1963 de jure merger of the French colonies with India. Projects aimed at
modernization began with the territory’s inclusion in the Second Five Year Plan (II Plan)
in the mid-1950s, but the process of change did not really get underway until the late
1970s. To summarize, the II Plan sought the “transformation of the economic system in
India so as to ensure greater efficiency in production as well as equality of justice.” 280
Agricultural development took the highest priority in this program, but the development
279
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In discussion with the author, August 2010.
II Plan, 1.
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of coastal economy also received attention that would lay the groundwork for the
normalization of the entitlements.

In their inaugural year, 1956-1957, fisheries

development programs were limited to the setting up of cooperative societies, the
provision of cold storage units, and training in modern fishing techniques.

These

programs were continued through the II Plan at a total expense of only Rs. 3 lakhs
divided almost equally among the three programs. 281 Other programs intended to address
quality of life issues included limited housing projects intended aimed at fisher
communities and government workers, a discussion of which follows in chapter 5.
Development projects benefitting fishers increased significantly under the III Plan
with additional schemes to collect and distribute fish seed, build ice plants, and provide
subsidies for salt and synthetic twine. Two further programs provided subsidized credit
for the acquisition of modern craft and other trade tools, both to individuals and to fisher
co-op societies. These last programs were aimed specifically at the “ignorance and
poverty” of fishermen “unable to command funds for purchase of craft and tackle,
clearance of debts, repair of boats, net-making, etc., except at usurious rates from money
lending-class [sic].” 282 An article published in Putuvai seytigaḻ proclaimed this boon to
the fisher communities of the territory:

“Mīṉavar nalam,” “Fishermen benefit.” 283

Fisherman could obtain so-called “pablo” boats – capable of hauling up to 23,500
kilograms of fish – at reduced cost from the government and receive training in any of the
territories four enclaves. 284
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II Plan, 47.
III Plan, 29.
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“Mīṉavar nalam,” Putuvai seytigaḻ (Pondicherry, India), January 8, 1964.
284
III Plan, 28. In fact, as proposed in the III Plan, boats were made available through a “hire‐purchase”
system at 25% subsidy. At over Rs. 9,000/boat, these craft were still out of reach for most fishers.
282
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State sponsored mechanized fishing and training in modern fishing methods
expanded slowly over the course of the decade. In a summary of the III Plan published in
the Union Territory’s Annual Plan, FY 1966-1967, it became apparent how slowly
progress on the coastal economy had been developing. In the first four years of the plan,
1961-1965, only two boats had been distributed, with four planned for distribution in the
final year of III Plan and six more in the first year of IV Plan. 285 Numbers drawn from
the UTP Annual Plan FY 1968-69 show that even this was optimistic. While engines
became available under a hire-purchase system, no boats were made available until FY
1968-1969: 286
FY 1966-1967
FY 1967-1968
FY 1968-1969

5 marine engines purchased;
“suitable” boats under construction
3 engines imported, 2 ordered locally;
Orders placed for 3 hulls
9 boats to be constructed and distributed

The slow rate of delivery on promises no doubt made an impression on the communities
these projects were intended to benefit. Pablo boats were phased out during the first half
of the 1970s to be replaced by fiber reinforced plastic, or FRP, boats that could be fitted
with small, diesel outboard engines (illus. 4.1). FRP boats had several advantages over
traditional catamarans: they were larger, held more men, carried more weight, and were
more durable. 287 The most ambitious modernization scheme to date, initiated in FY

285

When the IV Plan was finally released in 1969 it did not include any provision for the continuation of
the mechanization program.
286
Annual Plan 1968‐1969. Numbers submitted the following year show only eight boats distributed.
287
Catamarans, country craft made by lashing logs together with rope, are much smaller craft that allow
crews of no more than three and considerably limit fish catches. According to V. Jayanand, a career
administrator with the UTP Department of Fisheries and Fisherman Welfare, logs for their construction
have long been imported from Kerala at costs that are still prohibitive to traditional fisherman but many
still prefer them for the durability, weight, and stability in rough water.
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1975-76, was intended to speed the implementation of FRP fishing According to the plan:

“The program of mechanization of
fishing crafts will be continued at
a more intensified scale by
procuring 120 boats. Boat hulls
made of glass fiber and reinforced
plastic will be introduced [and]
production is expected to increase
from 16,000 tons to 25,000 tons
by the end of V Plan.” 288

This is the moment, a time when

Illus. 4.1 FRP boats at Kuricchikuppam

the government was heavily subsidizing the introduction of FRP boats and working
mightily to develop and modernize the craft of fishing to the Union Territory, identified
by Murugan as the change-point in the fisher mentality. It is worth noting, too, that the
period he identifies as the moment in which local fishermen started to increase their
dependence upon the government while growing increasingly complacent in their own
welfare came during a time when the Central Government was at its most intrusive.
The independent administration of the Union Territory was already proving
unable to meet development goals within planned timelines, and fisher communities
promised specific aid programs saw more promises failed than fulfilled.

Despite

numerous betterment schemes proposed in the years following the transfer, time and
again the administration left development goals unmet. With such a record it is not
surprising that vulnerable and marginal communities have come to hold very low
expectations for government assistance, even rejecting evidence that displayed a more
responsive side to government by excluding it from community narratives, insisting
288
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instead that “the government does not protect us at all.” 289 The regular repetition of
individual incidents of perceived injustice re-echo through Pattanavar communities
confirming the perception of an unsympathetic, or least unengaged, government:
A young man was killed last year when the wall collapsed,
but we will not be getting [any] money for two years. 290
They provided 10kg of rice to every family, but it was bad
quality to cook so we traded it in the shop [for other
things]. 291
In the morning they’ll bring some idlis, in the afternoon
some lemon rice or curd rice in a packet and they’ll just
give it and go away. [AM: For how many days?] Just that
day…and after that they don’t do anything. They may
ration some rice. That’s all. [But] it will be yellow. 292
Despite the dissatisfaction resulting from what is perceived to be almost certain
neglect by the government in Pondicherry, local political structures that in the past might
have fulfilled the relief role undertaken by the central government are also seen to be in
decline. The bodies of local governance that have traditionally been responsible for the
health of the community, the panchayats, are seen by many to be in decline across much
of the Union Territory. In Vambakirapallayam, for example, the Pattanavar panchayat
has been the victim of caste miscegenation. “We do not have this system because of
village conflict,” said Ramalingam. “[Other castes] kept coming and coming into the
village to stay,” forcing the fishermen into the margins. 293 Puthupattan agreed, adding
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Nagarajan (fisherman, Kilinjil Medu) in discussion with the author, July 2010.
Perumal (fisherman, Manal Medu) in discussion with the author, June 2010.
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Joseph in discussion with the author, July 2010.
293
In discussion with the author, August 2010. Ramalingam’s words were, “Avaṅka pōṅki pōṅki pōṅki pōṅki
taṅkiṉaṅka.” The repetition of the word ‘pōṅki’, “having gone,” accompanied with hand motions moving
farther away from his body with each repetition was conveyed as sense of inexorable invasion.
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that panchayat structures only work in homogenous communities.

“Here there are

different castes. Their occupations are different. It is hard to control them.” 294
In Vambakirapalaiyam, fishermen date the decline of their local panchayat to the
1990s. It was then that Cinna Pattanavars, a different fisher caste found primarily around
Chennai, began settling in Pondicherry. Conflict between the fisher castes shattered the
established hierarchy in the village, leading to rowdism between factions seeking an
upper hand in the local economy.

But more than tensions between fisher castes,

Vambakirapalaiyam was victim to the heterogeneity identified by Puthu. “Every caste
here has their own community panchayat,” said Ramalingam, naming in Hindu,
Christian, and Sambavar as three groups within the village that had their own panchayats.
A similar change has been noted in Karaikal District, particularly where
communities displaced by the tsunami have been relocated.

But here there is less

agreement about loss of local power structures. Sriji Kurup, the district director for CEE,
an environmental education and development NGO, began noticing changes as soon as
tsunami nagars – complete colonies built expressly to relocate displaced populations –
were completed. Traditionally communities would nominate up to fifteen members to
serve for a year-long term. These nominations were based largely on respect and position
within the community. When villages were relocated, said Kurup, members from smaller
villages would often be consolidated into larger colonies, destabilizing older hierarchies.
In itself this likely would not have been enough to lead to the kinds of disintegration of
local level control seen by Kurup, but it did begin a process similar to that described by
Ramalingam and Puthu in northern Pattanavar villages. “Who will they look to in a
crisis?” he asked me. “They do not know anymore,” he replied, answering his own
294
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question. “They will look to the government because they no longer know where to look
in the community.”
A more satisfactory answer was given to me by L. Mohammed Mansoor, former
District Collector in Karaikal, who had seen the same kind of disruption. “It keeps them
socially cohesive,” he said, but added that the panchayats had too much power over the
community in the past. “People are more willing to speak out against the panchayat,” he
said, “because they are emboldened by government allotments.”

He explained that

community members who could have formerly been marginalized by village leaders were
gaining new affluence through government doles. Rehabilitation assistance was not
something that local leaders could limit or take away as it was received directly from the
government. Village members no longer had to rely solely on the munificence of local
leaders. Villagers who may have earned the village’s ire, who had been ostracized or
otherwise marginalized from the community center, received government handouts
regardless of their status within the community, and this freed them to criticize village
leaders.
A second component contributing to the decline of the traditional panchayat was
the institution of elected panchayats in the Union Territory in 2006. Where under the
older, caste-dominated model members were nominated by village members based on
respect, influence, wealth, and other signifiers of position, elected panchayats were not
only open to any village members who chose to run, but barriers of caste were removed
in villages with significant minority populations. Veerampattinam, for example, remains
a predominantly Pattanavar village with approximately 4,000 residents. Kankayan, the
current panchayat president, is sanguine about the traditional leadership. “There is no
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problem here. Dalits and Vanniyars are minimal in number here, so they are not fighting
with us.” 295 In the entire village Dalits number less than one hundred voting members
and Vanniyars less than fifty. Even in the elected leadership there is little chance of
minority castes garnering enough votes to disrupt Pattanavar control.

In

Vambakirapalaiyam, on the other hand, its formerly Periya Pattanavar majority is now
challenged by significant populations of Cinna Pattanavars, Sambavars, Christians, and
even Telugu-speaking Ambattars. As already noted above, the Periya Pattanavars have
long since lost their local dominance, and as a result have little chance to control the
elected panchayat. But the introduction of an elected leadership that subverts historical
caste dominance goes beyond the mere loss of caste influence within a given community.
As one tahsildar noted to me, rehabilitation agencies must as a matter of law deal not
with traditional panchayats but with elected leadership. This change has flipped older
structures of reciprocity on their head. Nominated (e.g. caste) leaders have lost their
control over resources given to the community by the central government. This double
undercutting of traditional village hierarchies – the direct giving of ex gratia payments by
the government to recipients and the transfer of power from caste-determines leaders to
non-caste-determinative village-level leadership – had greatly weakened traditional fisher
panchayats, especially in the more heterogenous, urbanized villages in Pondicherry
District.
Coupled with the loss of community mechanisms that abet preparedness and
mitigation – building atop medus, panchayat collections, and familiar hierarchies of
leadership in crisis – there is a perceivable loss of vocational lore that has long been used
by fishers to protect against the risks associated with the sea, part and parcel of the
295
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change in mentality that was until recently the indigenous bulwark against the natural
behavior of the sea. Before moving to examine the failures of institutional memory in the
years leading up to the 2004 tsunami it will be useful to become familiar with the
indigenous mechanisms of response that have been left to atrophy as government
programs have increased.

Even the Wide Sea
Pattanavar fishermen in the Union Territory, perhaps more than anyone, must find
a way to balance the risks associated with living near the sea with the benefits. Among
the benefits are vocation and sustenance; the risks are rather more numerous and
uncertain. This uneasy balance is captured in a verse of the Tirukkural, Thiruvalluvar’s
classical text of Tamil couplets, which many older fishermen know and were proud to be
able to recite to me as evidence of their learning:
neṭuṅkaṭalum taṉ nīrmai kuṉṟum taṭint
eḻilitāṉ nalkātu āki viṭiṉ 296
Even the wide sea will be depleted
if the clouds do not give of themselves
By itself the couplet ties the wealth of the ocean to the inevitable regularity of monsoon.
The sea is not an infinite resource to be mined without consideration for the future. And
while the medieval science of the aphorism is wrong – no contemporary fisherman with
whom I spoke believes that clouds can drink up the whole of the ocean – the words are a
reminder to the community that the resources of the sea must be husbanded with care.
This care comes in knowing not only when and where to fish, but also when not
to fish. This knowledge is tied to the cycle of the monsoon, regionally called musappu, a
296
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Pattanavar dialect word derived from the Tamil words for ‘three’ and ‘month’ – mūṉṟu
and mācam, respectively.
“It’s a local term [that] may vary from Pondy to Karaikal
region. Musuppu means a strong cloud will form and the
weather and wind will change immediately. By these
symptoms we know not to go fishing. 297
In the standard spoken dialect of the Pondicherry region this is typically rendered more
closely to written Tamil as “munu masam” or “mul masam,” referring to the three months
between October and December when heavy cyclones are most likely, and it remains
today a low register shorthand for the annual northeast monsoon season. 298

An

awareness of musappu and being able to recognize its “symptoms” was once part of
traditional fisher folklore. This knowledge provided a modicum of safety to the
community by mitigating the worst risks associated with storm and the heavy seas
associated with them by preventing the riskiest behavior, namely going to or staying at
sea when a storm approached.
The foundation of this knowledge was simply knowing when musappu occurs.
Even with modern technology fishermen remain acutely aware of the wind, as this is
often the first symptom of impending trouble.

From mid-January until June the

prevailing winds bear south to north. From June to mid-July the winds subside until midJuly, the beginning of the Tamil month of āṭi (anglicized ‘Aadi’).

Aadi masam,

sometimes called “kattu masam” or “the month of wind,” is notable for its muṭṭā kōṭa
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Tangavadivel (panchayat member, Karaikal Medu) in discussion with the author, July 2010.
Most Pondicheriennes simply use the word monsoon. Several Franco‐Indians used ouragan or
tempête when speaking to me, though it is unclear whether these words were a part of their normal
usage of if they deployed them solely for my benefit as a foreigner. Certain French words have
penetrated the de facto register of older, French educated Pondicheriennes speaking to foreigners –
words like monsieur (pron. ‘mohsee’) and beaucoup (pron. as in French) – even, in my experience, to
non‐French or Tamil‐speaking foreigners.
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kāttu, or strong summer winds, which impact on the fishers has earned it the name mēlā
or paḷḷik kāttu, the west or Vanniyar wind. 299 The Vanniyar wind cuts harshly across the
shoreline making the daily return from sea extremely arduous for non-OBM 300 fishers
must paddle directly into the wind or, with modern boats, expend more than usual
amounts of petrol as their small outboard engines muscle against the wind. From midAugust “the sea will be silent,” 301 and the wind may change direction without warning.
The western wind of Aadi masam is followed by the erratic stillness of late
August and September. The subsequent arrival of a steady wind out of the north marks
the beginning of musappu. It is the most predictably dangerous time of year for the entire
coastal economy. Catamaran and FRP fishers who still survive in a largely subsistence
economy will avoid launching when the seas are stormy and might miss several days of
work in a single week, especially during the Tamil month of Karthikai, when the
kuṉṉodai kattu blows from mid-November to mid-December.
Even more dangerous than storms during musappu are the infrequent and
unpredictable storms of Chitirai masam (mid-April to mid-May):
Oru marakkā tali arata puyal citirai puyal
A storm in Chitirai reaps a marakka of grain.
This proverb is framed as an exaggeration that serves to underscore the belief that the
sudden storms Chitirai masam are calculably worse – in fact eight times worse – than the
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typical storms of musappa. 302 Pattanavars in Pondicherry also say citirai puyal kunnodai
puyal – “Chitirai storms [like] kunnodai storms” – which equates storms occurring in late
April and May with Kartikai’s kunnodai kattu. 303 One fisher, Tangavadivelu (hereafter,
Velu) of Karaikal Medu, described such out of season storms in the following way:
“It will come in Chitirai, but there is no scientific
explanation. [It] is from the north to east direction. It starts
like a mild wind but takes drastic effect within half an
hour.” 304
Velu’s description highlights the uncanny nature of Chitirai storms. Where storms during
monsoon are expected, and even understood as a natural artifact of the annual progress of
the seasons, there is little comparable understanding of the meteorological phenomena
that create storms in general, nor even a recognition that they are caused by similar
phenomena. Many fishers who avoid going to sea during the height of monsoon to
mitigate the risks associated with fishing in rough seas have nevertheless been caught
unaware by oncoming Chitirai puyal for this very reason. Despite the dangers inherent in
being caught at sea, few fishermen take proactive, material measures to prepare against
such possibilities beyond staying ashore during the harshest seas of musappu.
We take a water bottle and food in tiffin box for one day.
If we are going for two or three days we cook in the boat.
Small fiber boat fishers take kanji. 305
Preparations similar to those described above are practiced across the territory. As a rule,
fishers head out to sea with some water, but not enough to last should they be caught in
an emergency. Sometimes a little food is taken, but not with regularity.
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It also used to be the case that each day at sea would begin with a prayer – to
Renuka Devi and Balanchar in Karaikal, for example, or Senkeni Amman in
Veerampattinam. “They will protect us if we do proper puja,” said Nagarajan. 306 Added
Velu, “The sea is god to us, so we pray before going fishing. Kadal Mata will definitely
save us from evil.” He continued:
The sea gods are Kuttiamdavar, Kilakathiyar,
Samparuppam, Kanniamma, [and] Kodaimarathat. We
always pray [to] god when we used to go fishing. Now the
situation is changed. For catching the kōlā (flying fish) we
always pray. We do not wear chapals or even cut our hair
on a fishing day. [But] by seeing foreigners and Americans
(velaikkararum amerikarrarum) we are now coming out of
our traditional practices. 307
The change is especially acute among the younger men, those often considered rowdies
by the older generations. Perumal, a curious drunk who swings quickly from jollity to
anger whenever he is in his cups, complained bitterly about both the government and god
whenever I asked about what kind of help is given to storm victims: “They are nothing.
They are not helping us properly. I have [only] my brother and the rest [of the Manal
Medu fishers].” 308 Rowdism and drunken behavior is less prevalent in the villages north
of Karaikal than it is in and around the Pondicherry fisher hamlets, which only makes the
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Tangavadivel, in discussion with the author, August 2010. Kola fishing is a significant event in the
annual fishing cycle, occurring between May and August, and traditionally brings rich returns. Kola fishing
takes place in the deep sea, often at twice the depth of other fishing, and is consequently more
dangerous. As a result it is subject to a complex set of rituals prior to commencement, alluded to by Velu.
According to Bharathi preparations for the first kola voyage also include bathing in oil and maintaining
ritual purity by abstaining from non‐vegetarian meals and from sex. Fishwives will also maintain ritual
purity and prepare a special variety of pongal that can keep for several days. Since success depends upon
the blessing of the deity, fishers will not even refer to the kola fish or to their gear by their usual names,
instead deploying a separate vocabulary for these items during fishing. See also S.B. Bharathi,
Coromandel Fishermen, 61‐63.
308
Perumal, in discussion with the author, June 2010.
307

198

more sober opinion of fishers like Arumugam more poignant. When asked if he practices
puja like his elders he says matter of factly, “no, the gods mean very little.” 309
All of this is part of the change in mentality perceived by Murugan, Velu, and
others in both the fisher communities and in the agencies aiding in their development, a
change that is seen by many to highlight the loss of regard for traditional ways. “Before
if a vellaikarar (outsider, non-fisherman) touched a net with their shoe we would
immediately hit them because it is [like] god to us, but now the attitude is changed.” 310
This quasi-mythic “before,” munnale, the time many older community members
reference when speaking about traditional ways of knowing the sea, is impossible to pin
down with any specificity but can be located prior to the development initiatives that took
place in the late 1970s. It ends during their youth but includes the time of their own
apprenticeship and the time of their fathers’. These memories, parcenary in character,
inform the narrative of who they are as men and what they used to be as a community.
“We know about the climate….we adapted to live with disaster,” explained
Tandavasamy, 311 a sentiment echoed and amplified by almost everyone:
We have knowledge about the sea and wind, traditional
fishing techniques [that] are changing terribly now. 312
We don’t have fear about the sea. We are accustomed to it.
Whether it is heavy rain or wind, we are not afraid. 313
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It is very dangerous. The whole fisherman life is danger.
There is no security when we go fishing. Cyclone, tsunami
and a lot of [other] dangers are there. 314
This attitude of hard-won wisdom and confidence in the face of certain danger is what
Pattanavar elders mean when they speak of a fisher mentality. It is based, they insist, on
traditional knowledge that is “absorbed from their parents” without “follow[ing] any
verbal teaching.”

“We live here from childhood,” summarized Murthi, “and have

mentally adapted.” 315
Local coping mechanisms for dealing with the annual inevitability of cyclonic
storms has traditionally been geared towards identifying and minimizing the risks
associated with living and working in close proximity to Kadal Mata, the Sea Mother.
Velu, who is remarkable for the breadth of his traditional knowledge despite his
comparatively young age, is one of the few fishermen young enough to have come of age
after the end of the “Before” who still fully embraces traditional ways of knowing the
sea:
Most of our villages are placed over the mēṭu (sand dunes),
[and] by that save themselves from the floods. There is no
life loss during cyclone, only material loss like boats [and]
nets. But due to overpopulation now fishing hamlets are
getting dispersed into plain areas, too. 316
This has certainly always been the case in Karaikal, 317 where medus rise abruptly out of
the kallarām, the sandy beach, to heights of ten or more meters forming a natural sea wall
that repel all but the most ferocious storm surges. This is somewhat less the case in
Pondicherry town where medus are far less prevalent but almost the whole of the settled
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town from Vambakirapalaiyam to Solainagar, a distance of about four kilometers, is
fronted by a ten meter stone revetment that grew out of the original French seawall.
North of Solai Nagar and south from Dubraypet much of the kallaram had disappeared
beneath enormous stone breakwaters extending into the sea from the shore, called tuntil
valivu in Tamil, one of the government infrastructure initiatives begun since 1980
intended to protect fisher villages and mitigate the effects of beach erosion.
A sizable fraction of accumulated traditional fisher knowledge treats what
Pattanavars call the “symptoms” of storm, indicators by which fisherfolk can identify an
approaching storm. As was already discussed above, winds a key symptom. But changes
in wind are often too sudden, as in the case of chitirai puyal, or the character of the wind
is too seasonal – e.g. the vata kattu, the aadi kattu, etc – to give any kind of warning of an
impending change in the weather. Fishers that barely manage a subsistence living 318 over
the course of a year cannot afford the luxury of staying ashore during the three months of
musuppu. The situation has been exacerbated in recent years with the institution of a
forty-five day ban on fishing during the dry months of April and May.
Since not fishing is not a viable option for many of these men, being able to
recognize the symptoms of an upcoming storm used to be vital to their safety part and
parcel of their socialization into the community. Skilled fishers could “sense the nature
of the shore soil and predict the weather, [and] in a majority of the occasions their
prediction came true,” 319 but now much of this local knowledge is being forgotten. Even
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before the government began to discuss building media centers in tsunami-affected
villages, the electronic media of radio and television had already begun to supplant
traditional ways of knowing. “The television will warn us is a cyclone is coming,”
agreed a group of fishers in Kilinjil Medu, begging the question: what about before
television? “The radio would warn us. There is a weather station in Chennai and
Andhra. They would give a cyclone warning.” 320 Many others agree. Today, when a
storm approaches, “the government tells us” using radio, television, and local public
announcement systems. 321 Ironically, a sizable number of men who declare unreservedly
that the government does too little to help the community no longer seem able to identify
traditional signs of coming danger. The government may do too little to secure the safety
of Pattanavar communities, but then so apparently do many young Pattanavars.
The recognized signs of a coming storm are few but nearly universal in both
Pondicherry and Karaikal districts. The first indication of impending bad weather is
often a ring around the moon. 322 But a peri-lunar ring is rarely enough of an indicator by
itself to prompt the mobilization of precautionary measures. Rather the appearance of
such rings would encourage fishers to look for other signs or, if such indicators had
already appeared, the combination of signs would force a decision to be made about the
safety of launching on a given morning.

These signs are specific to the fisher

community, unavailable to outsiders. One method still used in Karaikal District for
identifying the approach of storm is to note the behavior of the fish themselves.
Tandavasamy explained:
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Few types of fish settle near the shore. [When a storm
approaches] the water current flows in two directions. The
upper level and lower level flow in opposite directions,
[and] by this action some unexpected types of fish will be
caught. It’s also a symptom of climate change. 323
In Tandavasamy’s telling, the symptom of cyclone is the presence of unusual fish close
to the shore, mackerel and cuttlefish being frequently named. Often this is coupled with
multiple counter-directional currents, called irukkā veḷḷam. 324 This method was used in
the fishing grounds near Pondicherry town, as well, but had declined in recent years.
According to one informant from Vambakirapalaiyam, when the currents are altered by
an approaching storm “whales swim in the upper layers towards the shore.” 325 Sea
snakes, too, appear in the upper currents curling into balls.
But it is not just unusual fish that signal impending heavy weather but a change in
quantity of common fish. Everyone with whom I spoke in Karaikal District agreed that
unusually high amounts of ribbon fish and prawn could presage a storm. In fact this was
typically the first symptom named to me. Pondicherry fishers agreed that it did indeed
used to be the case that before storms “fish were available near to shore, but now they are
not available because STB boats (large trawlers) washed away the small fishes.” 326
Kankayan, president of the Veerampattinam panchayat in 2010, put the matter most
succinctly, saying “we are habituated to the coastal environment. Any change happens is
easily apparent to us.”
But prophesying cyclones and mitigating their effects are different matters. To
know a storm is approaching is not the same thing as taking measures to reduce risk and
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lower ones exposure to hazard. Most Pattanavar fishers, including many of those already
quoted, speak proudly of their habituation to the dangers of life near the sea, but even
those no longer able to predict the onset of a cyclone still reduce risk by avoiding fishing
is seas wroth with distant storms. Among older fishermen being able to identify the
symptoms of a storm themselves is all that is required to avoid undue risks, either by
staying ashore or trying to make it back to shore before the worst. This latter group does
not eschew technology – many have televisions and most own radios – but adaptations to
weather are made on the basis of personal knowledge, and risks is minimized using
traditional technologies.
Two of the most significant local
adaptations to storm traditionally made by
fisher communities have been building
their villages atop medus and down their
protected west-facing sides and using the
traditional catamaran (illus. 4.2). Much
more than the newer FRP boats slowly
replacing them, traditional catamarans are

Illus. 4.2 Traditional catamaran

built to work in the conditions under which they are used. “The wooden catamarans are
very safe in [storm] conditions,” said Ramalingam, a fisher working out of Manal Medu
in Pondicherry District. “It never tilts, but the fiber boats are very dangerous.” He
continued:
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[The FRP boat] can tilt very easily. With a catamaran,
even if it tilts it can be adjusted. But fiber boat, when it
tilts it is difficult to bring it back into position. We go
through the wind and settle on the shore of another village.
They will help us. 327
These measures seem inadequate in the face of what we now know the sea is capable.
The 2004 Indian Ocean calamity overwhelmed the Pattanavar community’s traditional
mechanisms for coping with inundation just as the recent events in Sendai, Japan, have
underscored just how unprotected, even unprotectable, coastal communities are from the
massive wave surges caused by tsunami. But these tools for identifying risk and
mitigating loss from flood are a part of the traditional identity narratives of fisherfolk in
the Union Territory. They have been enough, excepting in the most extreme cases,
because according to the fishermen themselves there is almost no danger of flood in
traditional villages. As Puthu put it, “There is no danger here. Flood only comes
occasionally, so no problem. The sea never came inside the village or eroded the shore.”
But what does he mean by this seemingly counterfactual statement? It certainly is
not the case that Pondicherry – a predominantly coastal region – is not at risk from flood
According to the administration’s annual disaster management plan the district is
vulnerable to a variety of flood scenarios:
Puducherry has always been classified as a multi-hazard
prone district. Cyclones and floods have wreaked havoc in
the district several times in the past few centuries…Part of
the problem owes its genesis to the location of the district
[which] has a coastline of approximately 24 km. Therefore
the district is vulnerable to the cyclonic depressions of the
resultant rains, which cause floods.
Puducherry has an area…of extremely fertile and well
irrigated lands benefitting from water draining over fields
and through major and minor river systems. The district
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however suffers from the flooding when excess water flows
down these local rivers…due to the Northeast monsoon
rains in the river basins [upstream in Tamil Nadu] and in
the district itself.
The drainage is poor and the encroachments over the
drought years have lead to a scenario where even rainfalls
which are slightly above normal can cause floods
disrupting the normal course of work. 328
More than any other man, Puthu was inconsistent in his claims about flood, insisting on
one day that floods never occurred and on another that they only came once or twice, or
even occasionally, but were nevertheless “not a problem.”

In fact, fishermen in

Pondicherry make a key distinction that, once understood, clarifies Puthu’s apparently
incongruent flood imaginary.
The Tamil word translated as ‘flood,’ veḷḷam, has two distinct uses in the
Pattanavar dialect, neither of which is used to denote flood at all, at least as it is
understood by international bodies like the World Bank or the European Union. In his
case study of the flood management techniques used during the 2004 floods in
Bangladesh Ainun Nishat, country representative of the World Conservation Union, cites
two factors necessary to combine for an event to be called a flood. First an area must be
submerged under water “for some time,” causing inundation. Second the inundation
must cause damage to property, disruption to the communication or commerce, or
otherwise cause harm to life. That is to say, “inundation plus damage equals flood.” 329
The European Union similarly defines flood as “the temporary covering by water of land
not normally covered by water” and flood risk as “the combination of the probability of a
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flood event and of the potential adverse consequences for human health, the environment,
cultural heritage and economic activity. 330 But there is no one to one correspondence
between these definitions of flood and the Tamil word vellam.
When I first began asking about the occurrence of flood in fisher hamlets I was
frequently told to much personal consternation that inke vellam vantille, “vellam does not
come here.” My initial confusion was compounded by an historical knowledge of floods
that had occurred in the region, some even quite recently, but my informants were
responding to me as they understood the word. The first use, already noted at above,
appears in the sense of an ocean current. The current (vellam), like the wind (kattu),
varies from season to season, and knowledge of it is necessary to navigate between shore
and fishing grounds. Any combination of simultaneous currents, the irukka vellam, is
often a surer sign of approaching inclement weather than are changes in the wind. The
second common usage, closest to the western understanding of what flood is, was
explained in the following way:
Vellam and vatham are the two words. Vellam means
increase in sea water, vatham means decrease. When the
sea does come into the village it immediately goes out
again. 331
The final sentence was spoken with emphatic gestures, one hand drawing slowly over the
other then quickly sweeping out with a sudden clap: kaṭalnīr poṅki (the sea having come)
varakum (it will go [like that]). This effect is almost entirely due to the traditional
placement of villages on medus, for whenever water does come into the village (vellum)
it would quickly drain back into the sea (vatham), what Ainun Nishat describes as
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traditional practice of flood proofing. 332 To apply the concept ‘flood’ – at least as it has
been defined by international bodies like the European Union and the World Bank – to
the word ‘vellam’ was not sensible in the context of the local Pattanavar dialect. In short,
fishers who spent their lives in water simply did not conceive of flood in same way as the
agencies rehabilitating them post-tsunami. Vellam, in the sense of flood, is a Vanniyar
word and a Vanniyar problem.
In short, the Pattanavars have a very specific relationship to the risks of storm and
sea and their traditional role in mitigating them, and the narratives they tell reflect these
beliefs. To borrow a phrase from A.R. Venkatachalapathy, in those days there was no
flood, because ‘flood’ was an unnecessary concept within the community. Because of
traditional building patterns, water came and went; it did not stay. Because of traditional
knowledge about the wind and the current and about the “natural behavior” of fish and
sea and sand, fishermen could identify with “90% percent knowledge” the approach of
dangerous storms, 333 and when storms did come they were weathered with traditional
technologies and other coping mechanisms. This all began to change, particularly from
the mid 1970s, due to government development initiatives. Programs aimed at fishing
technologies increased fish catches through improved materiel and training, but the
subsidies required to support these changes in turn increased dependency on government
programs, though this last effect is scarcely recognized within the community. It is these
older certainties that came into conflict with the rehabilitation efforts undertaken by the
Government of Pondicherry and various NGOs post-tsunami, efforts that themselves
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were shaped by administrative narratives about the historical role played by government
in disaster relief and rehabilitation.

AnArchives: The Failure of Administrative Memory
The real work of post-disaster reconstruction always takes place at the local level.
Such an assertion may seem counterintuitive in the face global response to recent
disasters like the earthquakes in Chile and Haiti and the tsunami and nuclear disaster in
Japan. To be sure, a functioning centralized government might have alleviated some of
the problems of coordination that have beset reconstruction in Haiti, just as federal efforts
aided quick - if not necessarily effective – response in Chile and Japan. But such
centralization can also confound efforts at relief and repair if vested political interests
have too much sway, as has been in evidence since the Fukushima nuclear emergency in
Japan in the spring of 2011. 334 The kinds of problems intrinsic to powerful, vested
interests accruing to themselves too much control over recovery projects was described to
me by L. Mohammed Mansoor as “too many cooks.” 335
It would be easy to explain this apparent dysfunction by relying on comical
bureaucratic stereotypes or what amount to a neocolonial framework that cavalierly pits
notions of “development” versus “deficiency” against one another – where development
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is conceived only as a western-styled modernity while nations found deficient lack or
even actively resist such a “western disease.” 336 But while such apparatus might be
alternately entertaining and offensive, they do little to illuminate the processes mobilized
during a natural disaster or other civil emergency. Effective disaster response, in other
words those strategies that not only serve to relieve immediate distress but also works in
the long term to build resiliency, mitigate or even eliminate future crises, requires a kind
of organizational learning that can be difficult to achieve in a pluralistic, democratic
polity. Simple “detection and correction of error” 337 often stands in place of actual
organizational learning. The latter requires what Lloyd Etheredge and James Short have
called a “collective intellectual coherence,” 338 a shared map of reality that embodies
coherent policy commitments across an agency or organization over time. Detection and
correction can be hindered in a number of ways, not least of which is a lack of
communication between responsible agencies – an obstacle to detection – and the
hierarchical processes of government itself in which decision power is fragmented both
within and across agencies, a dual policy that both protects against individuals or partisan
cadres unilaterally changing policy while granting effective veto powers to the same. 339
In Pondicherry this fragmentation had effects that only came to light posttsunami. First, bureaucrats within the administration often proved unwilling to share
information with agents outside of their immediate chain of command. While careful
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circumspection is not necessarily unwarranted when sensitive information is shared
across departments, surprising tensions manifested between and even within departments.
On one occasion while trying to coordinate file access permissions between the
Department of Revenue (DRDM) and the Project Implementation Agency (PIA), I
overheard PIA Joint Project Director V. Jayanand exclaim to his office manager,
“Kandasamy [Chief Collector Ragesh Chandran’s personal assistant] is not my boss!”
But Kandasamy was acting as the direct mouthpiece for the Chief Collector, whose office
I had just left and who was in fact, as the head of PIA, his boss.
Fractures such as these were often a direct result of adherence to an arcane set of
administrative procedures practiced in the Union Territory, procedures arising out of an
overlay of Tottenham-based reforms adopted in the 1960s over the erstwhile French
system of administration.

Founded on the recommendations of the Tottenham

Committee (1945-46) for the reorganization of the entire British colonial secretariat
system, the Tottenham system called for the strict separation of duties for each grade of
secretarial officer and rigid structural hierarchies. Every official action undertaken in an
office operating under Tottenham structures is recorded in a various registers in order not
only to monitor progress but also arrest delays and limit arrears. It is quintessentially,
even proudly, bureaucratic. In the words of a one training manual used for the UNDP’s
two year “Strengthening of State ATIs” project:
[T]he present system of administration is called
Bureaucracy, which is also called Desk Government, and it
is blamed for all the evils of delays and red tapism [sic].
The salient features of bureaucracy are:
1. Hierarchy
2. Following Rules and Procedures
3. Written Documents
4. Impersonal Order
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Bureaucracy aims at rational or impersonal Government
because all the decisions are taken based on rules and
regulations on written documents.
Tottenham system is based on the principles of
Bureaucracy. The first step in the system is to divide the
office into various sections….Depending on the size and
functions of the office, the nomenclature will be
different. 340
One of the intrinsic weaknesses of Tottenham is its vulnerability to malpractice
when its dictums are taken to extremes, a fact exhibited to exasperating effect when I
tried to obtain a copy of a letter that granted me express permission to access files at both
DRDM and PIA. The letter, which had been written by the Chief Collector-cum-Director
of PIA Ragesh Chandran, had been submitted to PIA several weeks prior, where I had
been duly accorded access to files in that agency. In accessing specific files I learned that
files created prior to May 2005 were held by DRDM, a department headed by the same
man. When I sought these documents directly from Revenue officers I was informed that
I would first need to obtain permission. Having already obtained this from the Chief
Collector, I returned to PIA in order to make a copy of his letter granting it. When I
asked the office manager at PIA for a copy of the letter he seemed nonplussed. I
explained to him that the letter had already granted me permission to access PIA and
DRDM files and explained that as the head of both departments the single letter from
Ragesh Chandran was meant to serve for both agencies. “Well, yes,” he replied, “as a
person he is a single man, but as head of this or that department he is two completely
different people.”
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This kind of dysfunction, motivated as it was by a zealous adherence to
Tottenham procedure, is illustrative of the obstacles to mission coherence identified by
Etheredge and Short in their own examination of bureaucratic mechanisms in the U.S.
“If different programmes are adopted, at different times, to achieve different ends, in
response to different constituencies,” they wrote, “the cumulating mélange may have no
other collective rationale.” 341 As “sub-unit intelligence” increases, the effectiveness and
coherence of an agency as a whole can actually decrease. The loss of internal coherency
is exacerbated when parallel responsibilities are located across agencies, even when the
agencies are located within the same government and working towards the same goals.
This effect is beautifully illustrated in the above example.

As PIA grew

increasingly coherent as an agency its sub-unit intelligence began to diverge from the
super-unit intelligence of DRDM, despite the fact that both units were working towards
similar aims, e.g. post-tsunami rehabilitation.

The most detrimental effects can be

minimized through adequate communication and record-keeping – even within the
strictures of the Tottenham System – but communication is too often hampered by
conflicting hierarchies, such as those in evidence across the DRDM-PIA complex. For
example, even before the establishment of PIA a single tahsildar had been tasked with
coordinating rehabilitation projects within DRDM. His role was effectively duplicated
when PIA was created, but his duties were never coordinated with those of the new
agency. Ironically, avoiding this kind of redundancy was part of the originating rationale
behind the creation of PIA in the first place.
***
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To move now from the contemporary results to the historical foundations, the
records used by Alfred Martineau in the compilation of his 1917 monograph on
Coromandel storms originated in the French colonial archives held in Pondicherry.
These archives originated out of mandates enacted at the end of the eighteenth century
that established the Archives nationales in 1790, consolidated and centralized preRevolution records in 1794, and created departmental archives in 1796. By the time the
French regained permanent control of their territories of India in the first quarter of the
nineteenth century, a well-regulated file management and archive system had been in
place in Paris for two decades. Prior to this, as part of les Établissements français de
l’Inde, the engine of colonialism necessarily required efficient record-keeping. Regular
dispatches were sent to the home offices in Paris, and in situ files were physically
removed from Pondicherry prior to sieges and occupations by hostile forces. Despite
having been put to the flame on multiple occasions by British forces, the French were
nevertheless able to carry away and return or otherwise preserve the records that were
later used by Martineau to write his history.
The administrative system in use in Pondicherry during the colonial period was
described by Cyril Antony as a “near perfect system of record management.” 342 Antony
had served as Undersecretary for Art and Culture and his opinion of the French records
system grew out of his experience conducting research for the Pondicherry Gazetteer in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. As compiler of the gazetteer and curator of the state
museum in Pondicherry he was regularly confronted with the problems of historical
materiel in the Union Territory. Certainly the French kept very good records, but after
more than sixty years of independent rule and archival misrule the duplication of
342
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Martineau’s achievement is difficult to imagine. The state archives in Pondicherry are a
shadow, almost literally, of what must have been available to Martineau as GovernorGeneral of French India. Its existence is obscure, its location is widely unknown, and its
records are in disarray. As with other archives in India, once a file has been located and
pulled for examination there is no guarantee that it will be re-shelved where it might be
found again. 343 Unfortunately, this aura of disarray extends beyond the state historical
record and penetrates into the mechanisms of current administrative discipline, and as a
result the possibilities for institutional learning are severely curbed.
The period between the de facto transfer of the French territories to India in 1954
and the de jure merger in 1963 is best described as a period of confusion as the new
government transitioned from one system of political administration to another.

A

sizable number of experienced French-Indian civil servants opted for French citizenship
only to be replaced by equally large numbers of inadequately trained political cronies.
Many appointments were handed out as favors by politicians both within and outside of
the former territories, and those who had been trained in systems of office management
were trained in the Tottenham system rather than the system prevailing in the former
French territories. The decade following the de facto merger was a period marked, even
marred, by favoritism and “ad hoc governance.” 344
Adding to the confusion was the disregard with which resources husbanded by the
former administration were treated.

As experienced colonial administrators left the

territory the institutional memory that had been sustained by them fell into disarray. The
French removed most of the documents related to the premier and deuxième Bureaux,
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including the papers of the Bureau des Affaires Politique and most documents directly
related to the political or military affairs of the colonies. Others deemed less sensitive
were left behind. Many of these were packed into zinc-coated lockers before being
removed to storage; others were left in situ while departments reorganized or shifted
spaces. 345 Still others were reportedly thrown into refuse piles or burned indiscriminately
by the incoming (Tamil) appointees. 346 Of the files that remained, very few were treated
even with the care prescribed by the Tottenham system. Some were moved to the
Romaine Rolland public library, for want of a better location, while others remained in
bundles and were left to deteriorate beneath stairs, in abandoned storage rooms, and even
in water closets.

In short, the decade 1954-1963 reduced the archival memory

established by the French administration to a pitiable condition.
With the de jure merger came a flurry of experimentation in an attempt to reform
records management in the now Union Territory of Pondicherry. The first administrators
of the new U.T. were members of the Indian Foreign Service who had staffed the Indian
Consulate to French India. As Indian officer liaisons to France they were ignorant of
French file and archiving systems in place in the colonies and consequently many older
documents – even those produced during the transfer years – were often obscure to them.
With any sense of continuity between the colonial administration and the post-merger
government fatally disrupted, coordination between pre- and post-merger services and
functions was impeded by an inability to coordinate past and present policies. The first
officials elected in the U.T. began appointing political favorites and other “toadies” while
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under the administrations of Edouard Goubert (1963-1964) and V.V. Reddiar (19641967) IAS officers from neighboring Tamil Nadu were deputized to serve the
government of Pondicherry. The appointees were not familiar with the French system of
file management and the new civil administration was dominated by civil servants with
neither the knowledge nor the experience to effectively deal with the issues faced by the
infant administration. 347 What

files were maintained “were only showpieces.” 348

Between the years 1963 and 1969 four significant measures were taken in an
effort to re-establish administrative efficiency. The first was the 1963 introduction of the
Secretariat system of administration in which policy matters were attended to by twelve
secretariat departments as defined by the Government of Pondicherry (GoPY) Allocation
Rules of 1963, a system still in place to this day.

It has not been without critics. F.

Bahnuna, Chief Secretary to Government in 1985, wrote:
“There has been a tendency to shuffle the subjects from one
department to another and from one Secretary to another
rather frequently and without due consideration to any
known principle or stated policy leading to what may be
described as a ‘blurring’ of the dividing line as [sic]
between the Secretariat Departments, aiming no more sense
of the number and nomenclature of the Departments as
determined by the Allocation Rules.” 349
In 1967, an inspection team from Delhi seeking to tighten efficiency in the UTP
conferred ex officio status on several heads of department and simultaneously introduced
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a single file system that they hoped would result in the speedier culling of outdated files.
The shift resulted in a considerable dilution of power within some departments while
others disintegrated altogether. Assuming this semi-collapse to be due to the introduction
of the single-file system rather than to the conferral of additional department titles, it was
replaced by the Tottenham System less than a year later, on July 1, 1968. The system
was expanded into non-Secretariat departments by August 1 of the following year, but
little progress could be made towards efficient reorganization of the administration
without manuals detailing the new system, and according to Bahnuna these manuals were
not even provided until 1975.
The final management innovation of the decade was the introduction of the
Central Records Branch and Internal Records Sections. After 1972 the Central Records
Branch began to operate as a unit of the Organization and Methods Cell, though over
time it too migrated, eventually ending up within the Department of General
Administration under the Chief Secretary (Stationery and Printing). In spite of – or more
likely because of – these changes in the years immediately following the de jure merger,
the general impression of the UTP administration during the 1960s was one of disorder.
The cogs of government had been greased with the labor of unqualified or untrained
workers then replaced by civil servants from Tamil Nadu who, while better trained, were
unfamiliar with the methods used in the UTP before 1968. And then even after this
transition had taken place, reference manuals were not provided for seven more years.
All of this served to disrupt the collective intellectual coherence of the postmerger GoPY. Without stable structures to adequately maintain the quotidian work of
the administration the political and policy memory of the government had no foundation
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upon which to stand, no reservoir from which to draw. In the early 1970s Cyril Antony,
then assistant publicity officer to the GoPY, 350 was assigned the task of compiling the
first gazetteer for the Union Territory. During his work to uncover what he calls “the
mementos of the colonial administration” Antony found what records left by the French
to be in appalling condition, heaped in inaccessible corners across the city. The files of
the directorate of education, for example, were discovered lying in an attic of a French
period building, while other boxes of documents had been left beneath a leaking sewage
pipe. “The rest,” says Antony, “were in powder. I saw it.” 351
During a research trip to New Delhi Antony met with then Director of the
Archives of India, S.N. Prasad, to whom he described the state of the French records in
Pondicherry. According to Antony, Prasad had ling held a desire to open branch archives
outside of Delhi, and Antony suggested Pondicherry as the location for the southern
district branch. The Pondicherry Archive was formally announced in March 1979, 352
though construction did not begin until Prasad’s successor, S.A.I. Tirmizi, inaugurated
the project in the early 1980s. The Pondicherry Archive was tasked with the long-term
preservation of records deemed of “permanent value” and thus closely linked not only to
the responsibilities of the Central Records Branch decreed in 1972 but also to the dictates
of the Tottenham System, which classifies in great detail how long official files are to be
kept, and in what manner. 353 But where the Central Records Branch was under the
350
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direction of the Organization and Methods Cell, the archive was ordered by the Deputy
Secretary to Government (Education) and placed under the temporary jurisdiction of the
State Editor under the direction of the Undersecretary to Government (Art and Culture).
Put another way, from the outset responsibility for the creation and maintenance of the
Pondicherry Archive was divided between three administratively unrelated sections –
Printing, Education, and Art and Culture – while its duties were beholden to the
responsibilities of yet a fourth section, the Central Records Branch, which was under the
direction of yet a fifth, Organization and Methods. The situation fostered neither ease of
communication nor cooperation between respective agencies and the resulting disorder
has had echoes that continue to affect efficiencies surrounding the tsunami rehabilitation.
The results were predictable: the administration, lacking a legacy of records
continuity while simultaneously building additional layers of inter-departmental
hierarchies often working at cross-purposes, had created for itself an inefficient engine to
sustain institutional parcenary memories of past policy or for recognizing historical
parallels with contemporary crises. The consequences of this included not only in a
marked lack of coordination between departments tasked with response and relief in the
event of a crisis but also between the enclaves of Karaikal and Pondicherry. While the
creation of PIA was intended in part to remedy a situation in which right hand almost
literally did not know what the left hand was doing, the in-built inconsistencies and
incoherencies in the administrative apparatus were simply duplicated in PIA then
multiplied across the channels of communication between PIA and its nominal parent,
DRDM.

kept for ten years after which time they are subject for review for continued preservation. R. Disposals
are “permanent,” though even these are to be reviewed ever fifty years.
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Such incoherencies could have been avoided with the establishment of
appropriate continuities with past policy. This is not to suggest that old policies should
have been recycled and reused indiscriminately, a strategy that has been problematized
by Anna Tsing and Henrietta Moore and Megan Vaughan, among others. 354 Rather, as
was shown in chapter 2, French response policies in the colonial era were built upon
every prior mobilization of relief. Successful policies were reprised and improved – for
example the modification of survey teams constituted first only of Frenchmen to teams
dominated by Indians – while unsuccessful policies were revised or discarded.
Contrariwise, in the independent Union Territory each new incident of relief was
approached as a discreet event, unbound from history. As a result, with the exception of
November 1977, each new storm was treated as the last. And even the exception proves
instructive: instead of learning from the response in 1977, potential lessons were
remaindered unequivocally to the past. When strategies similar to 1977 do appear they
run on parallel tracks. That is to say, matching strategies were achieved not through
intentional reduplication of past success but rather through unintelligible happenstance
achieved by trial and error. Lacking long-term continuity of personnel – and the system
of seniority used in the UTP not only allows but encourages movement between
unrelated departments – continuity of records, that is an established and accessible
institutional memory, is the best way to create coherent policy.
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This environment begs the question: can such a government learn? Antony, an
out-spoken critic of the UTP standard operating procedures, thinks not. 355 He firmly
believes that Pondicherry has lost many good officers due simply to the way in which it
has historically been run. When he came to the territory in 1966 as a UPSC appointed
junior officer he was joined by another officer appointed to be Senior Town Planner who
left after only a few years, telling Antony that he was “disgusted” with how UTP was
run. 356 Antony himself volunteered for early retirement in 1989 for the same reason: “I
saw the administration going to the dogs.” 357 The material and administrative legacy of
Pondicherry, he asserts, have been shamefully neglected for half a century. “I find that
everything [about how documents are kept by GoPY] is wrong, from top to bottom,” he
opines, insisting that an organization not properly organized cannot preserve the records,
and that records not properly organized signify a disordered organization. “Can there be
such a government in existence, or is it a mafia organization?”
Such hyperbolic language does not draw advocates to his cause, but his insistence
that this is an intentional neglect is not wholly unfounded. His comparison with the
mafia is rooted in the same blame game alluded to by the Director of Planning and
Research, A.S. Vijayalakshmi. If there is no record of a blunder – or more pointedly of
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an intentional misdeed – the resulting professional or public consequences are slower to
come. The urge to perform effectively is too often over-ridden by the desire to suppress
failure and avoid blaming or embarrassing others, which only encourages individuals to
manage error by duplicating the circumstances that lead to error in the first place:
“withholding negative information, avoiding direct confrontation, seeking unilaterally to
control the situation and to protect both self and other.” 358 As a result, the administrative
apparatus in place in Pondicherry in late 2004 was one that favored murkiness over
transparency and in which resistance to accept personal responsibility for the smallest of
tasks retarded transformations that might have resulted in more responsive governance.

So, do governments learn?
“Governments do learn,” wrote Lloyd Etheredge a quarter of a century ago,
“although primarily tactics to stay out of trouble in the press.” 359 Speaking of the U.S.
government’s repeated involvement in Central America Etheredge described American
institutions as following a “reparative (and ahistorical) logic that is neither rationally
derived, nor moral, nor effective (on its own terms) in the long run.” 360 Emergency
response in Pondicherry in the six decades between the de facto merger and the 2004
tsunami similarly followed a reactive, ahistorical logic neither rationally derived nor
effective (on its own terms) in the long term. As we saw in chapters two and three, the
archival record suggests that the French administration actively sought to minimize the
effects of the monsoon season. From Charpentier de Cossigny’s plan to reinforce with
masonry the defensive ditch encircling the southern quarter to improve flow-through and
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alleviate flooding – flooding that persists to this day – to the erection of the seawall on
the coast to the construction of the syndicat agricole and the coastal road in Karaikal
linking the Arasalar River to the medu villages in the north, the infrastructures built by
the colonial administration seemed to be purposively designed against the inevitable risks
associated with seasonal flooding.
This begs the question: what was the post-merger administration designed to do?
One of the chief concerns of the colonial government was to maximize the profits derived
from exports from the colonies.

After their military and imperial ambitions in the

subcontinent had been tightly circumscribed by the British in the eighteenth century, the
French were forced of necessity to focus on the production and protection of trade goods.
Efforts by the administration to minimize losses resulting from seasonal flooding made
sense, even if recommended projects were not always completed. The negative effects
on trade into and out of Pondicherry after the 1916 cyclone were aggressively moderated
by major repairs completed in 1922, and trade saw exponential growth over the next
decade, with total export value increasing more than tenfold, from 24.5 million rupees to
270.9 million rupees between 1921 and 1929. 361
But this prosperity was short-lived, as the effects of the world depression leveled
the French economy by the middle of the next decade. By 1932, total exports from
Pondicherry had almost halved, from 129 million tons to 66 million tons, while the value
of exports to France had dropped more than two-thirds, from 85.3 million to 27.8 million
rupees. The pier was again damaged by cyclone in 1952, further disrupting repairs that
had been suspended the prior year due to lack of funds, and this blow signaled the end of
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the French entre-pot. By 1953, one year before the merger, the total tonnage ported
through Pondicherry, including imports and exports, had been reduced to 22,000 tons. 362
These numbers only serve to underscore the dominant interests of the French
during their tenure in the sub-continent. The erection of the seawall served to protect the
port. The maintenance of the canal surrounding the town, formerly a defensive moat,
served to direct the overrun of rainwater away from the production centers of the city,
particularly the southwestern quarter, long home to weavers and oil-pressers. With trade
nearly decimated from a pre-merger high of 129 million tons, a now non-functional port,
and new access to the much larger ports at Madras and nearby Cuddalore sea trade was
low on the list of priorities for the post-merger administration.
Beginning in 1956 Pondicherry was included in national-level state development
planning as outlined in a series of Five Year Plans, even though the French territories
would not officially join the Indian union for another seven years. The changed priorities
of the new territorial government were outlined from page one of their addenda to the
Second Five Year Plan:
“So long as the State was under the French, pretty little was
done for the progressive improvement of the economic and
social structure of the people. Except in the case of
Medical, Education, and Public Works Department,
scarcely any department for undertaking agricultural
improvement and provision of other social services
existed.” 363
After the de facto transfer, departments engaged in any measure of development – e.g.
Agriculture, Fisheries, Health and Welfare – were reorganized “to meet the needs of a
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State embarking anew on a program of all-round development, calculated to raise the
economic and social levels of the masses.” 364
Several development projects were planned to improve the conditions of the
lowest classes at a projected cost of nearly 19 million rupees in 1955-1956. Flood control
and drainage schemes were immediately planned in Karaikal and Yanam and new flood
banks and a regulator were planned on the Chunnambar River dividing Pondicherry town
from Ariankuppam.

Fisheries initiatives proposed included the development of

Fisherman Co-op Societies, a small-scale mechanized fishing unit, the provision of coldstorage units, and vocational training in modernized fishing methods. Additional projects
included the construction of public latrines in Karaikal and Mahe and the housing
projects discussed in chapter 5. It was also proposed that a new pier be built and portage
facilities be expanded and improved south of the main town, on a site then occupied by a
fisher hamlet, the removal of which was not deemed to be in the least problematic. 365
Tellingly of things to come, by 1965 Pondicherry’s planners were already scaling back
some proposals. G.R. Kamat, Secretary to the Planning Commission, wrote that planning
“should be oriented to meet the needs of defence and to safeguard the country’s security
and its long-term interests.” 366 Housing projects planned during the 1950s were limited
“in view of the shortage of building materials and defence requirements,” 367 while
Fisheries Department objectives were limited to boosting production and flood control
projects were restricted to improvements already begun on the Uppar Drain; all other
flood control measures were delayed until the IV Five Year Plan (1969-1974).
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Why Governments Need to Learn
Institutional memory is maintained within two primary mechanisms of
recollection, the archive and the personal memories of individuals within a given
organization. Lloyd Etheredge’s examination of U.S. foreign policy in Central America
demonstrated an inability of the U.S. government to learn from past policy decisions, but
this was not for lack of archival material from which to draw lessons. Rather Etheredge
argued that policy makers generally drew the wrong conclusions from known facts and
preconceptions about the situation on the ground. Rather than following what was
perceived by critics as an interventionist stance, U.S. policy in Central America was
characterized by a “business as usual” inattention: in any situation not yet deemed to be a
(potential) trouble-spot it was taken for granted that the situation would not change. In
the absence of dramatic evidence to the contrary, U.S. foreign policy decisions about
Central America were based on “imagination systems” characterized by “patterns of
policy, of misjudgment and misperception and of collectively self-defeating behavior
within the policy process.” 368
The post-merger approach to disaster in the Union Territory was characterized by
similar processes. As discussed above, however, where the U.S. had at its disposal a
powerful archival apparatus, the UTP lacked from the beginning the tools necessary for
forging meaningful links to historical decision-making. The result was a system based
less on a coherent understanding of how past policy decisions had been made and their
long-term effects on the territories and more on a series of beliefs about what the
hydrological infrastructure of the colonies had been. The result was the development of a
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specific body of legend surrounding the efficacy of French hydrological science in the
colonies. These legends, called “policy legends” by Gary Alan Fine and Barry O’Neill,
led many contemporary administrators to decide that more pro-active approaches to flood
mitigation were unnecessary, as decisions made by the French had rendered such policymaking redundant.

The existence of water-control infrastructures also gave

administrators a ready scapegoat to deflect guilt arising from failures to address
predictable seasonal flooding. Systems meant to alleviate flooding and redirect overflow
were already present, they would argue, thus any flooding must be the result either of
failures in the French design or, more likely, of encroachment upon these systems.
Policy legends are texts “that [describe] an institution’s action in a context that
supports a particular policy choice or presents social conditions in a context that calls for
governmental or collective action.” 369 In their transmission policy legends present “facts”
relevant to an ongoing public debate or point of policy. They are legends in the proper
sense of the word, more content than fixed form, even while legend as a folk genre is
notoriously difficult to define. 370 In general, legends are more connected to “real life”
than fairy-tales, closer to history than to myth. They are historical narratives rooted in
time and place and they are fiercely local. Gary Alan Fine’s definition of (contemporary)
legend explains the processes at work: “An account of a happening in the world which
the narrator or an immediate personal contact was not directly involved, and is presented
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as a proposition for belief; it is not always believed by speaker or audience, but it is
presented as something that could have occurred and is told as if it happened.” 371
Two policy legends appeared again and again during conversations with
informants. The first is the nebulous belief that flood mitigation and relief was somehow
“better” during French control of the region. While the form of the legend is never quite
the same – sometimes taking shape as a full narrative, sometimes as a bit of gossip or a
complaint against the predations of the lowers classes – the content was remarkably
stable over a period of two years spent collecting examples of the legend as it percolated
between the various line departments.

The second, related legend holds that all

(important) French records have been lost. The specter of this second legend has already
been raised above, and the adherence to this belief often works to confound the work of
historians of Pondicherry, many of whom do not even seem to know where the state
archive is. 372

But the effects of these legends on even the most conscientious

administrators – among whom I number Ragesh Chandran and Mohammed Mansoor –
are more pernicious because the imagined loss of historical evidence absolves
contemporary officers of any responsibility for possessing an awareness of precedent.
They can (and do) claim for themselves the benefits of French policy without the fear of
being contradicted by documentation.
To return to the first policy legend, that French water policy was somehow better,
one of the most common shapes that this legend takes is as a query set, a device to

371

Gary Alan Fine, Manufacturing Tales (Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1992), 2. Italics original.
Interestingly, not even Cyril Antony knows the location of the Pondicherry Archive, even though his
conversations with S.N. Prasad in the late 1970s might be at least partially responsible for its existence.
He feels the absence of an historic textual legacy so keenly that he independently produced and
submitted to the GoPY a report on the state of records management in the Union Territory in 2010, more
than twenty years after he retired from public service.
372

229

provide information perceived to be of some utility while deflecting responsibility for
whatever may be discovered thereby. A conversation I had in July 2009 was typical of
this instantiation of the legend. It started as a typical interview:
AM: What is your job here?
Devadasan: My job, or the job of the Department [of
Planning and Research]?
AM: Let’s start with Planning and Research
Dev: We are the liaison department between the Delhi
government and Pondicherry.
Devadasan went on to describe the role of the department in collecting the budgets,
expenditures, and plans of each department and collating them into an annual report
submitted annually to the central government. While the department periodically creates
reports on its own, it is currently more of a clearing house of government fiscal and
development planning information. Consequently, when tsunami hit the territory in 2004
it was the responsibility of P&R to find the financial resources necessary to fund the
initial response.
AM: You know what every other department is doing, but
you don’t really plan anymore? Isn’t that the role of the
department?
Dev: No. We designed a small savings plan [used to
benefit fishers] and handle right to information [inquiries].
AM: You know I am here researching floods in
Pondicherry. How the government responds. I would have
thought that the Planning Department would be involved in
that.
Dev: Pondicherry is not much affected, in spite of
Pondicherry being spotted as the most damage prone area
by the scientific section. Pondicherry is one of the most
damage prone areas because of some scientific things that I
have been told by some scientists. But you are asking about
floods? Look at the syndicat agricole, the French period
syndicat agricole. The irrigation…
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This was not the first time I had heard the syndicat agricole – a series of ponds,
tanks and channels linked throughout the territory for purposes of both irrigation and
drainage – referenced in conversations about flood control in the territory, but this
conversation highlights several important characteristics of this particular policy legend.
Devadasan’s allusion to the syndicat was designed as a means to deflect the conversation
away from his personal authority or knowledge. His reference was used to signal the end
our interview by suggesting that he could help me no further, that I must seek information
elsewhere. Interestingly, he coupled this implication together with further disclaimers
about “some scientific things that I have been told by some scientists,” at once granting
authority to his account by relying on “scientific things” while yet deflecting factual
responsibility from himself onto “some scientists.”
Devadasan took no credit for having information about the syndicat, instead
depending upon scientists’ explanations. But in pairing “scientific things” with the
syndicat he was making the pointed suggestion that it is not just science that can explain
the flood conditions of Pondicherry, but French science that laid the foundation. This
same science explains the inherent contradiction in his claim: “Pondicherry is not much
affected, in spite of Pondicherry being spotted as the most damage prone area.” Through
the judicious application of science (really of engineering) Pondicherry has avoided the
worst effects of floods, despite its location in a flood-prone area. Devadasan’s invocation
of the syndicat was the merest insinuation of a deeper history of hydro-engineering in the
colony. He made no direct claims about the utility of the system himself, but he was
certain that the answers to my questions lay there in their underlying “science.”
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The implicit message of the legend – the purpose for which it was typically
mobilized – was that the French administration was able to control flooding in the
territories, that they bestowed usable infrastructures to the post-merger government, and
that these systems had been allowed to degrade to an alarming degree in the subsequent
decades.

The moral character of the legend was very nearly universal among the

government officials who spoke of the syndicat.

Even in the rare instances in which

non-government informants spoke of it, the details enumerated in the telling were
consistent with the versions circulating within the administration.
Outside of the government few informants spoke directly about the syndicat but
with Devadasan were insistent that I look into the history of French hydro-engineering in
the territory. Speaking of the seawall built across the city below the modern promenade,
for example, Jean Deloche said that without it “half of Pondicherry would be
destroyed,” 373 an assessment not so very different from the dire predictions voiced by the
Department of Planning in its draft proposal IV Plan discussed in the last chapter. While
never a part of the syndicat system proper, the seawall has been something of a bulwark
against encroachment from the sea since the mid-eighteenth century (Illus. 4.3). Deloche
and fellow Pondicherry historian P. Raja credit the wall and its drains – which themselves
are an integrated component of the syndicat – with contributing to the long-term
preservation of the colonial ville.

But much like Devadasan, their versions of the

narrative only nibble at the edges of the legend proper.
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Illus. 4.3 Vue des magasins de la Compagnie des Indes à Pondichéry 374

The syndicat agricole was built taking advantage of existing, pre-colonial
irrigations tanks called ēri. Like the syndicat that followed it, eris had a multiform role in
water management in the Tamil-speaking region of south India. Not only were they used
for the obvious purposes of preserving rain run-off and recharging groundwater supplies,
but they were also a means to moderate soil erosion and control flood. Sometimes dating
back as far as the medieval period, these often extensive water systems were not built by
single patrons or dynasties but rather represented what Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain
called the “steady accumulation of skills” needed to command the huge amounts of labor
and wealth required to support what were often massive undertakings. 375 “Traditionally,”
they continued, “people realized that their generation did not represent the last word in
the development of a technique and that future generations should be left with
something.”
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Unlike the British, whose often massive expropriations at the local level
eventually left communities with too little money to maintain their eris, 376 the French not
only maintained but enlarged the system, a policy that remained a development priority in
French India at least though the 1930s (illus. 4.4). 377
Pondicherry’s

As part of this system,
original

channels

and

drains – what are now the Grand and Petit
Canals, parts of the Uppar Drain, and the
channel dividing Pondicherry town from
Kuricchikuppam – were integrated to
direct rain overflow safely through the
town and out to sea. 378 A 1941 report on
the operations of the Public Works
department details continued efforts to
improve

drainage,

protection

and

communication between the ville and the
outlying fisher districts.

Illus. 4.4 Syndicat Agricole, c. 1935

The Grand

Canal, first built to stabilize and extend the water resources of the small Uppalam stream
around which the colonial factory was originally built (see chapter 1), was extended
northwards then east to the sea. Its southern length was also improved, reaching as far
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south as the railway bridge in Duppeypet. The length of the canal was paved in order to
increase flow-through rate while the seawall at Kuricchikuppam was strengthened,
putting the lie to Jean Deloche’s assertion that the stone revetment was a more recent
construction.

A third project – the replacement of the old bridge connecting

Vaithikuppam with Kuricchikuppam with a metal bridge – eased commerce between the
ville and the outlying fisher villages. 379 All three of these measures were intended to
mitigate, if not completely eliminate, the effects of flooding in the town.
It cannot be suggested that the existence or purpose of the syndicat is generally
known by the majority of people living in the Union Territory, though the presence of
canals throughout the town is obvious and agricultural workers, who according to the
2001 census still make up nearly 25% of the labor population, still depend on the
remnants of the syndicat. But the traces of the syndicat linger in the public discourse,
especially among the well-educated urban elites. One college professor, who lived near
the canal in Muthialpet north of the town center, said to me that flooding was entirely the
responsibility of the slum-dwellers who build their huts right against the canal. “Ten or
fifteen years ago it was not so bad,” he told me in English. “But they kept building more
and more houses next to the eri. Now every time it rains the houses flood and they ask
for a hand out from the government.” 380 The same story was repeated by many residents
of the old ville indienne, especially those who lived near to Petit Canal, an area that still
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suffers terrible flooding during monsoon. “They come and sleep right next to the canal
and when the rain washes everything away they always want some handout!” 381
But the core of this legend resides within the administrative circles of the UTP
government. The narrative simply holds that flood mitigation policy was better under the
French administration.

While nobody ever suggested to me that the administration

responded more efficiently during emergencies during the colonial period, the
implication was that the need for response was mitigated by the effectiveness with which
the French planned against the event of flood.

Speaking in 2009 to a disaster

management workshop organized by the DRDM and the UNDP, Chief Collector Ragesh
Chandran gave an eloquent encomium of the system developed by French over the course
of the nineteenth century:
The French designed the canal system so beautifully. It
was so elegant. They were all interconnected so when water
was overflowing or full in Ousteri tank it would go to
Valliandrapet. When it was full in Valliandrapet then it
would go into another and then into the river and then into
the sea. But now there is not even one meter [of drainage
clearance] there. 382
On its face Chandran’s statement is true. Not only did the syndicat divert flood from
residential areas, but it also saved water for future use. But it bears repeating in the face
of this most persistent legend that the system was originally developed by local
populations from the time of the Pandyas to the Vijayanagara dynasty.
Regardless of its origins, the syndicat was maintained and improved during the
colonial period. It was left to atrophy only after the de facto merger in 1954, a process
that only accelerated after the de jure merger nine years later. In the decades that
381
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followed, continues the Chief Collector’s narrative, the syndicat was allowed to decline
through a combination of lax maintenance and lazy building regulation enforcement
which allowed large hutment colonies to spring up against the eris and canals. This was
especially evident at Ousteri west of the town proper, to the northwest between Gorimedu
and Lawspet, and to the southwest at Abishegapakkam, regions that saw explosive
suburban growth from the mid-1980s onwards. As a result, he said, “this system no
longer exists intact. There were drains wide enough to be one hundred feet across, but
they have all been encroached.”
There can be no question that this legend does have a basis in fact. The French
built and maintained an integrated irrigation systems that expanded the capacity of
traditional Tamil irrigation methods. They built canals to connect lakes and tanks, and
they did all of this to conserve rainwater for irrigation as well as to mitigate the effects of
seasonal flooding. They also diverted and improved the course of the Uppar River as it
flowed along its natural course through the colony from very early on in their
residency. 383 Where this history turns into policy legend is at the moment when decisionmaking elites marshal this narrative around specific issues of policy, namely in an effort
to qualify the reasons for seasonal flooding, or rather to explain (away) the
administration’s failure to alleviate it. Er. M. Rajendiran, Chief Engineer of the Ports
Department, articulated a good summary of the legend:
You see this at Abishegapakkam, where the people have
built their houses…you see, during French times there were
canals connecting all of the kulams so that if one
overflowed the water would just flow to the next tank, and
the next one and so on. In this way floods were contained.
But now there are houses right up against Abishegapakkam
Lake. Developers came in and built houses and all along
383
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lake. And in Saram, Rainbow Nagar, Ousteri…this is only
since the 1980s when builders started building so many
houses in these places [which happened] because the
government did not enforce any regulations. So people
have their homes right against the water [so that] when
flood comes the water has no place to go but into their
houses. And then they come to the government asking for
relief. 384
Several characteristics of the legend reappear in this telling. The most obvious is the
invocation of “French times,” a phrase intended to set up a distinction between
controlling powers, between then and now. This construction is the same as that used by
the Pattanavars when speaking about “munnalle,” or “before.”
A second, more curious, characteristic is the appearance of Ousteri Lake, also
called Ousudu, which is a constructed lake dating to the Vijayanagar period. Though it
was later abandoned it was rebuilt it the insistence of Anandarangapillai during Dupleix’s
tenure as governor of Pondicherry to irrigate the nearby field as well as to supply water to
the town, underscoring the link between French hydrological infrastructure of it Indian
predecessors.

The French later built a water filtration plant on the site at

Muttrapallayam – yet again fitting into the history of French water management in the
region. But the land around Ousteri has only recently begun to be developed as the urban
population of Pondicherry presses westward. He may well have been thinking of either
Murungapakkam Lake to the southwest or perhaps Kanakan Lake, which sits halfway
between Ousteri and Pondicherry on National Highway 45A and is the site of ongoing
residential development at places like Pudhu Nagar, Tatchnamoorthi Nagar, Sri
Moogambigai Nagar and the Indira Gandhi Medical College.

But his telling is doubly

interesting because he speaks of “Saram, Rainbow Nagar, Ousteri,” neighborhoods
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radiating westwards from the center. While Ousteri certainly remains an icon of French
hydrological science, this is perhaps not the reason that it was inserted into the narrative.
Rather, it seems more likely that it was a phrase meant to express the inexorable crawl of
urbanization into what used to be wilderness.
In 2010 I was again able to speak to the Chief Collector and I asked him what role
he thought the syndicat agricole played during the tsunami, whether he believed it
mitigated the effects of the wave. His response stepped back from the position he had
stated the prior year.

“I won’t be able to say that,” he replied. “The fact of French

government, the records, how it was designed, [it] is a matter of history now. It’s a
matter of history.” But then he immediately restated the legend even more vigorously:
And when we study that we see that it’s perfectly designed.
The entire Puducherry region was perfectly designed as fair
as drainage is concerned, as far as roads. But we have not
developed upon that. We have seen [that] people have
encroached upon, most of those drainages have been
blocked, the many lakes which are supposed to be water
carrying bodies have been filled up. It had that effect, no
doubt about it. But to say that there was something else…I
can only say that the granite boulders that were put around
Pondicherry have prevented tsunami from hitting us. I
don’t have anything to say. 385
Just as the French were said to have possessed a “near perfect system of record
management,” so too had the French colonies been “perfectly designed” for drainage.
Just as the confusion that followed the merger irreparably damaged the potential (or
archival) memory of the Union Territory, so too did unregulated growth spoil its flood
imaginary.
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The parallelism between fisher narratives and administrative policy legends is
quite striking. Both versions of Pondicherry claim a “before” that was better; both
versions assert a gradual decline for which the narrators are not responsible. The fishers
blame the government, sometimes for coddling the young, sometimes for failing to heed
the old. The government blames those in the kutcha hut squatter colonies (kudisaikal)
but also “builders” and those in previous administrations who allowed the decline to
happen. And in neither instance do the narrators permit responsibility for what are seen
to be systemic failures to fall on their own communities. Both versions grant, even if
incidentally, that part of Pondicherry’s resilience has to do with its placement, its
planning, and its design. Both Karaikal and Pondicherry were built on expansive river
plains on top of quick draining, sandy soil. Engineers and fishers both claim that much of
the impact of the tsunami was, in the words of fisher Arulraj, “drunk up” by the rivers. 386
Much of the rest, at least in Pondicherry, was deflected in some small way by the
expansive stone seawall protecting the coast. 387
Yet there seem to be no lessons drawn by either side from the interim period
between coadunation and catastrophe, 1954-2004. Even if we grant that things were
somehow “better” munnalle/in French times/before – which is not a concession that I am
making here – and that changes to response mechanisms and coping strategies necessarily
followed the tsunami, what are we to make of this post-colony/pre-disaster period? It is
here that the critique of Cyril Antony and the all too infrequent admissions of various
administrators – many of which will be discussed in the next chapter – becomes most
poignant. For where Alfred Martineau was pointedly aware of the stream of policy
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history in which he was swimming, even if he refused to draw conclusions, the
administration of the Union Territory was only treading water in the years and decades
before 2004. And at a certain scale, perhaps Martnieau was correct to draw no
conclusions. Recent events in Japan have reminded us – as if we could have forgotten –
that it is impossible to adequately prepare for a calamity on the scale tsunami, and
whatever measures might be taken too often go awry. 388
But communities can and do prepare for crisis and for disasters that are imagined
possible.

The Government of Pondicherry did not make substantive efforts in this

direction in the years before 2004, depending instead upon mechanisms designed in a
different era for a different imaginary. Nevertheless, the Union Territory was extremely
lucky to escape tsunami with damages that were in many ways comparable to the losses
suffered during the 1977 cyclone, and with a mortality rate for the entire Union Territory
that was lower than that of the neighboring town of Devanampattinam, Cuddalore
District. In the wake what Santirabal Singh called a “loss to the nation” Pondicherry
finally began taking steps to minimize future losses and build more resilient
communities, but in doing so they have damaged some of the very mechanisms that made
fisher hamlets – and even Pondicherry itself, the erstwhile hameau de pêcheurs – resilient
in the first place.
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-5Rehabilitation: Discussions and Debates
For all that has been written since 2005, it cannot be said that the December 26
Indian Ocean tsunami was “unprecedented.” The medieval Tamil flood imaginary, as
was demonstrated in chapter 1, was founded on mythic and literary images of
catastrophic flood, images that were re-mobilized at the beginning of the twentieth
century by Tamil nationalists seeking to counter the hegemony of classical Sanskrit
culture. In chapter 3 it was seen how residents on one Indonesian island had maintained
for nearly a century coping and response mechanisms that prevented major loss of life in
2004. In fact, the incidence of tsunami in Indonesia is quite high: fifty eight occurred in
the century before the Indian Ocean disaster. 389 A similar earthquake off the coast of
Chile in February 2010 sent tsunami warnings across the Pacific. Though the highest
recorded wave amplitude was only 2.6m, 390 many towns along the Chilean coast were
devastated. 391 The March 2011 earthquake in Japan registered yet another precedent for
calamitous tsunami, while their inevitability was underscored by the (re)discovery of
stone tsunami warnings dating back more than six hundred years. "High dwellings are
the peace and harmony of our descendants,” read one stone slab found in Aneyoshi,
Japan. "Remember the calamity of the great tsunamis. Do not build any homes below this
point." 392
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Catastrophic tsunamis may well remain rare, but cyclone has long been a risk
associated with the Coromandel Coast, and storms capable of washing away entire
villages have occurred in living memory.

The torrential rains in Rameswaram,

Ramnathapuram District, in mid-December 2004 – less than two weeks before the Asian
tsunami – prompted one resident interviewed by The Hindu to recall a 1964 cyclone that
washed away the town of Danuskodi. 393 This forty year old storm made the news again
when Dinamalar printed an article on the centenary of the Pamban rail bridge that
connects mainland India to the site on Rameswaram from which Lord Rama is said to
have surveyed Lanka.
Even when we grant that no one can predict tsunami, rain and flood – and the
risks attending each – are an accepted part of life on shore and sea for Pattanavars in the
Union Territory of Pondicherry. Necessarily it begs the question: having recognized the
dangers, how do they cope every day with risks that others might reasonably seek to
avoid? What coping mechanisms have the Pattanavars developed over time to mitigate
either the risks or the anxieties associated with coastal work and living? In the last
chapter I explored many of the material strategies used by fishermen to predict danger
and limit loss: building communities atop sandy medus, learning the natural behavior of
fish and sea, recognizing the warning signs of impending change, and supplicating Kadal
Mata for protection.

All of these go into the communal construction of a “fisher

mentality” believed to endow Pattanavars with the physical and mental attributes required
by their vocation.
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Another explanation has been offered by Robert Paine, who theorized that
communities living in close proximity to hazards learn to cognitively repress the
calculation of risk in order to move through dangerous life-worlds without falling victim
to anxieties about what might befall them, what he calls the “no-risk” thesis of risk
management. 394 Members of these groups use a variety of methods to suppress the need
for such calculations. They might, for example, attribute negative experiences to bad
fortune or the actions of spirits, demons, or deities. Negative hazard outcomes are
ascribed to “God’s will.”

U.S. pastor John Hagee, for example, famously called

Hurricane Katrina “the judgment of God against the city of New Orleans,” 395 while radio
broadcaster Glenn Beck said of the Sendai disaster, “whether you call it Gaia or whether
you call it Jesus, there's a message being sent.” 396 Similarly, a retired Franco-Indian Air
Force officer told me that the tsunami had struck India because women had too many
rights. 397
Another common process identified by Paine is the suppression from personal and
collective memories of experiences that contradict desired outcomes. Puthu’s assertion
that “flood does not come here,” for example, is a parallel manifestation of a similar
process, but as was shown in the last chapter this kind of hazard suppression is based
more on the construction of hazard at the local level than it is on the willful nullification
of dangers. Active suppression of such memories is evident in the ways that tourism
enterprises were often exempted from buffer zone regulations barring new construction in
394
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the tsunami belt. 398 To be sure, such calculations were economic at their base, but their
commercial success depends upon the process of risk suppression described by Paine.
Neither of these mechanisms reduces risk. Instead they “manage” the perception of risk
by constructing shared frameworks of meaning and establishing shared systems of belief.
Both processes are evident among the Pattanavars, though sometimes more
obliquely than described by Paine. Experiences of loss are frequently attributed to the
will of gods. Blame, however, often lies not with the inscrutability of the goddess but
more with a local failure to perform the necessary devotions. Fishermen up and down the
coast predicted dire consequences if disrespect was shown to any manifestation of the sea
god, a belief that motivated Murthi to tell me that if I – or anyone – stepped across his
nets or gear that he would strike me because, “they are like gods to us.” To many older
fishermen the idea of not performing puja was bewildering. “If we do good puja,” said
one man in Kilinjil Medu, “Elaiyamman will certainly protect us.” The requirements for
good puja vary from village to village, and they are well-known even by children. In the
same village, primary school children from the age of eight could tell me that
Elaiyamman was to be given buttermilk, paneer and turmeric water. But when asked if
they were ever supposed to give chickens or goats, as they do to Senkeni Amman in
Veerampattinam, they rejected the suggestion in no uncertain terms.

Such beliefs

represent the obverse to Paine’s thesis that malevolent powers cause disasters. This may
sometimes be perceived to be true – a fact we saw underscored by Anandaranga Pillai’s
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astrological explanation for the 1745 cyclone – but just so, external powers can be
cajoled to prevent disasters through right conduct and proper devotion.
The last chapter explored the ways in which fishermen across the UTP actively
resist or reject certain events from memory, particularly examples of government
assistance to the community that demonstrate an administration that is more responsive to
the needs of the fisher community than community narratives wish to admit. We saw in
chapter 3 how the establishment of the Durieux Health Clinic after the 1968 cyclone was
attributed to the empathy of the French embassy, particularly the empathy of the wife of
the Consul-General, in the face GoPY ambivalence, though the construction of such a
clinic could not have been undertaken without government permission and assistance.
We have already seen among some fishers a denial of risk, much as Paine’s thesis
predicts. Even more interesting, however, is not the denial of risk, or even the acceptance
of risk coupled with assertions of characteristics or abilities specific to the task of
weathering them, but the very different perceptions of risk that exist within and without
the community. “There is no danger here,” they say, “[because] flood only comes here
occasionally.” Sea water (or heavy rains) coming into the village, even coming into the
house, does not signal flood. Flood only occurs when water comes and does not recede
quickly, as within a day. “If water comes and stays, then only is it a flood. If the water
comes and goes, no flood has occurred.” 399 The Pattanavar definition of flood becomes
particular significant in view of the ways in which the GoPY has sought to rehabilitate
fisher communities since 2004.
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Contrary to Paine’s no-risk thesis, however, there is an explicit understanding of
many of the risks inherent in the fisher vocation; older Pattanavars do not shy from
admitting the dangers of their work.

Informants in both Pondicherry and Karaikal

described at length the dangers inherent in off-shore fishing, and they described the
measures taken against these risks. Even though many measures were based upon regular
and proper religious sacrifices, and others rooted in superstition, the mere fact of
conscious acts to control and mitigate risk belies the suggestion that Pattanavars work to
suppress the calculation of risk.

Rather, and this is key to understanding many of the

tensions that arose between the government and Pattanavar communities, the dangers are
perceived differently among fishers than they are among more inland communities. This
difference is underscored by the connotative difference between vellam and vatham
discussed in the last chapter and evinced in comments that assert that “flood does not
come here” or verses tying the health of the sea to regularity of the rain.
“The fisherfolk live with risk anyway,” said CEE’s Sriji Kurup. “They are more
daring. They take more risks. These are their lives.” 400 The idea that the character of
the Pattanavars is tougher, less risk-averse, or more naturally resilient is expressed with
pride by many within the community, and one accepted largely without question outside
of it. “We are accustomed to it,” is the most common refrain. Said Veerarappan: “I am
a man. I have two arms. They have always brought me back. I am a man, and there is
god [gesturing above.] This is all I need.”

400

Sriji Kurup (liaison officer, Centre for Environmental Education, Karaikal office) in discussion with the
author, January 2009.
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The Project Implementation Agency
In the days and weeks that followed the 2004 tsunami disaster response in the
Union Territory was limited to providing immediate succor to its victims and surveying
the extent of damage. According to a government public relations publication, “the
Administration, as has always been, acted swiftly and launched massive rescue and relief
operations by putting the official machinery into service.” The account continued:
The officers and field staff of various departments swung
into action and did their best. Utilising the services of
School kitchens and Central kitchens food was prepared for
one lakh people within three hours and supplied to them
who ran away from their homes to safer destination [sic]
including relief camps opened by the Govt. The officials of
Police, Revenue and Fire service rescued the people from
the debris from the inundated area. The Samaritan of
neighborhoods and N.G.Os plunged into action in
extending helping arms to tsunami victims. 401
This narrative, published in an internal government newsletter nearly a year after the
disaster, paints an image of an efficient and capable administration that contradicts the
impressions of Santirabal Singh, Chief Engineer, PWD, quoted earlier saying that the
government “had no idea what to do.” In fact, Singh confirmed that the administration
provided food for tens of thousands of victims well into January 2005. But the real work
of rehabilitation did not begin, could not begin, until the GoPY better systematized relief
operations.
In the immediate aftermath the GoPY created several committees units to oversee
relief operations at different levels.
401

A rather unwieldy State Level Relief and

Project Implementation Agency, Putu vaḻvu cunāmikkup pin, vol. 1 (November 2005), 12. Italics added.
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Rehabilitative Committee – made up of then Lt. Governor M.M. Lakhera, Chief Minister
N. Rangasamy, and all Secretaries and department heads as well as members of the
legislative assembly – was constituted on January 3, 2005. 402 The establishment of this
committee within a week of the tsunami seems to have been motivated more by the
political need to publicly demonstrate engagement with the disaster, as there already
existed within the Union Territory two bodies responsible for disaster planning and relief:
the High Power Committee/State Disaster Management Authority, which had been
entrusted with coordinating mitigation and preparedness planning in the UTP since
2003 403 and the District Disaster Management Committee, established at the same time
and responsible for extending immediate relief measures to disaster-affected people. 404
In light of the argument presented earlier, namely that the Government of Pondicherry
had developed such a labyrinthine matrix of cross-hierarchies that different sectors of the
administration literally did not know the responsibilities of other sectors, the State Level
Committee represents another manifestation of an administration weaned almost entirely
from efficient response.
By the end of January 2005 Village Level Core Teams had been established to
more directly monitor relief and rehabilitations measures being organized at the village
and hamlet level. 405 Unlike the SLRRC, which virtually duplicated the oversight
responsibilities of the High Power Committee, the village teams were tailor made to
translate the duties of the District Disaster Management Committee at the local level.
Exactly six months later, a second government order established Village Committees for
402
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each hamlet to oversee the allotment of house sites to beneficiaries.

406

The direct

engagement with relief oversight at the village level was an innovation intended to foster
a sense of ownership of the reconstruction within individual recipients, investing at least
part of the responsibility for the success or failure of reconstruction efforts within
recipient communities rather than wholly upon the state apparatus.
In March a smaller Empowered Committee was established for the purpose of
considering proposals received from NGOs and voluntary organizations for the
construction of houses and the “development of habitats including community assets.” 407
In discussions earlier that year, the state level steering committee had entered into
negotiations with the World Bank to provide funding for the reconstruction of the Union
Territory. Numerous smaller offers were also tendered to the administration, but there
was no initial agreement on how such donations should be handled. The Empowered
committee was constituted in part to coordinate this end of the rehabilitation. One option
they considered was to hand funds directly to individual line departments – Public Works,
Fisheries and Fisherman Welfare, Women and Child Development, Agriculture, etc. –
who would be responsible for specific sectors of the rehabilitation, but World Bank
officials rejected this proposal, citing their experience in Gujurat following the 2001 Bhuj
earthquake. 408
Meanwhile, a joint delegation of officials from the World Bank, the United
406
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Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the
International Development Association (IDA) had come to Pondicherry in February to
tour the devastation and have discussions with GoPY leadership, including Lieutenant
Governor Lakhera, Chief Minister N. Rangasamy, Chief Collector Ragesh Chandran, and
Karaikal District Collector L. Mohammed Mansoor. According to interviews conducted
between 2008-2010 with GoPY officials present at these meetings, in lieu of providing
monies directly to line departments the World Bank suggested the creation of a central
agency to monitor but not execute rehabilitation projects akin to neighboring Tamil
Nadu’s Project Monitoring Unit. According to Ragesh Chandran, the GoPY proposed
instead to go even further. “Being a small area we will do one thing,” he recalled:
We will create a project implementation agency. We will
implement it ourselves without handing it over to the
different departments and diverse interests. And then the
World Bank went to Tamil Nadu and said “you must do the
same thing.” Well, Tamil Nadu said, “No, we have a well
set out system [and] we will implement it through the
various departments. We will also create the monitoring
unit.” So they have the PMU, we have the PIA. That is
how it came. It has been decided by the government before
it was created. We will create the system; they [the PIA
with World Bank funding] will implement it. 409
Follow-up discussions held with officials from the Government of India (GoI) and
Planning Commission in New Delhi resulted in the Emergency Tsunami Reconstruction
Project (ETRP), “a long-term Rehabilitation work relating to housing and other
infrastructure development works.” 410 To further facilitate World Bank financing of the
ETRP and other rehabilitation programs along the tsunami-affected Coromandel Coast, a
Development Credit Agreement was signed on May 12, 2005, between the GoI and the
409
410
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World Bank signing on behalf of the IDA. Simultaneously, another agreement, viz. the
Project Agreement, was signed between the World Bank and the GoPY, which allowed
the territory's ETRP to be inaugurated on May 19, 2005.
Prior to the inauguration of these projects the details of the ETRP had been
outlined by the World Bank in a technical annex submitted to the GoI. In it the World
Bank described the creation of “a new legal entity — PIA — [that] will be established
with its own bank account, accounting, reporting and auditing arrangements,” 411 The
name “PIA” was not defined in this document, though from Collector Chandran’s
account above and documents discussed below it can be surmised that PIA was by this
time a familiar acronym in the circles discussing the GoPY’s collaboration with the
World Bank. The details of PIA's operations and management, however, were left to be
defined in an Operations Manual then under preparation..
The Project Implementation Agency (PIA) was announced by government order
on April 24, 2005, in the following terms:
[I]t has been decided...in order to implement the assistance
given by the World Bank as well as to undertake various
other activities related thereof for relief, rehabilitation and
reconstruction in various sectors, and also to give effect to
the policy of reconstruction of permanent houses and
infrastructure facilities for the Tsunami affected areas and
rehabilitation of Tsunami affected people with the
participation of NGOs and voluntary organisations in a
speedy and time-bound manner. 412
Rather than establishing it as a new sub-unit within an existing agency or department,
PIA was was constituted under the Societies Registration Act of 1860. By doing this the
411
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governing body of the PIA was vested with sole control of all properties and finances
belonging to it, in effect setting up an administrative structure parallel to but not a part of
the GoPY. Relief funds – whether from the World Bank, the GoI, or other bodies – were
deposited into a separate bank account controlled by PIA’s governing body and not
subject to established GoPY accounting rules or auditing protocols, though separate
protocols were put in place as a necessary condition of World Bank assistance.
By the rules of the Societies Act PIA was also granted the ability to alter, extend,
or abridge its mandate subject only to a vote of its members, rather than to the regulations
of the government as a whole. Thus changes to the mandate of PIA would be subject
only to the imprimatur of its individual members rather than to the legislative process
required for amending secretariats and line departments.

The only rein on PIA’s

independence was a grant of supersession given to the GoPY in the case of gross
mismanagement, but even then such supersession could not be for more than one year.
The agency was originally charged with four primary objectives: 1) the repair,
reconstruction, or resettlement of affected communities, 2) the revitalization of
agricultural livelihoods, 3) the development of a fisheries policy to include a study into
new forms of livelihood support, and 4) a vulnerabilities assessment for the long-term
risk management of the coastal zone. Because of its status as a registered society, the
agency held unprecedented power within the GoPY to act and operate independently of
the government apparatus. In addition to streamlining the process of project funding,
subject now only to the will of its Joint Project Director, PIA was given decision-making
powers unavailable to other government agencies: the ability to hire third party
consultants, the ability to execute contract based on cost coupled with quality control, and
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most importantly the ability to directly accept funds from the World Bank and other
donors into agency controlled bank accounts.
The terms of the agreement between GoPY and the World Bank – the first
agreement ever signed between GoPY and an external agency 413 – and its status as a
charitable society gave PIA broad responsibilities over all rehabilitation or development
projects growing directly out of tsunami recovery and a wide scope in which to carry
them out. By the publication of the agency's operations manual in the summer of 2005
the agency had already expanded its mandate beyond it original four duties to include:
[U]ndertak[ing] restoration, reconstruction and rehabilitation
work and programmes necessitated by any natural calamity
in the State with funds provided to it by the State
Government or received by it from the Central Government
or any donor or Funding Agency in order to enable the PIA
to implement the restoration, reconstruction and
rehabilitation works and programmes entrusted to it by the
State. 414
Objectives outlined in the manual included, but were not limited to:
• Resettlement
• Social and economic rehabilitation of affected populations
• Planning for long-term disaster preparedness and loss
mitigation
• Undertaking research examining the causes for loss and the
means for minimizing the same
• Increasing funds through charitable collection
• Increasing these funds through investment (vis. Societies
Registration Act of 1860 and the Bombay Public Trust Act
of 1950)
What becomes clear from the enumeration of objectives is that while the original
responsibilities outlined in both the technical annex and G.O.Ms. 57 remained in force
413
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within months of its creation PIA had already exercised the rights afforded it as a
“charitable society” to expand beyond post-tsunami rehabilitation to include, among
other things, general disaster response planning and long-term financial investment.
Despite guaranteed World Bank funds earmarked for rehabilitation and development
initiatives, new stress was put on both the collection of additional charitable funds and
their increase through mechanisms of intelligent savings and investment. The financial
stability fostered by these practices proved the agency’s sustainability. As a result there
was little resistance to PIA requests to extend its terminal, three year mandate, first in
2008 and again in 2010.
One consequence of this success is that officials are now discussing the indefinite
continuation of PIA as the nodal agency for disaster management and crisis mitigation
planning in the Union Territory. “The present perspective is that not everyone will return
to their line departments,” explained the Chief Collector. “The thinking is that the new
department requires a disaster management wing, [then] why not the mandate of PIA be
changed from tsunami rehabilitation alone to help the disaster management division of
the Revenue Department?” 415 Such a decision seems likely to create tensions within the
GoPY for several reasons. First, other departments may well grow to resent the fact that
PIA operates freely outside of the strictures of hierarchy imposed on line departments.
PIA also controls its own operating budget external to the central operating budget of the
GoPY. It is unclear whether this would continue should PIA become the new disaster
wing, but there is no provision in the Societies Act for how to treat any capital gains
earned through investments authorized by the governing body. Rather, the Act states that
415
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control of these will be vested in the governing board until the society is dissolved.
Finally, many officers tasked to PIA from line departments were chosen based on their
training and experience within those departments.

Permanent reassignment would

necessarily negatively impact the operations of line departments until replacements could
be assigned, and even then there would be a significant loss in institutional memory and
sub-unit intelligence within each department. But these issues were only just being
considered in mid-2010. At the time of this writing any further speculation serves little
purpose.
Comparative Magnitude at a Glance
As was discussed in chapter 3, since the cyclone that struck the
Coromandel Coast in November 1977 could have in many ways served as a template for
subsequent large-scale disaster response in the Union Territory it is worth briefly
comparing the magnitude of each event side by side. This comparison is not meant to
suggest that the 1977 cyclone was of similar scale to the 2004 tsunami. In terms of scope
and effect the cyclone has more in common with earlier cyclones than it does with longterm trauma caused by the tsunami.

Nevertheless, when discussing the physical

rehabilitation faced since 2005 it is instructive to compare it with the earlier event in
terms of material scale.
At first glance the exercise seems unreasonable (Table 5.1). In terms of affected
population, number of relief camps, number of fishing craft destroyed, and fatalities there
seems little reason to compare these events. On unpacking the numbers more carefully,
however, the utility of such a comparison becomes more apparent. Beginning with the
number of villages affected, it is at first surprising to see that more than three times as
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many villages were classified “affected” in 1977 than in 2004. Certainly the tsunami
affected the coast, and even at its widest the Union Territory rarely extends more than
five kilometers inland. Several factors clarify this dissonance.
Particular

1977

2004

No. of Villages affected

113

33

Population affected 416

> 10,000

43,432

No. of Relief Camps

5

48

No. of fishing boats damaged/destroyed

657

No. of houses damaged/destroyed

7426

7,491
(CMFRI)
10,061

No. of crops affected

1214 Ha.

792 Ha.

No. of deaths

2

601

Table 5.1 Comparison of key damage metrics, 1977 and 2004

First and foremost, where the tsunami only affected coastal regions the cyclone
dropped rain on the entire region. In addition, due to their physical locations, both
Pondicherry and Karaikal are subject not only to the rain that falls in the district but also
the rain that falls in Tamil Nadu and must flow through the Union Territory watershed.
While the inundation resulting from tsunami did reach several kilometers inland in many
places, such as at Karaikal, it did not do so at Pondicherry town. The reasons given for
this vary but fall into two broad categories. Engineers and scientific officers working for
the GoPY suggest that Pondicherry town escaped the worst because of its
416

This is a category given in GoPY documents on tsunami. “Affected” is never defined, but it differs from
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geomorphology. Being sited near the mouths of the Ariankuppam and Chunnambar
Rivers allowed much of the force of the wave to be “swallowed” by the rivers and
allowed to quickly drain back into the ocean. A few even credit the remnants of the
syndicat agricole for effectively increasing the hydrological capacity of the district. This
latter group suggests that the old seawall also helped to blunt the destructive force of the
wave. Pattanavars, on the other hand, maintain that the seabed before Pondicherry town
drops suddenly some distance from the shore. As the tsunami wave neared the shore it
effectively “fell” into a deep trench, dropping the height of the wave so that a shorter
wave hit Pondicherry than struck the coast at neighboring Devanampattinam, for
instance. Such a physical feature also would have affected the roll of the wave, causing it
almost to “stumble” and dissipating some of its force. Either effect could have an impact
on the number of towns inundated by the tsunami, limiting the scope of the disaster to the
villages nearest the shoreline.
The population numbers are somewhat more difficult to compare. It is needless to
compare fatalities between the two disasters, but a single detail about the tsunami adds a
modicum of verity to the villages numbers discussed above. In the entire Union Territory
there were 601 deaths from tsunami. The majority of these were in Karaikal, but 107
deaths did occur in Pondicherry. 417 In nearby Devanampattinam, Cuddalore District,
approximately the same number of deaths occurred, but across a population nearly 1/100
that of Pondicherry’s. One source told me that as many as five times as many people
were killed in Devanampattinam. 418 The relative resilience of the densely urban
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Pondicherry (pop. 735,000) compared to the markedly less urban Devanampattinam (pop.
8,500) is only made more notable when cast in the light of the physical features discussed
above.
The “population affected” numbers are somewhat more difficult to compare.
Numbers from the 2004 disaster have been firmly at 43,432 since mid-2005, compared to
approximately 10,000 affected by the 1977 cyclone. While what constitutes “affected”
was never clearly defined in either instance, the category certainly includes those who
were evacuated and fed in shelters. In 2001 the total population of UTP was 974,000;
thus the affected population numbered about 4.5 percent of the total population. In 1977
the Revenue Department did not enumerate the affected population, but it did note that
between 10,000 and 11,000 people were fed daily in government relief centers. Using
numbers from the 1981 census, the population of UTP in 1977 would have been a little
less than 600,000 people, meaning that less than two percent of the population was fed by
government kitchens during the crisis. But being fed is not the same as being affected.
Neither does this number track with a third number, the number of houses
damaged or destroyed, which in 1977 totaled nearly 7,500. It seems fatuous to suggest
that the number of people fed in government kitchens numbers less 1.5 per house
damaged when most houses would have housed families. But neither does it follow that
every family living in a damaged or destroyed house was necessarily fed in government
kitchens. Nevertheless, it might be safely inferred that the “affected population” in 1977
was considerably higher than merely the 10-11,000 people fed. Household size in India
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today averages 4.8, 419 suggesting that if we count as “affected” all members of destroyed
and damaged houses based on modern numbers the “affected population” would surge to
36,000, or approximately 6% of the population in 1977. Of course we cannot assume
these numbers, but it suggests that the percentage of the population affected by the 1977
cyclone is much nearer to 4.5% “affected” by the 2004 tsunami. It is reasonable to
assume, then, that the total percentage of the population affected by the earlier disaster
was comparable, if not greater than, the total percentage affected by tsunami.
As regards the fisheries, despite the vast difference in the raw numbers, the scale
of loss from the two disasters was comparable in this regard as well. According to the
Revenue Department report published after the cyclone, in 1977 there were about 4,500
fisherman families living between the two town centers. In the mechanized fishing sector
alone 33 boats were completely destroyed while another 24 were “also sunk [but] being
salvaged.” 420 This represented a significant percentage of the total mechanized fishing
capacity of the Union Territory in the late 1970s, a sector that had only recently begun to
modernize under the programs of the IV Plan. At the beginning of the decade there were
only forty mechanized boats in the entire Union Territory, 421 and subsequent schemes to
increase mechanized capacity were scaled back annually for the remainder of the
decade. 422 The 600 catamarans lost to the cyclone represented about one-seventh of the
total country craft in UTP and affected more than 1,000 fishers. On the whole, following

419

“National Family Health Survey ‐3,” International Institute for Population Sciences, accessed May 6,
2011, http://www.nfhsindia.org//nfhs3.shtml.
420
Report on Cyclone and Flood Damage, 10
421
GoPY, Annual Plan 1971‐1972, 57.
422
See GoPY, Annual Plan 1972‐1973, 69. For example, in FY 1972‐73 a scheme to acquire 20 mechanized
boats was dropped because subsidies could not be guaranteed by GoI. It was instead projected that only
five boats would be added to the UTP mechanized fleet.

260

the cyclone UTP fishermen lost more than twenty percent of their total capacity, and well
over fifty percent of their mechanized capacity.
By comparison, a 2009 study conducted by the Central Marine Fisheries Research
Institute on behalf of PIA identified a marine fisher folk population of 43,000, of whom
approximately 25% were employed in fishing activities.

CMFRI identified 365

mechanized boats damaged or lost to tsunami, affecting a working population between
1,800-3,000 fishers out of a total 10,341. 423 Nearly 8,000 smaller boats were lost – 93
FRPs and 7,436 catamarans – which easily represents the remainder of the active fishers
in the Union Territory. Furthermore, beyond the simple material damage incurred by
tsunami, many fisherman admitted being fearful of returning to the sea, some not doing
so for six months or more after tsunami. While the 1977 cyclone severely hampered
fisheries production, the 2005 tsunami crippled it well for well over a year, and it has
been slow to recover ever since. According to CMFRI, the average annual marine fish
landings in the decade before tsunami was 18,416 tons, while in the years following the
average has dropped to 10,819 tons. 424
The more interesting numbers, from a comparative standpoint, are the damages to
housing and to agriculture. The latter can be handled quickly, but demonstrates the vast
scope of damaged wrought by the 1977 cyclone. According to the Revenue Department
surveys, 1214 hectares of ready-to-harvest crops were completely destroyed by the dual
action of the cyclone and its subsequent inundation. This number is already 60% higher
than the 792 hectares damaged by tsunami, but an additional 4,249 hectares of crops were
423
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partly damaged in 1977, bringing total agricultural damage to seven times that caused by
tsunami.
It is housing, however, that makes for the most interesting comparison, because it
is housing that was identified by GoPY and the PIA as the foremost responsibility of
rehabilitation. And it is housing rehabilitation that has caused the most tension across the
Union Territory in the years since tsunami.
Habitats versus Houses
By the end of January 2005, housing reconstruction had eclipsed all other
necessarily rehabilitative measures being pursued by the administration. As important as
it might have been to get fishermen to resume their daily routines (a process that in some
places took up to a year) and to repair or rebuild portage facilities, the need for shelter
dominated the discussion. Without purpose-built cyclone shelters, like those found in
Bangladesh, GoPY quickly set up neighborhood relief “camps” in schools, marriage
halls, and other large public spaces. The immediate concern was how to provide succor
in the face of catastrophe, but it was clear the administration was at a loss on how to
proceed in the long term. As Santirabal Singh pointed out, providing food, water, and
shelter for weeks on end was not the solution. He admitted, too, that “[reconstruction] is
our duty, even though we failed in 2005-2006.” 425
“The task before us,” wrote GoPY Development Commissioner B.V. Selvaraj
(I.A.S.), “is to undertake long term rehabilitation and reconstruction measures.”
The foremost responsibility in hand it to provide pucca
disaster-resistant dwelling units to those who have lost
their houses and those who are living in vulnerable coastal
425
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areas. The initiative and the lead taken by some of the
NGOs is extremely encouraging and is rather
unprecedented. 426
Other key measures named by Selvaraj were the restoration of livelihood, “particularly in
the fishing villages/hamlets,” and the reclamation of agricultural lands.
Despite the catastrophic scale of tsunami, post-tsunami rehabilitation presented to
the administration an unprecedented opportunity to “build back better.” 427

New Life

After Tsunami, the PIA newsletter for rehabilitation progress first published in late 2005,
declared “Construction of New Houses and Modern Habitats.” The article cited public
statements made by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who said that scientists
cannot remain “silent witnesses” to natural disasters. Rather, “we must enhance our
predictive capabilities and preparedness for meeting emergencies” arising from natural
causes.

428

The idea that tsunami presented an opportunity to build better, disaster

resistant houses circulated within the administration at the same time that notions of what
constituted “modern” habitats were debated. What emerged from these debates was what
came to be frequently expressed to me as “habitats not housing.” This trope argued for an
aggressive program of community (re-)engineering in which “better” – that is to say more
modern – colonies would be constructed for tsunami affected people. These colonies
would include many amenities that middle-class Indians already took for granted: inhome current, clean water, toilets, public schools/anganwadis, a community
center/emergency shelter, and available media centers.
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One local NGO that this way of conceptualizing the rehabilitation project was the
Pondicherry Multi-purpose Social Service Society (PMSSS), a development NGO
attached to the archdiocese of Pondicherry. PMSSS worked extensively on development
projects arising out of tsunami rehabilitation, building over 1,000 houses in Pondicherry
and Tamil Nadu. In an undated draft proposal for a joint housing project undertaken with
Caritas Internationalis in Devanampattinam, Cuddalore District, Tamil Nadu, PMSSS
defined the primary responsibility of the government as “provid[ing] properly built
houses in safe location [sic] to the affected people respecting C[oastal] R[egulation]
Z[one] notification issued by Government of India.” 429

In stating the government's

responsibility this way two central aims of tsunami rehabilitation were balanced against
each other: the protection and husbanding of environmentally sensitive regions along the
coastline and the habitation of vulnerable coastal populations, either into homes rebuilt in
situ or into new colonies built out of the CRZ. 430 The project itself undertook to “give a
new quality house in an improved environment and increased social bonds [sic].” 431 It
was this combination of “improved environment” and “increased social bond” that
motivated much of the planning discourse.
However habitat would come to be defined, disaster recovery began in relief
camps. Most of these were located with the ambit of everyday life in a given community
or neighborhood.

Serendipitously, in the tumult of evacuation the administration

managed to create an environment within the relief camps that fostered community
429
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recovery: not just individual, atomized families were placed together, but entire villages
were allowed to settle as groups into marriage halls and other large public-use spaces. At
least in Karaikal the initial response of evacuation had been prepared by the District
Collection, Mohammed Mansoor, for several years. Prior to tsunami each community
had an assigned evacuation site, typically in schools, but during tsunami, says Mansoor,
“this all fell apart.”
Nobody knows how they ended up in the Royal and
Shanmugan Mahals [marriage halls]. It is a decision that
somebody made in a moment and people just ended up
there. The earmarked things did not work. 432
According to Mansoor, by 3 p.m., approximately seven hours after the first wave
hit the coast, the situation on the ground had been stabilized. The district administration
in Karaikal quickly recognized that their original plan to evacuate refugees to schools – a
plan that had been drilled into district level task forces for at least three years – was
untenable. Schools were too small, often inconvenient, and lacked facilities. Unlike
schools, marriage halls had kitchens, an unplanned for need after three or four days of
relief, and they could shelter ten times as many people as schools, centralizing relief
efforts. Communities had also managed to locate themselves together, though without
and sometimes against government orders. “It was not a conscious effort on our part. If
there were requests they were accommodated.”
Trauma literature has long argued that this is the preferred way to treat refugees.
In his study of the 1972 Buffalo Creek mine disaster Kai Erikson noted the abject failure
of relief workers to take community networks of emotional support into account when
assigning victims to temporary camps following the collapse of the impoundment, or
432
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“gob,” dam built above Saunders, West Virginia. 433 Speaking to the historically closeknit culture of mining communities in general, but especially in the tight confines of
Appalachia's narrow valleys, Erikson challenged the decision of federal aid workers to
place families into relief camps pell-mell, without regard for existing family or
community connections. Families from different communities were placed in adjacent
shelters, disrupting parcenary support networks built up over decades. In the social webs
of mining communities, strangers are rarely accepted into the close networks of
friendship and support that exist within communities, and while certain allowances might
be given to families who share the risks associated with mining, the trust required to
activate traditional mechanisms of coping with grief did not translate across communities
even when only separated by a few miles within the same valley. Had relief workers
taken the additional step of identifying the home community of each displaced resident
and made an effort to locate members of individual communities together, argued
Erikson, many long-term psychological effects engendered by the trauma could have
been mitigated, if not altogether avoided.
Similarly, Australian psychologist Gordon Milne linked the power of place to
mitigating post-traumatic stress disorders. In his survey of adult victims of 1974’s
Cyclone Tracy in Darwin, Australia, taken five years after the storm, Milne found that
31% of evacuees who relocated after the disaster suffered from emotional disorders,
compared to only 13% of those who had never left in the first place, or who evacuated
but returned and rebuilt. These same victims spoke as if “mourning over [a] loss which
went deeper than deprivation of house, possessions or job,” and 25% of evacuees
433

Kai Erikson, Everything in Its Path (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1976).
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interviewed by the Department of Social Security two years later, in 1981, regretted their
choice to leave Darwin. 434 Writing of the same disaster Peter Read admitted that neither
relief officials nor victims cited the loss of community as a significant cause of emotional
distress, but noted that officials from the Australian Department of Social Security
conceded that “since homes are of central importance…every consideration should be
given to restoration where possible, or to rebuilding on the same sites to maintain
established communities.” 435 Even so, they did so without conceding that it was the
initial destruction of these neighborhoods that had in fact been a contributing factor to the
trauma in the first place.
Read further argued that the reason that the “health” of homes or communities is
central to the emotional recovery of its victims is because:
[A]n ordinary home or suburb, once loved, transcends
particularity for as long as the person who formed the
attachment values that bond. Mystery and pathos…seep
from earth and bubble out from water in any place where
people have loved and bred and feuded with each other.
Each construction of event, experience, memory and place
is unrepeatable. 436

Like residents of the Karaikal fisher hamlets, residents in the affected
communities of Darwin identified themselves and clustered in ways not recognized as
meaningful to outsiders like relief workers or environmental impact assessors. In doing
so they (re)made for themselves precisely the meaningful social links that aided their
emotional recovery from the disaster, a process notably absent from relief efforts in
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Buffalo Creek. By allowing refugees to self-organize, relief workers in Pondicherry and
Karaikal avoided inflicting the kinds of unintentional trauma related to loss-of-place
described by Erikson, Milne, and Read, even if the process began unintentionally. The
extended family units of the Pattanavar fisher communities were, for the most part, able
to locate together. Once in relief camps, tsunami victims were quickly resettled back into
their home communities as soon as practicable. Temporary home repairs were then
begun with residents already in situ.
By adopting the “habitat not houses” trope GoPY disaster management officials
rewrote the tsunami as an opportunity to remake backwards classes in an image
considered more suitable for the 21st century, essentially making the project one of
enforcing a notion of modernity. Rehabilitation offered an unlooked for blank canvas on
which to outline the all-at-once social uplift of backward castes, a project that had been in
process since the integration of the Union Territory into the II Plan (1956-1961). But it
also set back forty years of development.
In 1955 the Planning Commission had written of Pondicherry that, “so long as the
State was under the French, pretty little was done for a progressive improvement of the
economic and social structure of the people.” 437 This first statement is demonstrably
untrue (see chapter 2), but it served a practical political motive: differentiating the former
colonial administration from the central government in New Delhi. By insinuating that
the prior administration had been exploitative of “the people,” Delhi was placing its own
motives as contrastingly liberal and egalitarian. That this statement was made during the
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de facto administration was no coincidence either, signaling a promise of future
development and modernization.
The II Plan went on to note “the peculiar town-building plans obtaining here,” in
which “houses are built right on the road and touching each other without open areas or
compounds.” 438

This

second

was

statement

largely accurate (illus. 5.1).
Facts on the ground would
require a program of slum
clearance before any new
housing initiatives could be
undertaken. A few housing
Illus. 5.1. “Peculiar town‐building plans” in Vambakirapalaiyam

projects intended as sub-

sidized housing for government employees were started at the end of the 1950s, but
housing projects targeted specifically towards fishermen, who had been described in the
II Plan as “generally poor and [who] suffer to a great extent for lack of housing
facilities,” did not begin until more than a decade later. 439
The first housing project for fisher communities was not completed until 1970.
Forty houses were completed that year at a cost of Rs. 1000/unit, 75% of which was
subsidized by the government with the remainder being applied as an interest-free, five

438
439

Ibid. 22
GoPY, Annual Plan: 1969‐1970 (Government of Pondicherry: Pondicherry, 1969), 45.
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year loan. 440 An internal review in 1972 found the allotment to be insufficient to build
adequate housing and the amount was consequently doubled. This program continued for
several more years, with the cost/unit being again increased to Rs. 3700 during FY77-78
due to an increase in labor and material costs. The program disappeared from the Annual
Plan after FY1977-78 having completed fewer than 500 houses. The idea, if not the
scope, reappeared fifteen years later, in FY93-94, as a “model village” of twenty pucca,
or cement, homes and a tube-well proposed to be funded under GoI VIII Plan. 441
Despite these modest efforts, in the half century since the 1954 transfer of power
by the French to the Indian government, the GoPY always seemed rather flat-footed
when questions of low-income housing arose. If post-tsunami reconstruction was to be
successful, the underlying reasons for this needed to be addressed.

In part, says

Mohammed Mansoor, there has always been a problem of “too many cooks.” “There are
too many interests in Pondicherry,” he said. “The Chief Minister, the Lt. Governor, the
central administration [in Delhi]; all of them are vying for handouts to this group or that
group.” 442 A second problem, particularly in Pondicherry town, was “the peculiar town
building plans pertaining here,” as it was described in the II Plan.

Because of

Pondicherry’s origins as a walled colonial factory, space in its core remains tightly
circumscribed.

Nevertheless, for Mansoor the imperative was clear: “this is a once in a
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lifetime chance to have an RCC house.” 443 The prevailing feeling within the GoPY was it
was the duty of government to provide them.
After the State Level and Empowered committees had been constituted in early
2005, village level teams were established to assist with damage assessment and other
localized tasks. By May, PIA had been registered under the Societies Act and various
NGOs had entered in Memoranda of Understanding with GoPY. The next step was to
secure land for the purpose of building new colonies, and it was here that the manifest
differences between the urban development of Pondicherry town and Karaikal appear
most pronounced. In 1937 the French Director of Public Works described Pondicherry in
the following way:
[It] was reconstructed at the turn of the 18th century and its
rectilinear streets and colonnaded homes push right against
the sea. The layout of the town is impeccable: the avenues
broad, the city seats majestic, the homes in high style. 444
Karaikal, in contrast,
[I]s separated from the sea by a sandy plain; to the south lies
the bed of the ancient Arasalar [River]...a sea breeze blows
pleasantly from the coast [and] the inhabitants thrive and do
not worry. All of its houses are away from the sea and there
is not, as in Pondicherry, a promenade along the coast. It is
said to be quite an agreeable location because the area is not
over-built. 445

Neither town has changed much at its core in the seventy-five years since Girod wrote
these words, and they remain a fair representation of each city’s center, though it must be
noted that Girod’s idyllic description of Pondicherry appears limited to the seaward ville
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blanche where the administration sat and its officers made their homes (illus. 5.2).

Illus. 5.2 Girod's ville blanche (seaside right) 446

To each, of course, can be added three quarters of a century of growth, but where in
Karaikal there is yet room to expand in every direction, within Pondicherry center – the
region demarcated by the former colonial town, its ramparts, and its immediate suburbs –
outward growth has long since swallowed the formerly separate villages of
Kuricchikkuppam and Muthialpet to the north, Muthaliarpet and Oulgaret to the
southwest, and the southern fisher villages above the Ariankuppam River. Within the
limits of the old town there is little space in which to build without demolishing existing
structures (Illus. 5.3). These different urban characters have played a defining role in
how reconstruction has been played out.
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Illus. 5.3 Northern edge of the old colonial center today, looking south 447

According to a revenue officer overseeing reconstruction projects in Pondicherry
town, there were factions in the government who desired to move entire fisher
communities to locations outside the CRZ. 448 This idea had several benefits: it removed
entire populations from the perceived risks associated with coastal flooding and storm
surge, it cleared the CRZ for improved protection of coastal environments, and it made
use of what open space remained in the territory. Each of these reasons was mentioned in
turn by officials across the spectrum of the rehabilitation project, and when they were
invoked it was done so with seeming sincerity, but their individual merits are debatable.
447
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Almost universally, the last reason ever given to support relocation was the
utilization of unused or underused land. In Karaikal this fact was accepted almost as
given. Deputy Collector Mansoor claimed to have only approached owners of lands not
currently under cultivation. “’This is a barren land,’ I said to them. ‘You cannot
cultivate it for many years after the salinization.’ [So] we fixed them a high price and we
nearly gave them that value.” 449 For Mansoor these negotiations were negotiations over
opportunity cost. “Better to sell them to the government than invest in desalinization,” he
laughed.
Today he claims that these lands were not under cultivation anyway, but whether
this was actually the case was not the point for Mansoor. After the disaster any crops
under cultivation on lands between the medu villages and the town would have been
destroyed by the inundation. But between 2008 and 2010 wide swathes of land between
Karaikal town and the coastal road that remain undeveloped and uncultivated. Numerous
informants told me that it had long been true that these lands were kept fallow. Some
attributed this to the desire of landowners to sell out to developers at high prices, while
others agreed with Mansoor that the land was too saline for cultivation. 450 Whatever the
actuality, such lands were relatively easy for the government to appropriate in Karaikal,
and relocation colonies numbering 1,986 houses were completed and ready for
occupation in places like Keezhakasakudy, Thalatheru, and Koilpattu by January 2008. 451
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In discussion with the author, August 2010.
Tangappa (day laborer, Karaikal) in discussion with the author, January 2009.
451
These are the so‐called “revenue villages,” or administrative units overseen by individual tahsildars, in
which the villages discussed herein are located, e.g. both Karaikalmedu and Kilinjilmedu are located within
Thalatheru. Nine revenue villages covering nineteen individual hamlets were identified for housing
rehabilitation in Karaikal; In Pondicherry a further nine were identified, covering fifteen separate hamlets.
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The same approach applied to Pondicherry – e.g. the forced relocation of
vulnerable populations out of high risk locations to lower risk sites – enjoyed a great deal
of silent support in the administration, but only the revenue villages most distant from
Pondicherry town had any undeveloped land for the construction of resettlement
colonies. 452 The policy was never voiced publicly for fear that to do so would “dilute the
entire process.”

Whatever officials might have wished privately, there were public

anxieties that any indication of such plans would be aggressively resisted. One tahsildar
worried aloud that the “rougher fishermen will not be able to blend with a new
community” 453 and he was not alone in his anxiety. “Fishers are difficult to handle,”
explained Mansoor, “so any action we take for them must be balanced against their
needs.” It is true that many fisher hamlets further from the center like Veerampattinam
and the Medu hamlets remain largely homogenous, but this is often a vocational choice:
“They have to be there [by the sea]. They should be there.” 454 But blended communities
like Kurichikuppam, Vaithikuppam, and Vambakirapaliayam put the lie to these
worries. 455 It is not that fisherfolk cannot live among others but that doing so, at least in
the urban center of Pondicherry, has lead to a decline in traditional community structures.
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Peter Wilcoxen, “Climate Change and Disaster Response” (presentation, Moynihan Post Disaster
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V. Jayanand (Joint Project Director – fisheries, PIA) in discussion with the author, May 2009.
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Through conversations with residents outside of fisher areas it is clear that this concern is not
unfounded. Or rather its obverse is evident: many Pondicheriennes privately believe fishermen to be
uncouth, lazy, and dangerous. It more likely that communities into which the Pattanavars would be
moved would object than that the fishers themselves would prove unable to adapt. It is not that fishers

275

Reconstruction in locations like Kalapet, Ariankuppam, and Poorananakuppam
were approached in much the same way as in Karaikal, though not without unique
challenges. In the latter two revenue villages it proved possible to locate rehabilitation
colonies in close proximity to villages destroyed by the tsunami. In Kalapet, however,
located well away from the city at the northern edge of the Union Territory, GoPY
originally planned two colonies totaling 800 dwellings. To initiate such a project they
needed to acquire lands under private ownership, but tensions were already high in
Kalapet. Many landholders had already lost land on the west side of the East Coast Road
(ECR) to eminent domain demands made by the government during the construction of
Pondicherry University, and officials were fully cognizant of the threat felt by owners
facing demands to cede seafront land for rehabilitation. There were further tensions
between these same landowners and fishers in Kalapet, who the former felt were already
encroaching on their rightful claims of legal ownership on lands east of ECR through
traditional squatting rights accorded to fishers in UTP. 456 These legal tensions were still
playing out in court in 2008 when construction on a planned 1014 houses in Kalapet
finally got underway. 457
Urbanized

villages

like

Solai

Nagar,

Vaithikuppam,

Dubraipet,

and

Vambakirapalaiyam were classified into special categories for in situ reconstruction. A
technical committee headed by the Chief Town Planner was constituted in November
cannot live among other communities but that doing so, at least in the urban center of Pondicherry, has
lead to a decline in traditional community structures.
456
Kandasamy (PIA) in discussion with the author, March 2009; Kothandaraman (faculty, Pondicherry
Engineering College) in discussion with the author, April 2009.
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According to the new Joint Project Director of the PIA, L. Mohamed Mansoor, all litigation related to
post‐tsunami land appropriations has been resolved since the beginning of 2010. In discussion with the
author, July 2010.
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2005 to work out a plan for the rehabilitation of nine urban hamlets. Each hamlet was
classified as an X, Y, or Z village and assigned tight building limitations based on
subjective determinations of urbanization.

In the least urban revenue village of

Pillaichavady, 550 plots of 800 sq. ft. were identified for the construction of homes on
raised plinths measuring 325 sq.ft. In Pondicherry, however, which included seven
separate villages totaling 2,000 individual dwellings, plots were limited to a 150 sq. ft.
plinth, regardless of the original area of the home being replaced. With neither large
sections of adjacent houses which could be cleared nor with temporary shelters adequate
for 2,000 families, it was necessary to pursue strategies different from the large-scale,
government-driven colonies built in Karaikal and Kalapet.
The availability of land was not the only reason marshaled in support of proposals
to relocate fisher communities inland. In terms of fostering disaster resistant
communities, protecting the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) was one of the most
developmentally progressive reason given for moving fisher communities inland. The
CRZ was declared by the Central Government in 1991 pursuant to the Environment
Protection Rules defined in 1986. 458 The CRZ notification strictly regulated growth
activities within 500 meters of the high tide line, specifically industrial development
excepting only those projects “directly related to water front or directly needing foreshore
facilities” or projects developed by the Department of Atomic Energy. 459

Similarly

prohibited were “commercial purposes such as shopping and housing complexes, hotels
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and entertainment activities.” 460 By the terms of the CRZ zones defined as CRZ-I, areas
defined as ecologically sensitive or important – national parks, sanctuaries, preserves,
mangroves, reefs, breeding and spawning grounds –

commercial and residential

rehabilitation projects were forbidden. Instead the Forest Department initiated a plan to
mitigate erosion and sea intrusion by planting a coastal belt of coconut, casuarinas,
punnai, pungan, and other trees along the coastal belt of the Union Territory. 461 There is
anecdotal evidence that in Tamil Nadu protected lands were often given over to
resort/tourism development, but none that I have been able to confirm.

In Tamil-

speaking regions of Sri Lanka, on the other hand, similarly defined areas were most
certainly exempted for commercial tourism enterprises and many coastal areas were
cleared of fisher communities ostensibly for concerns over safety only to be later handed
over to developers of high-end resorts. 462 Jennifer Hyndman, too, has demonstrated how
the government encouraged fears of tsunami in order to ease the transfer of sensitive
areas to politically powerful constituencies. 463 But such egregious examples are not
documentable in UTP. 464
CRZ protections often resulted in absurd contortions, particularly within the urban
areas of Pondicherry town covered by category CRZ-II, defined as “areas that have
460
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already been developed up to or close to the shoreline.” In this context, “developed area”
meant:
[T]hat area within the municipal limits or in other legally
designated urban areas which are already substantially built
up and which have been provided with drainage and
approach roads and other infrastructural facilities, such as
water supply and sewerage [sic] mains. 465
In these areas construction was only permissible on the landward side of “new (or
approved) road or authorized structures,” and it was this clause that was used to allow
dozens of new houses to be approved in the most marginal of areas of Vambakirpalaiyam
in 2010.

Located at the very edge of urban habitation in Pondicherry, Sivaraman

Imuldar’s plot is a case study in the difficulties inherent in the rehabilitation of fisher
habitats in urban areas. Located at the eastern end of a narrow, paved alley, the plot
represents both the challenges of reconstruction and the manipulations to CRZ
regulations required to approve reconstruction at such sites (illus. 5.4).
In order to reach the building site materials needed to be hand-carried down the
narrow alley pictured, significantly increasing both the time and the labor required to
complete the project. Water is supplied to the site by a spigot located directly above the
kuṭam – a broad bottomed pot traditionally used for fetching water – shown in the bottom
left-hand corner of the frame, but drainage and sewerage are both provided only by the
open drain visible running vertically down the center-left of the photograph. A survey of
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Illus. 5.4 Sivaraman Imuldar's building site

the wider site shows it to be located beneath Pondicherry’s massive stone revetment
(illus. 5.5). The only other access to the site is an earthen path running parallel to the
seawall that provides the “approved road” necessary to permit construction (illus. 5.6).

Illus. 5.5 Looking east towards the seawall

Illus. 5.6 The “approved road,” northern view

The last rationale typically given for using rehabilitation to move fisher
communities inland, hazard minimization and human safety, is considerably more
fraught. It is debatable whether the 300 sq. ft., two storey house built by Sivaraman will
280

be any safer than the considerably larger single-storey home he will eventually be forced
to abandon. While it will be built on a plinth raised one meter above ground level, health
risks related to lack of sanitation and the presence of open sewers remain. Furthermore,
while the plinth is intended to raise the living space of the house above marginal levels of
flooding, such flooding is more likely to occur in areas protected by the seawall because
no drainage cuts have been provided to allow water in the town to flow out to the sea less
than fifty meters away. Finally, raising the foundation of the house will result in its upper
storey being above the level of the wall, mitigating any nominal protection afforded by
the wall against lashing of monsoon rains and wind.
One point not taken into account by government planners, discussed in detail in
chapter 4, is that Pattanavars conceptualize the threat of flood differently than
communities living away from the coast. As Nagarajan said, it is not enough for water to
come into the town, or even into the home, to say that a flood has occurred. Rather,
standing water must remain in the village for some internally definable length of time.
For Pattanavars, it is reasonable to expect some amount of water to be in the village at
various times of year, especially during the monsoon, and villages had been built to
mitigate these effects. Homes built atop medus allowed water to quickly run downhill
away from inhabited areas or to filter through the porous sand.

In areas like

Vambakirapalaiyam these characteristics are not only removed – there are not sandy
medus aiding ground absorption upon which to build – but actively (if unintentionally)
designed against: villages are built on hard surfaces that slow natural absorption and the
seawall built to protect the urban center from storm surges actually retains water inside
parts of the town where no outflow has been provided.
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This effect is even more

pernicious in newly built “tsunami nagar,” colonies like Mahatma Phule Nagar and
Ammankoilpet built by PIA and contributing NGOs as part of tsunami rehabilitation.
Like the calculations made by Karaikal landowners approached by Mohammed
Mansoor in the early months of 2005, discussions about housing were discussions about
opportunity costs: what were the perceived benefits of relocation balanced against the
disadvantages?

The benefits already noted included lowering risk to vulnerable

population, protecting the CRZ, and using speeding rehabilitation. Arguments raised by
fishers against relocation centered on the loss of traditional land rights and home
ownership, loss of material security, inadequate provision of infrastructure in the new
colonies, and poor quality control in the new colonies, and the vocational need to be in
near proximity to shore.
The last three of these concerns also manifested as tensions between PIA and
NGO organizations. At their core these tensions defined the essence of the dominant
housing trope: what is a house and what is a habitat. If “houses” were nothing more than
empty dwellings into which recipient families could be placed without consideration for
what happened thereafter, what exactly defined “habitat”?

Whatever the ultimate

outcomes, GoPY and the larger charities most privy to these discussions – PMSSS, CEE,
SOS Save the Children, etc. – had similar ideas about what constituted proper habitats.
Internal checklists included many of the same details: in-built flood-resistance, drainage
and modern sanitation, provisions for latrines, community center-cum-emergency
shelters, primary school, public commons, clean water, and space to expand dwelling
space as families and communities grew. But the devil is always in the details.
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Surprisingly it was often the first, in-built flood resistance, which proved most
difficult to provide. We have already seen how urban development and mitigation
planning in Pondicherry town created a situation in which inundation became inevitable
given a not infrequent convergence of circumstances. But unthinking planning often had
the same result in more rural areas. Ravi Subramanian of PMSSS complained that much
of the flood resistance planned into post-tsunami rehabilitation colonies designed by
NGOs was neutralized by redesigns demanded by state planners. Speaking about the
colony at Devanampattinam, Ravi expressed confidence that the plan submitted to the
Government of Tamil Nadu by PMSSS-Caritas had been the best design achievable
within material constraints. “We were able to bring out a very good house [design] for
them,” he said. “The thing is, though:”
[W]e approached the [Tamil Nadu] administration and they
allotted the land. We had wanted the houses to go where
the backwater could not enter into these houses, but that
was made a challenge for us. So we were forced [by the
government] to build many of these houses in that area
where sea water actually enters. 466
Unfortunately, Ravi’s prediction was born out during heavy monsoon rains in 2008.
During a series of interviews conducted at the Centre for Environmental
Education (CEE) in 2008-2010, I was told how GoPY had similarly scuttled plans for
colony reconstruction. Sriji Kurup, who had been acting regional coordinator at the time
of tsunami and remained the district point person into 2009, described three different
blueprints submitted to PIA by CEE.

According to Kurup, each was summarily

dismissed or radically altered before it was approved. Despite the view that tsunami
reconstruction offered an opportunity to build back better, decision-makers seemed
466

Ravi Subramanian (PMSSS) in discussion with the author, November 2008.
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unwilling to entertain anything very radical. Kurup, however, did not condemn the
administration. His favorite discarded design, for example, was described as a geodesic
dome structure made from cost-effective, energy-efficient synthetic materials.

He

admitted that, despite the eco-friendly design, fisherfolk would have a colony built of
such homes difficult to accept. A further disadvantage was material availability. Even
though the panels required for construction would have been inexpensive to obtain during
the initial construction, once the project was completed replacement panels would have
been difficult to obtain.

Should the homes be damaged, or even require routine

maintenance, owners might simply forego repairs or jerry-rig quick fixes using locally
available materials, both processes which would degrade the quality of the dwelling over
time.
Part of the internally agreed definition of improved housing was that
pucca/reinforced cement concrete (RCC) houses must be built to replace those that had
been lost to the disaster. 467 This requirement might have been enough on its own to
thwart especially creative solutions to housing, but RCC construction had many
advantages. It was at once strong, generally disaster resistant, and widely available in
India. RCC construction also had great scope for repair, renovation and reinforcement
should engineering improve in the future.

“Anything is possible with reinforced

concrete,” said S. Kothandaraman, an engineer at Pondicherry Engineering College hired
to consult on rehabilitation projects. But even its strength and configurability could not
guarantee long-term viability if each building could not be properly maintained, one of
the principal concerns with the CEE plan. Education for routine maintenance of RCC
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constructions would be required in order to ensure the long-term durability of the
structure. Because rebuilding was taking place so close to the shoreline, Kothandaraman
was already predicting a decline in structural integrity. Structures built in the disaster
zone were subject to salt, surf and sulfites which were “the total enemy” of reinforced
cement. Problems could appear in as little as five years, he warned, and without attention
homes could become uninhabitable in as little as fifteen. His solution was to provide
training in routine maintenance to recipients. “It is our responsibility to train them how
to maintain these structures,” he continued. “Otherwise it will become a colossal waste,
and it should not be like that.” 468
But just as NGOs criticized administrators for enforcing unreasonable guidelines,
quashing innovation, or simply not paying attention to the physical features of a build
site, PIA seemed equally unenthusiastic about much of the work being completed by
NGOs. While officially welcoming, even encouraging, the contributions of external aid
agencies, 469 GoPY officials quickly soured at the part played by many smaller societies.
When asked about the criticism leveled by many NGOs that the government completed
colonies then forget about them, DRDM tahsildar M. Kandasamy responded that it was
the government left holding the bag after NGOs left the field. It was the government, he
said, that provided potable water and latrines, electricity, and roads. “NGOs only build
houses,” he concluded. “Once the buildings are completed they pack up and leave
without giving further assistance.” 470

But his assertion is not unassailable.

If, as

Kandasamy admitted, it was the government’s role to address infrastructure – sewage,
water, electricity, etc. – why was a water purification plant completed by Volontariat in
468
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Ammankoilpet in 2008 still disconnected from public water in 2010? “We need to
provide these things in a proper format,” admitted Ragesh Chandran. “And we should
not allow these things to happen.” 471
Inattention to such details resulted in colonies with a variety quality control
issues. Because the area surrounding Karaikal is flood prone, tsunami nagar built closest
to the old medu hamlets were built on raised earthen plinths in an effort to minimize
flooding. Unlike traditional medu villages that combined height of sand dunes with their
natural drainage capacity, the new colonies were built on packed earth. Roads reaching
the area were already built atop; the coastal road linking Karaikal town to the northern
fisher hamlets, for example, had been built to a height of 1.5 meters prior to tsunami.
Because these roads had been largely destroyed in 2004, during reconstruction they were
raised to two meters, 472 and the colonies reached by these roads were raised to the same
height. An exemplar of this approach is Mahatma Phule Nagar. Consisting of five
hundred houses contributed by the Government of Maharashtra and another five hundred
fifty built by Development Alternatives, MP Nagar also represents one of the largest.
The section of the colony built by the Government of Maharashtra was completed in
January 2008, but in August 2010 almost 99% of the dwellings remained vacant. But why
should this be the case?
The colony was provided with many of the amenities discussed above: sanitation,
electricity, potable water, pubic school, and a community center. Drainage was provided
by a deep, cement U-drain running along the length of the northern and eastern sides of
the colony (Illus. 5.7). The colony’s community hall-cum-emergency shelter and primary
471
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school are both visible in the top left corner of illustration 5.7 A bank of public buildings
contributed by the local NGO, Sneha, is also visible a low, grey form on the drain’s
opposite side. Each house is approximately 325 square feet with an open roof terrace
accessed by an external stair and an attached latrine. Water was made available at hand
pumps located in courtyards shared by groups of twenty houses. In fact, GoPY intended
to provide MP Nagar every modern
amenity, a list which included an
anganwadi, overhead water storage tank,
internal roads, a desalination plant,
sewage treatment plant, drainage, street
lights, primary school, play and shopping
areas, community hall, and rain-water
harvesting facilities. 473

Illus. 5.7 MP Nagar U‐drain, looking north

The only other

conveniences imagined during the planning process were primary health care centers,
libraries, and computer/media centers.
Facilities like those provided to MP Nagar made the development wish-lists of
both the GoPY and the larger charities contributing to the rehabilitation. Providing these
to displaced communities, they felt, would create “habitats” not just “houses.” Where
communities had been uprooted they had lost not just their homes but also the social
fabric of daily life. But few of these things actually made it into MP Nagar. There was a
community hall, but it was locked and empty during visits in 2008, 2009, and 2010. The
primary school remained unfinished as late as August 2010, though I was told by a
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panchayat member in Karaikal Medu that it would be completed in a few months time. 474
Houses were wired for current, but wires ran exposed along bare walls. 475

Other

complaints were leveled against the quality of construction: floors were uneven, windows
and doors were broken, safety bars were not installed, and the interiors were already
stained by water and mold (illus. 5.8-5.9).

Illus. 5.8 Kitchen interior

Illus. 5.9 Common room interior

“Why should we want to live in these homes when where we live now is dry and close to
the sea?” reasoned Ambalavan. 476
But one deficiency was especially difficult to overlook: PIA had inadvertently
created a residential flooding problem where none had existed before. In raising the
colony above ground level, PIA had inadvertently built barriers for to natural drainage.
The U-drain directed overflow south of the colony, emptying into a low-lying area
immediately south of the colony (illus. 5.10). But the newly rebuilt access road running
along the seaward edge of the colony had not been provided with sufficient drainage
channels through the bund, trapping both rain and drain water in the adjacent field. The
474
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same phenomenon occurred on the western edge of the colony (illus. 5.11), where the
raised roadbed connecting Mahatma Phule Nagar to Ammankoilpet trapped water
between the two colonies with no outlet.

Illus. 5.10 MP Nagar, southern approach

Illus. 5.11 MP Nagar, looking north

Ambalavan’s comment raises an important secondary point about how the
fishermen view the idea of habitat: their habitat is close to the sea. The colony at MP
Nagar was two kilometers from the sea, too far for the comfort of the Pattanavar
community for whom it was intended. Without someplace near the beach to secure their
gear, none of them were comfortable so far away. While the PIA had promised locking
shelters, and even provided them in several other villages, they had not yet been built in
Karaikal Medu and Kilinjil Medu. By the end of 2008 fishers would only talk of moving
after the monsoon had ended. A panchayat meeting scheduled to take place in late
January 2009 proved inconclusive. Eighteen months later the majority of the colony was
still uninhabited, and the territorial administration had in effect conceded entirely to the
demands of the fishermen by allowing them the keep their tsunami-damaged homes as
“work shelters” while at the same time handing over possession of houses in the new
colony, even though an original condition of receiving new houses had been the cession
of traditional rights over their old houses to the PIA.
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Fisher communities, in short, had a very different idea of what constituted a
proper “habitat.” Men were less concerned with latrines than they were with the safety of
their vocational tools. They were also generally less concerned with family-oriented
amenities like anganwadis, primary schools, and training opportunities than they were
with securing their livelihoods. Women, on the other hand, saw the latter as boons to the
general welfare, and in non-fisher communities where women held more influence
habitat outcomes were notably different.
Ammankoilpet, a much smaller colony built by the French NGO Volontariat, was
planned to provide many of the same infrastructure amenities originally included in the
plans for MP Nagar. Today there is a water filtration facility, a library, a shopping center,
and even a health clinic (illus. 5.12-5.15). The men in this colony displayed little interest
in these facilities, but the women were quite proud of them – even though they remained

Illus. 5.12 Ammankoilpet, Main Road

Illus. 5.13 Water filtration facility

290

Illus. 5.14 Shopping center

Illus. 5.15 Health clinic

unused as recently as 2010 – and they gave full credit to the panchayat for getting
Volontariat to provide them. “They asked for them. Our panchayat leaders told them,
‘you build them,’ so now we have them.” 477 Even the handful of women living in MP
Nagar in 2010 recognized the efforts of Ammankoilpet’s panchayat, even while critiquing
their own. “Our leader (talaivar) never asked for them,” one mother told me. I asked,
“why does Ammankoipet have these things?” “Their panchayat went to the government
and asked for them. So they have them over there, but not here.” Underscoring the value
women have placed on the health of the community, women who felt that rehabilitation
was meeting expectations were far more likely to take part in safety and awareness
offered by the government or by voluntary societies. They were also far more likely to
attend vocational training classes and take part in income replacement initiatives offered
by PMSSS and the Department of Fisheries and Fisherman Welfare. 478
In differentiating between houses and habitats, PIA hoped to provide a framework
within which rehabilitated communities could be made more self-sufficient. By doing so
it hoped to recreate those intangible structures of support that permeate long-standing
477
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communities, precisely those (social) structures disrupted by the response to the disasters
at Buffalo Creek and Darwin, Australia. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami the
GoPY’s disaster response apparatus moved refugees into relief centers established within
the ambit of daily experience. In Karaikal, officials had drilled emergency protocols and
evacuation points, but when these collapsed they adapted quickly to victims’ needs as
these needs were made apparent by the victims themselves. In both Pondicherry and
Karaikal, as refugees began to self-organize relief camps the officials quickly changed
their own expectations for how relief operations should proceed.
The next step was to shift them as quickly as possible back into permanent or
semi-permanent housing. Within thirty days GoPY managed to return 80% of tsunami
victims to their communities, 479 which was certainly not the case in Tamil Nadu. 480 But
the contrast between housing successes and failures in UTP remains quite stark. Until
empty tsunami nagar in Karaikal are permanently inhabited, the reconstruction of Kalapet
is completed, and owner-driven construction in Pondicherry town has run its course it
will be impossible to determine the relative success of housing reconstruction in the
Union Territory, because these three projects alone represent nearly 40% of post-tsunami
housing projects. Regardless of these remaining open questions, there is much to be
learned by examining the approach PIA has taken in this sector of reconstruction. Where
rehabilitation has been most successful it has paid heed not just to the desires expressed
by the recipient community but to the invisible structures all too often lost in a disaster.
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Conclusion
In the days following the Sendai earthquake and tsunami New York Times
blogger, Andrew Revkin, invoked the phrase “disaster memory” to describe mechanisms
of recall deployed by the Japanese to warn against the threat of tsunami. 480 He dated his
use of the phrase to a conversation he had had with Idaho State University anthropologist
Herbert Maschner, who had described to Revkin how villages in the Aleutian Islands
tended to be near the coast, for reasons not unlike the Pattanavars’. Revkin’s memory of
the conversation has Maschner describing how Aleuts would remain in these coastal
villages until a large quake and tsunami would strike the region, at which point
settlements would be moved back from the sea for three to four generations until,
gradually, people forgot the reason they were so far from the sea and resettle nearer the
shore. 481
Revkin’s own accounts of Japanese disaster memory show how villages
consciously placed large stones engraved with explicit warnings about settling too near to
the sea. “If an earthquake comes, beware of tsunamis,” warned one. 482 Another reads,
“High dwellings are the peace and harmony of our descendants…Do not build homes
below this point.” The fact that some of these stones are more than six hundred years old
belies Maschner’s implicit claim that societies are unable maintain such functional
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memories beyond a century. I suggest that Revkin’s category of “disaster memory” limits
our understanding of why processes of memory work as they do because, as outlined by
Maschner, it describes the process of forgetting more than it does the process of
remembering. Communities that perpetuate themselves through time via memory do not
define themselves based on what they have forgotten. Such definitions can only come
from without the community.
When I began this research in earnest I had very definite expectations for finding
certain types of memories about storm and flood, expectations shaped by Sumathi
Ramaswamy’s compelling exploration of the politics of loss in Tamil south India.

As

recently as 1996, the historian N. Subramanian wrote that he was under constant pressure
from the forces of “anti-history,” opining that a social traditional had helped to stabilize
the legend of a lost Tamil continent in the “native intellect” of the Tamils so tenaciously
that even modern education could not dislodge it. 483 Certainly at least until the end of the
1950s, primary school textbooks taught the loss of Lemuria as history (Sivasailam Pillai,
1951; Kalyanasundaram, 1959), 484 and I had expectations of finding old men who
recalled these stories, even if they did not use them to frame their own imaginaries. In
this, as is so often the case once an ethnologist enters the field, I was confounded. But
other narratives did shape what I have called the “flood imaginary.”
In order to delineate this imaginary I began by exploring its mythic dimensions,
rooted as they are in the literature of the Tamil Sangam. It is these stories that were
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identified by Ramswamy as the foundations of Tamil “labors of loss,” or those
“disciplinary practices, interpretive acts, and narrative moves that declare something as
lost, only to ‘find’ them again through modernity’s knowledge protocols.” 485 These lost
places do not exist as such in our lifeworlds but are called into being: they do no precede
labors of loss but rather are their outcome. But where Ramaswamy identified labors of
loss as a modern phenomenon, I suggested that they were in fact foundational to Pandyan
commentaries on the “lost” Tamilakam in the last half of the first millennium of the
Common Era.
From the mythic dimension to the historic, I then moved to examine cyclone and
flood response in colonial Pondicherry. Much groundwork was laid by Alfred Martineau,
an amateur historian and governor of Pondicherry for the better part of a decade in the
early 20th century, but I firmly believe that his material was worth re-examining in the
light of much more recent historiography on colonial hydrology and disaster management
– work like Rohan D’Souza’s Drowned and Damned, 486 Praveen Singh’s exploration of
the politics of flood control in northern Bihar,487 and Tirthankar Roy’s survey of disaster
response and economic recovery in British India. 488 Taken together with other work
completed in the last five years by such scholars as Bernard Barraqué, 489 Maurits
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Ertsen, 490 and Matthew Bender, 491 it is clear that there is an abiding interest in coming to
terms with how European powers strove to control water and mitigate flood.
This current work – if you’ll forgive me an intentional pun at the end of a long
and weary road – is but a ripple on the surface of these deep waters, one that was never
intended to examine in depth the history of hydro-engineering in the French colonies of
India. And while this was not the main thrust of this work, I think these pages give the
skeleton for what was to come in French-controlled Pondicherry in the last half of the
nineteenth century. Though unable to recover contemporary labors of loss in 21st century
Union Territory of Pondicherry – that is to say none of my informants drew from the
legacy of lost Tamilakam in the ways so compellingly outlined by Ramaswamy in
shaping their own flood imaginaries – I have been able to identify the very real ways in
which French colonial policies shaped later Indian policies. Even more importantly, I
think, I identified the ways in which beliefs about French mechanisms of response in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shaped how policies in the post-merger Union
Territory were understood and projected into the future. These beliefs “summoned into
existence” 492 a narrative of colonial flood response to which today’s officials point as a
paragon of effectiveness and efficiency, though this was not necessarily ever the case.
If the first two chapters of my dissertation lay the foundation for understanding
disaster management in the Union Territory at the end of the 20th century, The next three
chapters illuminated the frame. When speaking about emergency response, the constant
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refrain among officials and NGOs in the Union Territory was the need to “build back
better.” Among government officials in particular, this “better” was often framed in
relation to how they imagined the French administration to have planned against crises;
among local NGOs like PMSSS, CEE, ORSED, and other groups with international
affiliations, on the other hand, “better” was often intimately tied to notions of
development promulgated by the World Bank, the United Nation Development Program,
and similar organizations. Both of these perspectives favor a cosmopolitan, westernized
approach to development that ignore or even reject on-the-ground realities in areas
affected by their programs. Even where local NGOs were more attuned to local realities
– or the perceptions of these realities – the ultimate, sometimes unspoken, aim remained
modernization along western models.
It is interesting then that among officials in Pondicherry the exemplar for flood
mitigation – the French syndicat agricole – was built atop an existing system of canals,
dykes, and man-made ponds that in adjacent areas of Tamil Nadu date to the same period
in which Tamil commentators on Sangam texts were laboring to imagine Kumarikandam,
the lost continent of Tamilakam, into existence. Later additions in the region around
Pondicherry – Ousteri, for example – originate with the Vijayanagaras, but their
association with French water works is now a firmly entrenched “fact” in local policy
circles. The result is a tacit understanding that best practice for flood mitigation and
water control has come to Pondicherry from outside.
Anthropological research on development has shown this to be a common enough
assumption. Tania Li, Anna Tsing, and Henrietta Moore and Megan Vaughn have all
shown how colonial knowledge has shaped ideas about development in the post-colonies
297

while L’Estoile, Scott and many others have highlighted how the development imperative
itself often runs along a track parallel to the late-colonial imperative to improve colonial
subjects not through force but through conviction, what Albert Sarraut called in 1932
“our scientific and moral superiority [and] the deep humanity of our intentions.”

That

such privileging remains common is evidenced by the critique of the international aid
regimes of seeing either “development or deficiency.” 493

Organizations that define

disasters less by their local and/or material consequences than by the need for external
relief only serve to underscore this impression: developing nations like Haiti, Pakistan
and India often make the news for requiring foreign assistance in the face of natural
calamities while developed nations like Japan, Australia, and the United States make the
news for declining such offers – even when such offers are ultimately accepted (and with
much less fanfare).
On the other side of this equation stand those people and communities most
directly affected by both development and environmental risks. Existing parallel to the
various governmental strategies to mitigate flood are indigenous mechanisms for coping
with environmental hazards. People living near to natural hazards are not as purposefully
unaware of dangers as Robert Paine’s “no-risk” thesis and Maschner’s Aleutian anecdote
both seem to suggest. Where Maschner – or rather, Revkin’s own memory of him –
suggests a repeating sequence in which communities living under threat of natural hazard
suffer negative consequences, adapt, subsequently forget then reprise the entire cycle
every century or so, evidence from Japan, Simueleu, Grand Bayou, and the Coromandel
Coast all refute the notion. Where Paine argues that communities consciously construct
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risk as something over which they have little control, I have shown that Pattanavars
construct their life worlds – their flood imaginary – in ways that tightly circumscribe
what gets defined as risk. Instead of denying risk as something uncontrollable, the reality
of hazard is actively minimized by building villages in elevated soil locations that drain
quickly, by using a style of fishing craft that is easier to control in rough waters, and by
supplicating god for protection. Simultaneously, Pattanavars shape their self-images with
attributes of strength, independence, resilience, and devotion. As Veerarappan boasted in
the introduction, “I have two arms. They have always brought me back. I am a man, and
there is god.

This is all I need.”

Among the Pattanavars, hazards are not only

consciously recognized but controlled for.
What too often has been missed in well-meaning efforts to catalog and create
databases of indigenous knowledge has been the attempt to understand the social
imaginary in which such knowledges are typically deployed. It is entirely possible, for
example, to adapt and improve Pattanavar flood coping mechanisms within the context of
the development process in the Union Territory. But this is not what has been done.
Instead officials have adopted rehabilitation measures that ignore the ways in which local
fishers understand and conceptualize the risks they face on a daily basis. Before even
considering the critiques of collecting and redeploying indigenous knowledge – critiques
that problematize the very mechanics of particularization and validation that go into
making highly localized knowledge more broadly practical 494 – on-the-ground personnel
would be better served by attempts to understand the ways in which local communities
comprehend their needs (or their peril) in the first place. This is not simply asking
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recipients what they want or need.

In the case of urbanized fisher populations in

Pondicherry and semi-urban fishers in Karaikal, officials working on the rehabilitation
sought to address risks that the fishers themselves did not recognize. How are local
communities under government development to relate to issues when those issues are
defined outside of the lexicon of their own lifeworlds?
The remnants of French disaster protocol have remained as part of the colonial
legacies of Pondicherry, but we not should accept them, or even the term ‘legacy’,
unreservedly. As Nelia Dias is right to point out, the very notion of a “colonial legacy” is
problematic. 495 In the first place, the colonial past of a place is not always recognized as a
heritage. Post-colonies often resist and regularly reject colonial history as “theirs.” Even
more importantly, it validates the colonizer as the ancestor who bequeaths his legacy,
almost as an act of noblesse oblige. But whatever is passed down to the post-colonial
present had been given without condition. It is there to be used or discarded. As Jean
Deloche suggested to me, perhaps mid-twentieth century Tamils rejected the French
legacy out of hand, burning reams of documents without regard to their contents. 496
Perhaps they only forgot about them. We know this last to be true. It is strange, then,
that by the turn of the millennium the works of the colonial administration had been
elevated to something enviable through the constitution of policy legends.
In order to develop against future risk, it is first necessary to understand how
affected populations understand present hazards. It should never be enough to develop
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up to some predetermined “western” standard when this is neither economically
sustainable in the developing world nor desired by recipients. If, as Kathleen Tierney has
so forcefully argued, 497 the perception of risk is a result of organizational efforts to
present risks particular ways, that is to say that risk can essentially be understood as a
social construction, we must ask ourselves why it is that post-disaster rehabilitation and
future risk mitigation in the global south insists upon importing risk paradigms from the
global north?
As I completed my dissertation in June 2011, at the Nansen Conference on
Climate Change and Displaced People in Oslo, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees Antonio Guterres said, “we must now reconsider our approach” to
environmental refugees, what he considers to be “the defining challenge of our times.”
He urged the UNHCR to adopt language that would distinguish refugees of climate
related disasters from those seeking protection from persecution and armed conflict, and
while he suggested a “global guiding framework” to set procedural standards, he noted
that – contrary to definitions of disaster supported by CRED and other international
bodies – “primary responsibility for the protection and well-being of affected populations
will…rest with the states concerned.” 498 Elisabeth Rasmusson, Secretary General of the
Norwegian Refugee Council, echoed Guterres statement, citing a report also publicized at
the conference that 42 million people were displaced by natural disasters last year, more
than double the numbers in 2009. "This report provides us with evidence of the extent
and urgency of the problem that we cannot ignore,” she said, adding that “we must
497
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increase collaborative efforts to prevent displacement by natural disasters, and do a better
job of protecting those displaced." 499
This reconsidered approach, I contend, will only be possible with more research
of the kind I offer here: ethnographic work that balances the imaginaries of affected
populations – those social constructions that, in the words of Charles Taylor, “enable,
through the making sense of, the practices of a society” – against the narratives that state
administrations use to make sense their own genealogies of policy.
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